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Opportunities for dishonest earnings are widespread, and the economic costs of non-
compliance are well documented.1 The list includes tax evasion, insurance and account-
ing fraud, service tampering, fare dodging or lies in personal communication. As for
many decisions in economic life, people face a trade-off when encountering a misre-
porting opportunity. The monetary gain of a dishonest activity may be tempting, but
it may come at serious consequences such as severe fines. However, even in absence of
(monetary) punishment, people refrain from lying (e.g. Abeler et al. 2019 for a survey).
Parents raise their children to be honest (Houser et al. 2016), and the bible highlights
the importance of truthfulness for a society (Ephesians 4:25). Hence, there seem to be
also non-monetary costs that prevent people from lying.
The Economic literature has investigated the trade-offbetween honest and dishonest
reporting, and controlled laboratory experiments have turned out as a particularly
useful tool. In the typical setup, a participant takes part in a random lottery. Each
outcome of the lottery corresponds to a specific payoff. Importantly, the participant
claims the payoff herself, offering a possibility for dishonest earnings by misreporting
on the lottery outcome. Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) introduce this task as a
die roll, and Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) as a binary coin flip. Other paradigms study
dishonesty by misreporting on the performance in a real effort task (Mazar et al. 2008)
or by sending self-serving deceptive messages to fellow participants (Gneezy 2005). Also
closely related are tax compliance experiments (for early contributions see Friedland et
1See, for example, Slemrod (2007).
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al. 1978, and Spicer and Thomas 1982), in which subjects evade a deduction in order
to achieve higher earnings.
Subsequent research has built on these paradigms and has identified a variety of cru-
cial behavioral aspects and determinants for dishonesty reporting and non-compliance.
Contributions include, among others, positive and negative externalities of lying (e.g.
Erat and Gneezy 2012), the role of emotions (e.g. Coricelli et al. 2010), the relationship
of creativity and dishonesty (Gino and Ariely 2012), investigations into the structure of
lying costs (e.g. Lundquist et al. 2009, Cappelen et al. 2013, Gneezy et al. 2018, Abeler
2019), treatment by peer subjects (Houser et al. 2012), dishonesty under scrutiny (van
de Ven and Villeval 2015), the time delay in the reward for dishonest behavior (Ruffl e
and Tobol 2014), a subject’s perception by others (Konrad et al. 2014), the character-
istics of audit regimes to uncover lies (e.g. Beck et al. 1991, Alm et al. 1992, Alm et al.
1993), and socio-economic characteristics such as gender and religiosity (e.g. Friesen
and Gangadharan 2012, Shalvi and Leiser 2013).2
Nevertheless, puzzles on dishonest reporting behavior remain. This dissertation builds
on the previous literature and investigates into four of these puzzles using controlled
laboratory experiments. In Chapter 1, we ask if there are heuristics for (un-)truthful
reporting and address the multi-dimensionality of dishonest decision-making. Chapter
2 focuses on the consequences of self-selection into honest and dishonest earning op-
portunities. This also allows for an estimation of the distribution of behavioral lying
costs. Chapter 3 highlights the role of ignorance of rules and regulations for dishonest
reporting choices. Finally, chapter 4 investigates into the compliance decision of teams
and disentangles the decision-making dimension from the liability dimension.
The trade-off on costs and benefits of a dishonest report may be a complex task.
Finding the optimal solution for a specific reporting situation therefore requires cog-
nitive resources and suffi cient contemplation time (e.g. Mead et al. 2009, Gino et al.
2011, Shalvi 2012, and van’t Veer et al. 2014). Both are not always available, and peo-
ple have to rely on heuristics instead (cf. Kahneman 2011). Chapter 1 investigates into
the heuristics for reporting decisions. To this end, we run a laboratory experiment and
exogenously vary the available reflection time. The control group has enough contem-
plation time to consider the reporting decision carefully, while the treatment group is
caught by surprise and needs to come up with a decision in a short time frame. Our
2For a more thorough account of the literature, we refer to the extensive surveys by Abeler et al. (2019), Alm (2019)
and Gerlach et al. (2019).
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results indicate that subjects are significantly less prone to make a dishonest report
under time pressure. Dishonest subjects under time pressure also need more response
time than their honest counterparts. These findings may be good news as most subjects
have a heuristic of being honest.
We also discuss the multi-dimensionality of dishonest decision-making in chapter 1.
A precondition for a deliberate dishonest report is the awareness of the misreporting
opportunity. Only then, people can trade off the costs and benefits of the reporting
decision. Further steps may include formulating a credible lie or keeping track of lies
in the course of actions. We take a deeper look at the first two steps of the deceptive
process. The recognition of the misreporting opportunity takes considerable time, and
many subjects fail to do so under time pressure. In contrast, we find no evidence for
further differences in the reporting behavior when accounting for this precondition of
making a dishonest report. Hence, the lack of suffi cient contemplation time may not
affect the conscious trade-off on whether to misreport or to tell the truth.
A crucial question for the prevalence of dishonest behavior is whether people deliber-
ately self-select into misreporting opportunities. Chapter 2 addresses the self-selection
of honest and dishonest people. The career choice of a person might be a prominent
example. While the banking industry has the reputation of attracting notorious liars
(Cohn et al. 2014), nuns seem eager to be perceived honest (Utikal and Fischbacher
2013). Dishonest subjects are also more likely to self-select into the corrupt public sec-
tor in India (Banerjee et al. 2015, and Hanna and Wang 2017). In chapter 2, we ask
if subjects self-select into honest and dishonest earning opportunities based on their
individual behavioral lying costs. By offering subjects a choice between two income-
generating lotteries in absence and in presence of a misreporting opportunity, we elicit
the willingness to pay (WTP) for earning money in an honest fashion.
The good news is that most people are willing to spend some resources to earn their
money in an honest fashion. However, a substantial minority of subjects takes advantage
of the misreporting opportunity and drastically reduces their WTP as compared to the
situation without such an opportunity. These subjects also have a large propensity of
making a dishonest report. In contrast, their counterparts with a large WTP tend to
be honest. Hence, individuals anticipate their behavioral lying costs, and self-select and
report accordingly. The estimation of individual lying costs reveals that 30 percent of
subjects have very small lying costs, while 50 percent of subjects seem to abstain from
lying altogether. The remaining 20 percent prefers honesty to dishonesty but not at
the costs of forgoing a significant monetary gain. This estimation directly connects to
3
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survey evidence that misreporting is mostly unresponsive to the incentive size for lying
(Abeler 2019).
In Chapter 3, we manipulate the setup of the reporting situation itself. Subjects
need to make a report in a state of ignorance on whether they are telling the truth
or not. This mimics reporting decisions with a lack of information, for example when
people are unsure if they are eligible to a deduction in their tax declaration or not.
This may leave people with only two options. They may abstain from a self-serving
report and forgo justified earnings. Or they may make the self-serving report at the risk
of being a liar. We investigate such a reporting situation in a laboratory experiment.
The outcome of a binary lottery qualifies either for a high payoff or for a low payoff.
Subsequently, subjects claim one of the two payoffs. The control group knows which
outcome is eligible to which payoff, while the treatment group lacks this knowledge.
Ignorance on the eligibility to payoffs leads to a larger propensity of claiming the
high payoff, which almost doubles the fraction of unjustified claims as compared to
the control group. Hence, subjects seem to suffer more from the behavioral costs of a
deliberate lie than from a (potentially) dishonest report under ignorance. Nevertheless,
some subjects feel obliged to claim only the low outcome. An increase in the ex-ante
probability of being eligible to the high payoff crowds this behavior almost completely
out, suggesting that people only need to be suffi ciently certain to make the self-serving
report. An explanation for the reporting behavior under ignorance might be the highly
controversial social norms. While subjects consider a deliberate lie dishonest, the claim
of the high payoff under ignorance ranges somewhere between honesty and dishonesty.
Hence, subjects may fear negative consequences to their self- and social image less
when making their reporting decision under ignorance.
Inspired by corporate scandals such as the 2015 Volkswagen emission scandal, chapter
4 discusses dishonest decision-making of teams. There is consensus in the deception
literature that teams are more dishonest (Weisel and Shalvi 2015), for example due to
the erosion of social norms by dishonest communication (Kocher et al. 2018) or the
deferral of one’s own responsibility (Conrads et al. 2013). We build on these insights
but focus on the more complex compliance problem, which deviates from deception
problems in one important aspect. A dishonest report may lead to monetary sanctions.
This raises the question to not only who makes the compliance decision but also who
is economically liable for a fraudulent report. Moreover, the focus may shift from the
behavioral lying costs to the monetary fines. Our laboratory experiment investigates
the team compliance decision along two dimensions. First, we vary whether individuals
4
Introduction
decide alone or in a team. Second, we either hold subjects individually liable or allow
for sharing the costs and benefits of non-compliance between team members.
We confirm previous findings that teams are more dishonest than individuals are. The
economic liability is the main driving force, as allowing for shared liability leads to a
significant increase in dishonest reports. Team decision-making per se contributes little
to the increase in non-compliance. Further results indicate behavioral spillovers within
teams. Team members tend to convince each other of a specific reporting strategy,
which leads to a positive correlation of individual reports. Finally, the risk dimension
of the audit is the most important motivation for the compliance problem. In contrast
to deception problems, the concept of being honest has less weight in the compliance
decision. Hence, an audit might be suited to restore honesty in teams as long as each





Deception under Time Pressure —
Conscious Decision or a Problem of Awareness?
This chapter is based of joint work with Tim Lohse and Kai A. Konrad.1
1.1 Introduction
Misreporting opportunities are common in everyday life. Some opportunities allow for
a reflective decision while others come as a surprise and require an intuitive response.
On the one hand, think of the problem of declaring taxable income or declaring the size
of the monetary loss to an insurance company after a burglary. These problems leave
plenty of time for consideration. On the other hand, picture a spontaneous decision to
accept an excessive change (Azar et al. 2013) or a sudden control by customs at the
airport when leaving the baggage claim area (Konrad et al. 2017). Here, time is always
a crucial factor since dishonest activities involve coping with a trade-off between the
associated costs and benefits. Benefits of a dishonest report are oftentimes immediate
material or reputational gains. Costs may have not only a monetary dimension (such
as fines) but also a psychological dimension due to violations of internal norms causing
a bad conscience that dampens the utility of the material gain.2 Thus, finding the
1The chapter is based on the article ‘Deception under time pressure: Conscious decision or a problem of awareness?,’
published 2018 in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiztion, Volume 146, p. 31—42. For the dissertation, this
chapter has been editorially adapted. These changes are the sole responsibility of the author of this dissertation.
2The literature on deception has identified a variety of crucial behavioral aspects such as guilt aversion (Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006), an aversion to lying (Lundquist et al. 2009, Cappelen et al. 2013), the behavioral differences
depending on the type of lie (Erat and Gneezy 2012), the positive relationship between creativity and dishonesty (Gino
and Ariely 2012), the role of emotions (Coricelli et al. 2010) or a subject’s perception by others (Konrad et al. 2014).
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optimal solution to this trade-off is a complex and potentially cognitively demanding
task. Subjects might fail at this task under cognitive constraints such as time pressure.
The issue is especially tricky if the misreporting decision is preceded by a cognition
process that takes time in order to become aware of the misreporting opportunity.
In fact, awareness of the misreporting opportunity is a precondition for the conscious
decision to misreport and is hence an essential step in the misreporting process. The
longer this cognition process takes, the less time there is to balance the costs and
benefits of the actual report.
In this chapter, we use an innovative setting to shed light on this topic. We study a
laboratory experiment of self-serving deceptive behavior which combines two distinct
levels of reflection time with a cognition process about the opportunity to misreport.
We ask the following research questions: first, what impact does time pressure have
on misreporting behavior compared to a decision made with suffi cient reflection time?
Second, how is this effect of time pressure on misreporting mediated? Given the fact
that there are two crucial components of dishonest reporting —namely, the process
of gaining awareness of the misreporting opportunity and the conscious decision to
misreport —which of these two is more important?
Our results are as follows. Comparing reporting behavior under time pressure with
behavior with suffi cient reflection time shows that time pressure has a large impact on
the share of misreports: the number of dishonest reports significantly decreases by more
than one third. Moreover, analyzing the timing of reports made under time pressure
reveals that dishonest reports, on average, require 10 percent more time than honest
reports. More specifically, the distribution of dishonest reports over time first-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of honest reports over time. For the decom-
position of the misreporting process, our results suggest that the differences between
the decisions made under time pressure and the ones with extensive reflection time can
be attributed to different levels of subjects’awareness of the misreporting opportunity.
Restricting the analysis to those subjects who are aware of the misreporting oppor-
tunity and therefore make a conscious decision to misreport reveals that the share of
dishonest reports is nearly the same under time pressure and with suffi cient reflection
time. This finding highlights the importance of the cognition process that leads to
awareness, a component that has received only limited attention in the literature so
far.
We contribute, on the one hand, to the experimental literature on dishonest decision-
making under time constraints and, on the other hand, to the literature on the substeps
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of deception. The crucial novelty of our approach is that the reporting task comes
as a perfect surprise. Due to this setting, subjects are unaware of the misreporting
opportunity and cannot form strategies beforehand. Our rigorous implementation of
the time dimension ensures that all steps involved with a deceptive strategy, i.e., the
cognition process to become aware of the cheating opportunity and the balancing of
the costs and benefits of a dishonest report, have to be carried out within a (rather
short) time frame. Thus, we are able to study the true impact of time pressure on
(mis)reporting behavior and we can isolate the impact of awareness.
The impact of time constraints on decision-making has only recently found itself
in the spotlight of economic research.3 By varying the available reflection time exoge-
nously, one can identify behavior as either an intuitive response or as the result of a
reflective process. Shalvi et al. (2012) use a modified version of the dice rolling experi-
ment (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) to address the effect of an exogenous intro-
duction of time pressure on cheating. They find clear evidence of misreporting under
time pressure, but less clear-cut evidence with unconstrained reflection time. Although
there is a controversy as to whether participants were able to make up their mind on
the decision prior to the actual report (Foerster et al. 2013 and Shalvi et al. 2013), the
main insight provided by Shalvi et al. is that cheating is the automatic response. Gunia
et al. (2012) also manipulate the time dimension by introducing an enforced contem-
plation period into a sender-receiver framework with honest and dishonest messages
in the style of Gneezy (2005). Their results point in the same direction as Shalvi et
al. (2012) since enforced reflection time leads to less dishonest behavior. However, the
comparability of both settings is limited due to potential harm to other subjects and
strategic truth-telling (Sutter 2009). In contrast, Greene and Paxton (2009) inform us
that cheating takes more time and, hence, is not the intuitive choice. Most recently,
based on an experiment on MTurk, Capraro (2017) comes to the same conclusion and
observes more honest behavior under time pressure. As the payoff schemes and the
reporting task were explained before subjects had to take an honest or dishonest deci-
sion, they were aware of the cheating opportunity and could form conditional strategies
in advance. Since in our setting the misreporting opportunity comes as a surprise, we
3Among others, studies test the effect of time pressure on the quality of decision-making and on risky decisions
(Kocher and Sutter 2006, Kocher et al. 2013) or the relationship between response time and cooperation in social
dilemmas (e.g., Rand et al. 2012, Rand et al. 2014, Rand et al. 2016, Krajbich et al. 2015 or Stromland et al. 2016).
For an overview see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2018). From a broader perspective, we contribute to the literature on
the role of cognitive constraints (e.g., Mead et al. 2009, Gino et al. 2011, and van’t Veer et al. 2014) and deliberation
(Zhong 2011) on dishonest decision-making, which is surveyed by Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi (2015).
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exclude this possibility and ensure that subjects have to make the actual decision as
to whether or not to misreport within the short time frame.
A second literature strand takes account of the multi-dimensionality of dishonest
decision-making, in particular the cognitive process that leads to awareness of the
misreporting opportunity, the actual decision to misreport, and the construction of
a credible dishonest report. While all decision steps potentially require cognitive re-
sources, if subjects are not aware of the misreporting opportunity, then the subsequent
decision steps become trivial. They may automatically lead to a truthful report. Gino
et al. (2009) vary the saliency of the cheating option and find a decrease in cheating
rates when a (fake) participant explicitly asks for permission to cheat in the presence
of other subjects. In contrast, Fosgaard et al. (2013) use a more subtle procedure and
show that facilitated understanding increases the share of dishonest reports by women.
Walczyk et al. (2003) focus on the second and third step and find that the construc-
tion of a lie increases the response time of subjects. Our setting not only allows us to
distinguish between the cognition process and the conscious decision to misreport, but
also enables us to make inferences on the cognitive resources required for each step.
Hence, we are able to identify the process of gaining awareness of the misreporting
opportunity as a crucial determinant for dishonest decision-making.
1.2 The Experiment
1.2.1 Design
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). Sessions took place at the econlab in Munich from December 2015 to April 2016.
The pool of participants consisted predominantly of local Munich university students
who were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). A total number of 411 subjects
(average age 22.9; average payoff 13.8 EUR; 48 percent female participants) from var-
ious fields participated in the experiment. On average, a session lasted for 30 minutes
and had 11 participants. The experiment was a one-shot game with two treatments,
namely the ‘Contemplation Treatment’and the ‘Time Pressure Treatment.’We applied
a between-subjects design. Throughout the experiment, care was taken that partici-
pants remained anonymous and did not exchange views or learned of other subjects’
monetary payoffs neither during the experiment nor at the end of the experiment when
payments were made.
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Each participant was seated in a private cubicle at a computer. Some introductory
screens provided the general instructions. An initial mock decision that was unrelated
to the actual task in the experiment made them familiar with the technical choice
of alternatives. Then, participants drew an individual income from a computerized
private lottery shown as a binary wheel of fortune. Participants had an 80 percent
chance of drawing a low income (400 Experimental Currency Units [ECU] = 4 EUR)
and a 20 percent chance of drawing a high income (1000 ECU = 10 EUR). Probabilities
were common knowledge. In both treatments the participants’task was to report their
income simply by clicking either a button with 400 ECU or with 1000 ECU. There was
no default report, i.e. not choosing one or the other option resulted in a payoff of zero
and led to an exclusion from the analysis. As their (final) income report was the only
determinant of their payoff, participants with a low income had a monetary incentive
to misreport their lottery result.
Since we focused on misreporting on the individual level, the computer system reg-
istered both the true incomes from the lottery and the actual reports. Participants
were informed that no individual screen was observable to the laboratory staff during
the experiment, but they might have been aware that individual misreporting was de-
tectable in the data. However, as recent literature has also found significant cheating
in observable settings comparable to ours (Gneezy et al. 2018, and Kocher et al. 2018),
this kind of observability should have no major influence on our results.4 Moreover,
we have chosen a procedure that physically separated the learning of the individual
income from the actual reporting process.5
The two treatments, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, differ with respect to the available
time to make the individual reporting decision after getting to know the outcome from
the lottery.6 In the Contemplation Treatment (CT) subjects read that they now had a
fixed 60-second time period to think about the reporting decision and that only their
4 In a comparison of observable and unobservable settings, Gneezy et al. (2018) find differences for certain aspects
of cheating behavior, such as less partial and less absolute cheating in observable settings. Most importantly for our
setting, the likelihood of reporting the maximum outcome is nevertheless broadly comparable. As our analysis focuses
on treatment differences and partial cheating is ruled out by the binary design, the remaining differences are only of
secondary importance in our case.
5While the main experiment including the reporting task was displayed on the main (center) monitor, the income-
generating lottery took place on a separate notebook monitor (on the right).
6The research project originally involved a second treatment dimension. The purpose of this dimension was to evaluate
the effect of social cues on the stimulation of certain heuristics. Specifically, we displayed a picture of a treetop (baseline)
and a picture of human eyes (treatment) in the upper part of the monitor. Our hypothesis was that human eyes create
a diffuse feeling of being observed, thereby shifting attention to (potential) negative consequences of cheating, such as
a loss of reputation. However, this is not the case and we do not find a significant treatment effect along this dimension
(χ2-Test: p = 0.42). Hence, we pooled the respective data and focus entirely on the first dimension, namely the existence
of time pressure.
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FIGURE 1.1: Structure of the Experiment
report determined their payoff. Only after the 60 seconds had elapsed, participants
were asked to make their report. Hence, participants had suffi cient reflection time for
their decision. We refer to this report as the ‘contemplation report.’In the Time Pres-
sure Treatment (TPT), an initial income report had to be made under time pressure:
participants read that they now had only eight seconds to report their income and that
their report determined their payoff. This procedure made the reflection time of eight
seconds a binding time constraint.7 We refer to this report as the ‘time pressure report.’
Failure to give a report on their income led to a payoff of zero and to an exclusion from
the analysis. Unknown to participants, the time pressure period in TPT was followed
by an enforced revision period (displayed in gray in Figure 1.1): participants read that
there was a break of 60 seconds until the experiment continued and that they could
revise their time pressure report after the break. After the 60 seconds had elapsed,
participants made a second report by clicking on one of the two income buttons, which
determined their final payoff. We refer to this report as the ‘final report.’Since in-
formational circumstances in this second decision are different, we do not include this
report in our main analysis. However, we briefly discuss the results in section 1.3.5.
It is important to notice that before reaching the contemplation period in CT or
the time pressure period in TPT, respectively, participants knew neither the structure
of the experiment in general nor that they would be asked to state the outcome of
7To determine an appropriate time threshold that would cause a relevant amount of time pressure, we ran pre-tests
and a pilot. When restricting the available decision time to just six seconds it turned out that 2/3 of all participants
failed to report in time. When the time threshold was set to 10 seconds it was not binding for anyone. Without further
pre-tests or pilots we chose to allow for eight seconds in the actual experiment.
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their private lottery. Hence, they were not able to anticipate the reporting problem.
They could not make up their mind in advance on whether they wanted to misreport
or state their income truthfully. In our subsequent analysis we will compare subjects’
declaration behavior without time pressure in CT to behavior under time pressure in
TPT. Focusing on the contemplation report versus the time pressure report in CT
and TPT, respectively, will allow us to disentangle two effects: on the one hand, the
cognition process of becoming aware of the possibility to misreport, and on the other
hand, the conscious deception decision which involves trading off the costs and benefits
of misreporting.
Right after the completion of the main experiment, we conducted a questionnaire
concerning the experimental setting. One of the questions we asked was whether sub-
jects were aware of the misreporting opportunity for the respective report. The answer
to this question was used as a measure of awareness. In order to avoid any form of
moral sentencing or other distorting influences on subjects’responses, we used a neu-
tral framing for this question. A translation of the exact wording was the following:
“Were you aware of the fact that you were able to influence your payoff since you were
completely free to choose the answer that served you best?”The timing of this question
right after the completion of the main experiment ensured that subjects still had the
precise circumstances of reporting in mind but kept the report unaffected.8
The questionnaire was followed by several post-tests such as the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick 2005) to identify impulsive and reflective subjects. In the post-test
section, subjects were able to earn an additional 300 ECU = 3 Euro. Each session
concluded with two additional questionnaires, namely the Short Dark Triad (Jones
and Paulhus 2014) and socio-economic questions. The purpose of the Short Dark Triad
was to measure anti-social characteristics, specifically Machiavellianism, narcissism,
and psychopathy. Most importantly for our setting were Machiavellian traits (9 items)
such as manipulativeness or calculating, immoral behavior.
8As it is clear from the description above, our indicator of the awareness of the misreporting opportunity was not
exogenously varied. Therefore, we applied a careful assessment of the reliability of responses (for a detailed discussion,
please refer to section 1.3.3).
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1.2.2 The Multi-Dimensionality of Dishonest Decision-Making
Misreporting is a complex and cognitively demanding task that consists of several
steps and dimensions. The first and essential step is the cognition of the misreporting
opportunity, which depends both on its apparentness and the possibility of a prior
anticipation. For example, it is almost common knowledge that the filing of the income
tax declaration may offer opportunities for misreporting. However, finding potential
loopholes or possibilities to hide one’s income is much more diffi cult. Hence, the op-
portunity to evade taxes can be anticipated, but is in most circumstances not very
evident. In contrast, people sometimes face unexpected questions in their personal or
professional life, such as whether a forgotten or overdue task has already been com-
pleted. Here, the misreporting opportunity is apparent. But the lack of anticipation
might lead to its ignorance. In turn, subjects might (automatically) give an honest
report. The latter case also matches the situation of subjects in our experiment, since
the opportunity is easy to understand but comes as a surprise in TPT.
The subsequent step of the misreporting process is a careful evaluation of costs and
benefits and the conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. While the benefit
of a dishonest report is an immediate material gain in our setting, there are several
potential costs of misreporting. These may include, among others, fear of an audit,
an uncomfortable situation when receiving the payoff from the laboratory staff or the
violation of internal norms. Since there are no audits and we ensure complete confi-
dentiality of subjects’actions, the monetary incentive of misreporting should dominate
countervailing incentives for the majority of subjects. But the trade-off leading to this
insight potentially requires suffi cient reflection time, which is not available under time
pressure. Here, subjects are required to make an unreflected decision and have to rely
on heuristics. The specific heuristic applied then might depend on the cost or benefit
that comes to a subject’s mind first. In contrast to the reflective decision, subjects that
initially relate misreporting to the potential costs might try to avoid negative conse-
quences and therefore give an honest report under time pressure. This is all the more
true since honesty can also be a successful heuristic beyond the lab.
The theoretical underpinning for the dynamics of misreporting in our setting is cap-
tured best by Kahneman’s (2011) dual framework of decision-making. “System 1” is
responsible for quick, intuitive decision-making and requires (almost) no cognitive ef-
fort. In contrast, “System 2” choices show an in-depth evaluation of problems and
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lead to reflective decisions.9 Typically, decisions made under time pressure are "Sys-
tem 1" decisions and are based on heuristics. In principle, this heuristic could be to
misreport or it could be to tell the truth. However, a subject can misreport only if the
subject is aware of this option. The crucial contribution of our analysis is to separate
the impact of time pressure on recognition of the misreporting opportunity from the
impact of time pressure on the reporting choice for those subjects who recognized the
misreporting opportunity.
Both steps might require reflection time, and the time needed for each step should
depend on the respective situation or the framework. In our setting, the misreporting
opportunity cannot be anticipated by subjects. To gain awareness of the misreporting
opportunity, subjects need to overcome their initial surprise of being in a reporting
situation. Subjects are informed that their payoff is determined solely by their report.
The misreporting opportunity should be suffi ciently apparent to be recognized by a
large share of subjects. Further, the reporting task makes truthful reporting and mis-
reporting technically equally simple. Reporting is carried out by clicking one of two
buttons. We expect that this makes the technical reporting task very fast and easy
to perform, irrespective of the choice of report. As argued above, the choice of report
is potentially more time consuming, as subjects must weigh the benefits against the
various costs of misreporting.
1.3 Experimental Results
1.3.1 Overall Misreporting by Treatments
The analysis focuses on subjects that draw a low income and make their report within
the time limit. A total of 32 subjects in TPT were not able to make a report within
eight seconds, which indicates that time pressure was suffi ciently high.10 This leaves
us with 305 subjects in total, of which 117 subjects are in CT and 188 subjects are in
TPT.
We start our analysis with overall misreporting behavior, addressing the question of
whether time pressure decreases the share of dishonest reports. Figure 1.2 displays the
fraction of subjects that misreport a high income based on their low true income in CT
9Other explanations for this choice environment involve e.g. interpretations of the drift diffusion model (for a discus-
sion, see Clithero 2018) or of the social heuristics hypothesis (Rand et al. 2014).
10We find no major differences in the characteristics of the group of non-responders and the group of those that
responded on time. In particular, the level of awareness of the misreporting opportunity is comparable in both groups.
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Note:. Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM.
Bracket indicates significant treatment difference, ∗∗p<0.05.
FIGURE 1.2: Misreporting by Treatment
and TPT. About 35 percent untruthfully report a high income with suffi cient reflection
time while only 23 percent dishonestly report a high income under time pressure. This
difference is significant (χ2-Test: p = 0.02) and shows that time pressure decreases the
share of dishonest reports by more than one third.11
This estimate is confirmed by a multivariate analysis of misreporting (Table 1.1).
For ease of interpretation, we report the results of a linear probability regression. The
dependent variable is the share of dishonest reports and the reference group is CT for
all specifications. The coeffi cient on the time pressure dummy is significant in both base
specifications (with/without socio-economic control variables, columns (1) and (2))12
and decreases the share of dishonest reports by 12 to 14 percentage points. This result
contrasts with previous results of the literature.
11A preliminary conclusion is that honest reporting is the intuitive choice for a large share of subjects. An alternative
explanation for behavior under time pressure might be that subjects choose one of the reports randomly, such that honest
and dishonest reports occur with a probability of 0.5, respectively. A binomial test, however, rejects this hypothesis,
i.e., the observed probability of misreporting significantly deviates from the expected probability of 0.5 in case of
randomization (p < 0.01).
12Except for the number of siblings, none of the socio-economic control variables have a significant effect on misre-
porting.
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Time Pressure -0.122** -0.138** -0.143*** -0.142***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)




Socio-Economic Controls NO YES YES YES
Constant 0.350*** 0.082 0.014 -0.260
(0.044) (0.228) (0.239) (0.278)
Observations 305 305 305 305
R2 0.018 0.039 0.044 0.051
Notes: The table presents results of a linear probability regression with dishonest
reporting as dependent variable (binary variable). Time Pressure is a dummy
variable that is 1 for TPT and 0 for CT. Cognitive Reflection Test is the number
of questions solved (0 to 3) and Machiavellianism is the score in the respective
section of the Dark Triad (9 to 45). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
(1)VARIABLES (2) (3) (4)
TABLE 1.1: Multivariate Analysis of Misreporting
In an extended specification (column (3)), we include the performance in the Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) as an indicator of reflective thinking, which
might be related to the ability to misreport. So far, there is mixed evidence on the
relationship between reflective thinking and dishonest behavior (Fosgaard et al. 2013
and Ruffl e and Tobol 2017). For overall misreporting, we find no significant effect of
reflective thinking on misreporting. Also, subjects with Machiavellian traits (higher
scores in the Machiavellianism section of the Short Dark Triad (Jones and Paulhus
2014)) have a significantly higher probability of misreporting (column (4)). This fits
well with the definition of Machiavellianists as individuals who deceive for material
gain, but only when potential costs are limited and it is thus beneficial to do so. We
summarize our main finding as follows:
Result 1.1 Time pressure decreases the share of dishonest reports by more than one
third.
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1.3.2 Response Time in the Time Pressure Treatment
FIGURE 1.3: Cumulative Distribution of the Required Response Time in TPT
To shed further light on the question of whether honesty is the intuitive response,
we analyze the required time of subjects during the Time Pressure Period of TPT, i.e.,
reporting behavior during the eight-second time frame. If misreporting indeed takes
more time due to the cognition process and the balancing of costs and benefits, we
should observe that honest subjects need less time than dishonest subjects.13 Figure
1.3 plots the cumulative distribution of the response time of honest and dishonest
subjects. A first inspection reveals that the distribution of response time for dishonest
subjects first-order statistically dominates the distribution for honest subjects, i.e., it
takes longer to make an untruthful report. On average, dishonest subjects (5.88 secs)
need 10 percent more time than honest subjects (5.36 secs).
We conduct a number of non-parametric tests to assess the significance of these find-
ings (Table 1.2). Since we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of the homogeneity
of variances (Levene’s test, Brown-Forsythe test), we apply the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test and find that the difference between both groups is significant: a random honest
subject is 61 percent more likely to need less time than a random dishonest subject.
13As Krajbich et al. (2015) point out, differences in reaction times might be due to option discriminability and
not necessarily due to the existence of a dual process. Hence, our findings from this section should be interpreted as
supporting evidence for the findings from section 1.3.1.
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Test Test Statistic p-value
Homogeneity of Variances:
  Levene's Test 1.912 0.168
  Brown-Forsythe Test 1.654 0.200
Equality of Distribution:
  Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test 2.209 0.027
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 0.187 0.098
TABLE 1.2: Test-Statistics for Response Time under Time Pressure
Finally, the marginal significance of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the equality of
distributions (one-sided version) completes the picture. Hence, the analysis of required
response time in the TPT further supports that honesty is the intuitive response for
the majority of subjects. Our main finding from this section is:
Result 1.2 Dishonest subjects need 10 percent more time than honest subjects in the
Time Pressure Treatment.
1.3.3 Awareness of the Misreporting Opportunity
Results 1.1 and 1.2 suggest that misreporting is not the intuitive choice but rather
requires suffi cient reflection time. In the following two subsections, we decompose the
process of misreporting into the cognition of the misreporting opportunity and the
actual reporting decision of those subjects who are aware of the opportunity to misre-
port. Both steps are crucial for misreporting, but might be affected differently by time
pressure. We start with the analysis of time pressure on the cognition process of the
misreporting opportunity (awareness) and continue with the second step, the conscious
decision to misreport or to tell the truth.14
Figure 1.4 displays the awareness of the misreporting opportunity in CT and TPT,
respectively. While nearly two-thirds of subjects are aware of the misreporting oppor-
tunity in CT, only 40 percent report being aware of it in TPT. This difference is highly
significant (χ2-Test: p < 0.01) and suggests that time pressure reduces awareness of the
14Despite the two-step structure a joint regression analysis is not necessary: in all the probit models with a sample
selection (Heckman probit) or recursive bivariate probit models that we analyzed, tests show that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the two steps are in fact independent and should thus be estimated independently from each other.
Therefore, we first report a regression analysis of the awareness process (this subsection) and then the misreporting
behavior conditional on awareness (next subsection).
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Note: Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM.
Bracket indicates significant treatment difference, *** p<0.01.
FIGURE 1.4: Awareness of the Misreporting Opportunity by Treatment
misreporting opportunity by 39 percent (or 25 percentage points). This estimate is con-
firmed by a regression analysis with awareness as the dependent variable (Table 1.3).
In both base specifications (columns (1) and (2)), time pressure significantly reduces
the level of awareness. Hence, subjects need considerable reflection time to overcome
their surprise of the reporting situation and to identify the misreporting opportunity.
This result highlights the importance of this first step of misreporting.
To ensure the validity of this result, we test for inconsistencies in the answers to the
awareness question with respect to several dimensions. First of all, we focus on the group
of subjects with a high income. These subjects have no incentive to misreport either on
their true high income or on the question concerning the awareness of the misreporting
opportunity. Hence, this group is perfectly suited to corroborate our findings above.
While 61 percent are aware of the misreporting opportunity in CT in this group, only
43 percent report being aware in TPT. This clearly confirms our previous results.
Secondly, awareness of the misreporting opportunity is a precondition for making a
dishonest report. Therefore, a high percentage of dishonest subjects should state being
aware for the respective report. This prediction is in line with the data: while 86 percent
of dishonest subjects stated that they were aware in TPT, 88 percent of dishonest
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Time Pressure -0.251*** -0.259*** -0.275*** -0.260***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)




Socio-Economic Controls NO YES YES YES
Constant 0.650*** 0.410* 0.214 0.387
(0.044) (0.247) (0.254) (0.315)
Observations 305 305 305 305
R2 0.059 0.073 0.104 0.073
Notes: The table presents results of a linear probability regression with self-reported
awareness of the misreporting opportunity as dependent variable (binary variable). Time
Pressure is a dummy variable that is 1 for TPT and 0 for CT. Cognitive Reflection Test
is the number of questions solved (0 to 3) and Machiavellianism is the score in the
respective section of the Dark Triad (9 to 45). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, * p<0.1.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
TABLE 1.3: Multivariate Analysis of Awareness of the Misreporting Opportunity
subjects were aware in CT. Finally, there are also no inconsistencies with respect to
reporting behavior for the time pressure report and for the final report and answers to
the awareness questions within TPT (for a detailed discussion, see section 1.3.5).
The decomposition of the decision process into two steps reveals that reflective think-
ing is related to a better ability to recognize the misreporting opportunity. The highly
significant coeffi cient of the performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test in our al-
ternative specification (column (3)) suggests that the likelihood of gaining awareness
is 25 percentage points higher for a subject that answers all three questions correctly
(reflective thinkers) compared to a subject that answers none of the questions correctly
(impulsive thinkers). Machiavellian traits have no significant influence on the awareness
of the misreporting opportunity (column (4)). In combination, both findings suggest
that awareness is related to reflective thinking and independent of the moral attitude
as captured by the Machiavellian section of the Dark Triad. We summarize our main
findings concerning awareness as follows:
Result 1.3 Subjects need reflection time to gain awareness of the misreporting op-
portunity. Time pressure reduces awareness by nearly 40 percent.
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1.3.4 The Conscious Decision to Misreport
Note: Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM.
FIGURE 1.5: Conscious Misreporting by Treatment
Recognition of the misreporting opportunity is seemingly a precondition for misre-
porting. We restrict our attention to subjects that consciously choose between honest
and dishonest reporting. This restriction leaves us with 76 subjects in CT and 75 sub-
jects in TPT. Figure 1.5 displays the fraction of conscious dishonest reports for CT
and TPT, respectively. For the contemplation report, 47 percent of the aware subjects
decide to report dishonestly, while 49 percent do so for the time pressure report. This
difference between both treatments is not significant (χ2-Test: p = 0.81). The nearly
identical amount of misreporting in both treatments indicates that time pressure has
hardly any effect on the conscious decision to misreport.
This finding is confirmed by regression analyses (Table 1.4) both of the subsample
of 151 observations for subjects who stated that they were aware of the misreporting
opportunity (columns (1)—(3)) and of the complete sample with all 305 observations
that control for the effect of awareness (columns (4)—(6)). The dependent variable in
Table 1.4 is the share of dishonest reports and the reference group is the CT. In all
specifications of the subsample with subjects who are aware of the misreporting op-
portunity, time pressure has no significant effect on (conscious) dishonest reporting
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Time Pressure 0.016 0.008 0.024 -0.020 -0.033 -0.037
(0.083) (0.084) (0.081) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Awareness 0.407*** 0.407*** 0.406***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)




Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES NO YES YES
Constant 0.030 -0.038 -0.878** 0.086* -0.085 -0.417*
(0.353) (0.374) (0.439) (0.046) (0.210) (0.252)
Observations 151 151 151 305 305 305
R2 0.046 0.049 0.101 0.213 0.231 0.243
(5) (6)
Notes: The table presents results of a linear probability regression with dishonest reporting as dependent variable
(binary variable). Specifications (1) -(3) refer to the subsample of subjects that stated being aware of the
misreporting opportunity (n = 151), while specifications (4) -(6) use the complete sample (n = 305). Time
Pressure is a binary variable that is 1 for TPT and 0 for CT. Awareness is a binary variable that is 1 if the
subject reports being aware of the misreporting opportunity and 0 otherwise. Cognitive Reflection Test is the
number of questions solved (0 to 3) and Machiavellianism is the score in the respective section of the Dark Triad
(9 to 45). Robust standard errors in parentheses,  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
TABLE 1.4: Multivariate Analysis of Conscious Misreporting
(columns (1)—(3)). This finding is confirmed for the complete sample: all specifications
show that awareness of the misreporting opportunity is the main determinant of mis-
reporting (columns (4)—(6)). In contrast, the time pressure dummy is insignificant and
hence indicates that time pressure has no significant effect on misreporting beyond its
effect on awareness. While reflective thinking (as captured by the Cognitive Reflection
Test) has no effect on conscious misreporting (column (2)), Machiavellianists have a
significantly higher probability of giving a dishonest report (column (4) and (6)). This
depicts the other side of the coin compared to the finding for awareness: deceptive traits
predict conscious misreporting, but this is independent of a subject’s reflectiveness.
Result 1.4 Controlling for subjects being aware of the misreporting opportunity, there
is no evidence that time pressure has an effect on the conscious choice whether to mis-
report.
In sum, we find evidence that the intuitive response for a majority of subjects is
an honest report. The majority of subjects are not able to recognize the misreporting
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opportunity under time pressure, which in turn leads to a low share of dishonest reports.
However, in our framework time pressure has no effect on balancing the costs and
benefits of misreporting and on the final conscious decision whether to misreport.
1.3.5 Supporting Evidence: Revisions and the Final Report in TPT
In TPT, subjects make two reports over the course of the treatment: the initial time
pressure report and the final report after the revision period (compare to Figure 1.1).
Since the informational circumstances are different for the final report and not directly
comparable to the time pressure report in TPT and the contemplation report in CT,
our main analysis disregards data from the final report. However, the effect of reflection
time in the revision period should be in line with the effect of reflection time in CT:
more reflection time increases the share of dishonest reports. This is confirmed in the
data: in the final report in TPT, 49 percent of subjects with a low income untruthfully
report a high income. Hence, the share of dishonest reports more than doubles compared
to the initial time pressure report (23 percent).15 The difference is highly significant
(McNemar’s χ2-Test: p < 0.01).
This direct, within-subjects comparison of the time pressure report and the final
report also sheds light on the question if and in which direction subjects revise their
initial report. Almost all subjects (95 percent) deceiving in the time pressure report
also deceive in the final report. In contrast, a considerable share of 36 percent of
honest subjects in the time pressure report revises the report and deceives in the final
report. Taken together, this means that the reports are only revised in one direction,
i.e., towards more deception in the final report. This revision behavior speaks against
alternative explanations for misreporting under time pressure, such as a random choice
of available options. If this was the case, we should observe no revisions at all (in case
subjects would have remained by their randomly chosen choice) or revisions in both
directions.
Moreover, the final report allows us to analyze the relationship of responses to the
awareness questions and actual reporting behavior. As expected, awareness in the time
pressure report implies awareness in the final report: 97 percent of subjects that state
being aware of the deception possibility in the time pressure report also state being
15Although our structure for the revised report is different to settings with several sequential outcomes and reports,
this finding relates to increased misreporting in repeated settings (e.g., Kocher et al. 2018) or for repeated participation
(e.g., Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013).
24
Chapter 1 —Deception under Time Pressure
aware of it in the final report. Furthermore, partitioning the initially truthful subjects
by the responses to the awareness questions reveals: subjects that state being not aware
both for the time pressure report and for the final report stick to the initially truthful
report (97 percent of subjects). A medium share of subjects that state being aware
for both reports revises the honest time pressure report (22 percent of subjects). Most
importantly, subjects that state being aware for the final report but not for the time
pressure report are most likely to revise their truthful time pressure report (62 percent
of subjects). These observations are in line with the results from section 1.3.3 and 1.3.4
and stress the importance of the cognition process for understanding the time pressure
effect.
1.4 Discussion
In contrast to other settings, the subtlety and unpredictability of the misreporting op-
portunity in our framework allows for a more complete coverage of the misreporting
process. It consists both of the process of gaining awareness of the misreporting oppor-
tunity, and the conscious decision on the actual report. We are able to separate both
effects through the post-experimental questions on awareness in the respective reports.
Since gaining awareness requires the mental availability of the concept of deception
and its ignorance automatically implies an honest report, awareness is an essential
part of misreporting. This cognition process has not been the focus of the literature
so far. However, a decomposition of both steps is instructive for at least two reasons.
First, misreporting opportunities differ considerably both with respect to their costs
and benefits and with respect to their unexpectedness and apparentness. Hence, a de-
composition leads to a better understanding of the dynamics of misreporting under
different circumstances, such as time pressure. Second, the decomposition gives valu-
able insights for the prevention of deception. For example, in case of intuitive choices,
is it more effective to highlight the immorality of deceptive actions or to make the
deception opportunity as non-transparent as possible?
In contrast to previous results in the literature, we find that time pressure leads
to significantly less dishonest reports. This is in line with misreporting to be not the
intuitive response. For dishonest reports, subjects need to have in mind the concept
of deception to recognize the misreporting opportunity. Then, they have to make a
conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. Both steps potentially require cogni-
tive effort and hence may be time-consuming. However, our results show that it is not
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the trade-off between costs and benefits of misreporting that is cognitively demand-
ing and requires reflection time, but instead the cognition process of the misreporting
opportunity. This finding is interesting, since subjects only have to overcome their ini-
tial surprise to gain awareness of the misreporting opportunity. Once we condition on
awareness, the share of dishonest reports is nearly identical across treatments, which
suggests that the conscious decision to misreport is intuitive and does not require am-
ple cognitive resources. Although the moral dilemma might be more pronounced in
other settings, our results indicate that the conscious misreporting decision might be
determined by an inherent heuristic for honesty rather than a reflective process. Hence,
decreasing the transparency of the misreporting opportunity could be the most effec-
tive prevention of dishonesty. In contrast, actions that highlight the potential costs of
misreporting might have countervailing effects if they increase the awareness of the
deception possibility at the same time.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the role of the time dimension for dishonest decision-making
in a one-shot experiment. The time dimension turns out to be a crucial determinant of
deception. Some misreporting opportunities are unforeseeable and require an intuitive
decision, while others allow for extensive reflection time. Our treatments exogenously
vary the level of reflection time available to participants, inducing an intuitive versus
a reflective decision. The novelty of our approach is that the misreporting opportunity
comes as a surprise, thereby allowing us to cover the entire process of misreporting.
Besides the actual decision of whether or not to misreport, gaining awareness of the
misreporting opportunity is the crucial first step and a precondition for misreporting.
First, we address the question of what impact time pressure has on dishonest reporting
compared to suffi cient reflection time. Secondly, we investigate which part of the misre-
porting process is affected by time pressure. Hence, we isolate the effect of time pressure
on the cognition process that leads to awareness of the misreporting opportunity from
its effect on the conscious decision to misreport.
In contrast to the previous literature, we find evidence that misreporting need not
be the intuitive choice when the misreporting opportunity is not apparent and subjects
have the option to deceive for personal gain. This finding manifests in a lower share
of dishonest reports as well as in an increased response time for dishonest subjects
under time pressure. The decomposition into the process of gaining awareness of the
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misreporting opportunity and the conscious decision to misreport reveals that more re-
flection time increases the awareness of the misreporting opportunity, but has no effect
on the conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. Hence, our results suggest
that honesty is the automatic response since subjects need a considerable amount of
reflection time to gain awareness of the misreporting opportunity. This is an important
insight, since deception opportunities often come as a surprise and are not immediately
obvious.
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1.A Appendix —Screen-Shots from the Experiment
As noted in section 1.2.1, subjects found all instructions for the experiment on screen.
This appendix presents a selection of screen-shots from the experiment. The experiment
was conducted in German, and we provide an English translation here (additional
explanations on screen-shots in italics). For brevity and clarity, we only show the
most important or most characteristic screen-shots. The actual experiment consisted
of screens before, in between, and after the selection of screens shown here. Captions of
the respective screen-shot provide additional information to which stage and to which
treatment the screen-shot belongs to.
All Treatments: Explanation of the probability distribution before participation in
the lottery.
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All Treatments: Initial state of the Wheel of Fortune before pointer starts spinning.
All Treatments: Final state of the Wheel of Fortune with individual lottery outcome.
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Contemplation Treatment: Contemplation Period after participation in the Wheel of
Fortune.
Contemplation Treatment: Contemplation Report after Contemplation Period.
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Time Pressure Treatment: Time Pressure Period with Time Pressure Report.
Time Pressure Treatment: Revision Period after Time Pressure Report.
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Time Pressure Treatment: Final Report after Revision Period.
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Better to Win Honestly Than to Get Rich by
Lying?
This chapter is based of joint work with Kai A. Konrad and Tim Lohse.
2.1 Introduction
As the biblical proverb (Proverbs, 21:6) tells us, "[m]aking a fortune through a lying
tongue is a vanishing mist, a pursuit of death." But if the material reward from behav-
ing dishonestly becomes large, the temptation might become irresistible. The proverb
indicates: dishonestly earned money has a (behavioral) cost. For this reason, individuals
may enjoy honestly earned money more than they enjoy dishonestly earned money.
This leads to empirical questions. Are individuals willing to pay to earn in an honest
fashion? How badly do they suffer as a side effect of dishonest earnings? How is this
lying cost related to their choice between an honest earning opportunity and one that
allows them to make more money, but only if they are prepared to cheat? We resolve
these questions in a theory-guided experiment in the laboratory.
Our work is related to the literature on cheating in general, and to two strands of this
literature in particular. First, several papers study the role of monetary incentives for
lying, which allows for insights on the distribution of individuals’lying costs and their
preference for honest earnings. In particular, this literature investigates how subjects’
truthfulness depends on the size of the stakes at risk. The findings are rather hetero-
geneous (e.g., Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017),
Gibson et al. (2013) and Vranceanu and Dubart (2019). See also the surveys by Abeler
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et al. (2019) and Gerlach et al. (2019)). Second, a recent literature strand touches on
the issue of the self-selection of dishonest subjects into, or out of, lying opportunities.
Several field experiments document a relationship between the occupational choice to
work in corrupt sectors and the individual propensity to cheat (Banerjee et al. 2015 and
Hanna and Wang 2017). Faravelli et al. (2015) and Gino et al. (2015) investigate the
role of cheating opportunities for self-selection into competitive settings in the labora-
tory. Evidence on whether subjects deliberately self-select into cheating opportunities
based on their lying costs is limited so far. In Shalvi et al. (2011) the individuals are
offered a fixed payoff as an exit option over participating in the dice rolling game. In
their framework the take-up of the exit option is not much affected by the possibility
to lie, and lying behavior seems to be almost unrelated to the value of the exit option.
Lying costs may not be the major driving force for self-selection here.
We elicit individuals’willingness to pay (WTP) to increase the odds of having an
opportunity to earn honestly instead of earning money through a misreporting op-
portunity. This WTP can reflect how badly different individuals suffer from making
dishonest earnings. Therefore, this WTP can be seen as a subtle way to measure the
heterogeneity in lying costs. We also observe individuals’ actual reporting behavior
when the misreporting opportunity emerges. We study how the willingness to pay and
the reporting behavior are related to each other. These findings give a good indication
of whether individuals self-select into honest or dishonest earnings based on their lying
costs.
More precisely, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which individuals choose
between two lotteries in two different choice regimes. One lottery, (let us call it the
‘Bad Lottery’) has a zero outcome with high probability and a win outcome with a
low probability. The other lottery yields the zero outcome with a low probability and
the win outcome with a high probability. Let us refer to it as the ‘Good Lottery.’The
Bad Lottery is costless. To obtain the Good Lottery instead, individuals have to pay a
price. Their lottery choice is recorded for two different regimes. One regime is truthful
by design: the lottery outcome is identical to the individual’s final payout. Here, an
individual’s attitude toward truth-telling is irrelevant. The other regime allows for
misreporting. In particular, the individual may claim the win outcome even if the true
lottery outcome is zero. Whether and for which price an individual is willing to acquire
the Good Lottery may depend on the individual’s valuation of a true win outcome
compared to a dishonestly claimed win outcome in this regime.
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Our results indicate that some, but not all individuals have a smaller WTP for the
Good Lottery in the regime with the misreporting opportunity. Some individuals are
not willing to spend money to obtain the Good Lottery. And these individuals also tend
to misreport whenever the opportunity arises. Other individuals expend considerable
resources to obtain the Good Lottery. These individuals are also less likely to misreport
if the misreporting opportunity emerges.
2.2 The Decision Theoretic Framework
Consider an individual that maximizes its expected monetary payoff. The individual
chooses between two binary lotteries (labeled ‘Good Lottery’and ‘Bad Lottery’). Each
lottery yields either a high payout xH (denoted as ‘win outcome’) or a low payout
xL (denoted as ‘zero outcome’), with xH > xL. The Bad Lottery B yields the high
outcome xH with probability pB and the zero outcome xL with probability 1−pB. The
Good Lottery G yields xH with probability pG and xL with probability 1−pG. Lottery
G is the better lottery because pG > pB.
2.2.1 The Honest Regime: Choosing in the Absence of a Misreporting Opportunity
An individual can choose the Bad Lottery B for a zero price. For a price z ≥ 0 she can
choose the Good Lottery G instead. We denote the two choice alternatives by (B, 0)
and (G, z). Once this choice is made, the individual learns the lottery outcome and is
rewarded with this true outcome as her payoff. The expected payoffs from (B, 0) and
(G, z) are πB = pBxH+(1−pB)xL and πG = pGxH+(1−pG)xL−z. The indifference price
z∗ = (pG − pB)(xH − xL) (2.1)
gives the individual the same expected payoff from (B, 0) and from (G, z∗). For a price
z ≤ z∗ the purchase of the Good Lottery G leads to a higher expected payoff. Hence,
the expected payoff-maximizing individual chooses (G, z) for z ≤ z∗ and (B, 0) for
z > z∗. The fraction of individuals who choose (G, z) as a function of z is depicted as
a function γT (z) in Figure 2.1: γT (z) = 1 for z ≤ (pG − pB)(xH − xL) and γT (z) = 0
for any higher price.
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Note: Figure displays the predicted fraction of individuals purchasing the Good Lottery G
as a function of its price z in the URR and HR.
FIGURE 2.1: Predicted Demand for the Good Lottery G
2.2.2 The Untruthful Reporting Regime: Choosing with a Misreporting Opportunity
Let us change one assumption in the set-up. As before, the individual chooses between
(B, 0) and (G, z) and then learns the true lottery outcome. But then the individual is
asked to report the lottery outcome. This report does not need to be truthful, i.e., the
individual can choose any report ξ ∈ {xH , xL}. She receives exactly this reported value
ξ as her payoff.
Suppose that the individual has a (behavioral) cost of reporting untruthfully. Let this
cost be equal to θ ≥ 0 and a draw from a random variable with cumulative distribution
function F (θ) with support [0,∞).1 This θ might be interpreted as the sum of internal
lying costs, including (self-)image concerns and the costs of violating (self-imposed)
social norms, as modeled explicitly e.g., in Gneezy et al. (2018) or Abeler et al. (2019).
For brevity, we refer to θ as the individual’s lying costs.
1We assume that an individual’s θ for reporting ξ(xL) = xH is the same in both lotteries. In the experimental setting,
we are able to address whether this is a valid assumption.
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Based on these primitives the optimal reporting behavior of an individual with lying
costs θ is the following. A win outcome xH is always reported honestly, ξ(xH) = xH . In
contrast, whether the individual reports truthfully if the lottery outcome is xL depends
on θ: ξ(xL) = xL if θ ≥ (xH − xL) and ξ(xL) = xH if θ < (xH − xL). The individual
misreports on xL if and only if her lying costs θ fall short of the monetary benefits of
misreporting. Taking this reporting behavior into account, the expected payoffs for the
choices (B, 0) and (G, z) are
πB(θ) =
{
xH − (1− pB)θ if θ < xH − xL





xH − (1− pG)θ − z if θ < xH − xL
pGxH + (1− pG)xL − z if θ ≥ xH − xL
. (2.3)
This makes the lottery choice straightforward: an individual pays z and chooses (G, z)
if πG(θ)− πB(θ) ≥ 0, and goes for (B, 0) if πG(θ)− πB(θ) < 0, where
πG(θ)− πB(θ) =
{
(pG − pB)θ − z if θ < xH − xL
(pG − pB)(xH − xL)− z if θ ≥ xH − xL
. (2.4)
For the case of indifference, we assume that the individual chooses (G, z). The fraction
of individuals who purchase (G, z) as a function of z is depicted as γM(z) in Figure
2.1.
For a price z > z∗ = (pG − pB)(xH − xL) the individual will never purchase (G, z).
This behavior is independent of the individual’s θ: for θ ≥ xH − xL the individual
reports truthfully, but we have πG(θ) − πB(θ) = (pG − pB)(xH − xL) − z < 0. For
θ < xH − xL the individual reports ξ = xH for any true lottery outcome, and we have
πG(θ)−πB(θ) = (pG−pB)θ−z < (pG−pB)(xH−xL)−z < 0. Hence, γM(z) = γT (z) = 0
for all z > z∗.
For z ≤ z∗, individuals with θ ≥ xH−xL report truthfully and choose (G, z), as pur-
chasing (G, z) gives them a higher expected payoff than (B, 0). In contrast, individuals
with θ < xH − xL report ξ = xH for any true lottery outcome. For these individuals,
πG(θ) − πB(θ) is weakly increasing in θ: the higher the individual’s lying costs, the
worse the zero outcome is compared to the win outcome, and the higher the individ-
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ual’s WTP for the Good Lottery. An individual is just indifferent between (B, 0) and
(G, z) for (pG− pB)θ− z = 0, or θ = z/(pG− pB).2 Individuals with a lying cost higher
than (or equal to) z/(pG − pB) purchase (G, z), while individuals with smaller lying
costs choose (B, 0). Accordingly, for a given z the fraction of individuals who choose
(G, z) is equal to the probability that θ ≥ z/(pG − pB), or,
γM(z) = 1− F (
z
pG − pB
) for z ≤ z∗. (2.5)
2.3 Experimental Analysis
2.3.1 Design
Overview. We conducted our laboratory experiment in September and October
2018 at the econlab Munich.3 Each subject made decisions in two regimes in a sequential
order.4 In the ‘Honest Regime’(HR), the individual chooses one of two lotteries and
receives the true payout of this lottery. In the ‘Untruthful Reporting Regime’(URR)
the lottery choice is followed by a reporting stage with an opportunity to misreport
and to potentially earn a dishonest income by reporting a win outcome although the
lottery yielded the zero outcome.
Lotteries. In both regimes there are two lotteries, the Bad Lottery and the Good
Lottery. The lotteries have the same binary outcomes: the zero outcome has a payout
xL of EUR 0 and the win outcome has a payout xH of EUR 12. For the Bad Lottery,
the probability pB of the win outcome xH is 1/6, and the probability (1 − pB) of the
zero outcome xL is 5/6. For the Good Lottery, the probability pG of the win outcome
xH is 4/6 and the probability (1 − pG) of the zero outcome xL is 2/6.5 Evidently, the
Good Lottery is better than the Bad Lottery by first-order stochastic dominance.6
2This relationship allows for an estimation of an individual’s lying costs based on her articulated WTP. For a detailed
discussion of the estimation procedure and results from the experiment, refer to section 2.4.5.
3A total of 308 subjects participated in 18 sessions of the experiment (average length of a session 75 to 90 minutes).
These were predominately local university students (average age 24 years; 55.5 percent female students). Subjects
were recruited from the laboratory’s subject pool using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The experiment was programmed and
conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The average payoff from the experiment was EUR 17.90 (min. EUR 6.50,
max. EUR 27.50) including a show-up fee of EUR 9 and earnings up to EUR 2.90 from the post-tests.
4We randomly varied the order of regimes: half the subjects started with one or the other regime. To exclude any
income effects or hedging behavior, only one of the two regimes was chosen at random for payout at the end of the
experiment.
5Probabilities of the outcomes were visualized as drawing numbers from ’1’—’6’on a computerized wheel of fortune.
Each number represented either the zero or the win outcome of the respective lottery. The wheel of fortune determined
the true lottery outcome for the subject.
6 Important to our design, subjects are not given the possibility to opt out completely, but only to improve their
chances of an honest win outcome. Uncertainty over the outcome and the potential temptation to lie are not removed
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Elicitation Method. In both regimes the subject chooses between the two lotteries.
We use the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit an individual’s reservation price for
choosing the Good Lottery over the Bad Lottery: Subjects make a series of choices
between the Good and the Bad Lottery for 18 different possible price levels of the
Good Lottery. The price for the Bad Lottery was EUR 0 for each choice, while the
price z of the Good Lottery declined in steps of EUR 0.50 from EUR 8.5 to EUR 0.7
Accordingly, a subject’s maximum WTP zmaxi is defined by the highest price level for
which the subject chooses the Good Lottery over the Bad Lottery.
Implemented Choice. When making their choices, subjects know that the lab-
oratory had pre-determined a seller price z0 that would apply, and that would be
announced by the laboratory once they made their binary buying decisions for all pos-
sible values of z. The seller price z0 was set to EUR 4 in the Honest Regime and to EUR
1.5 in the Untruthful Reporting Regime.8 As subjects only receive the information on
the price z0 once they have made their choices, it was in their best interest to consider
their choices between (B, 0) and (G, z) as potentially payoff-relevant for all possible
(B, 0)-versus-(G, z) comparisons.9
Lottery Allocation. If a subject chooses the Bad Lottery for z0 (i.e., zmaxi < z0),
the cost-free Bad Lottery at a price of EUR 0 is implemented (‘Bad Lottery - self-
selected’). If a subject expressed a WTP that (weakly) exceeded z0 (i.e., zmaxi ≥ z0),
then, with probability 2/3, the subject was assigned to the Good Lottery at a price of
z0 (‘Good Lottery - self-selected’). With the remaining probability 1/3 the subject was
assigned to the cost-free Bad Lottery instead (‘Bad Lottery - assigned’). This procedure
provides us with information on how individuals make their reporting choices if they
have a high WTP for the Good Lottery but have received the Bad Lottery.10
completely. The WTP is therefore more likely to be due to the reduction of the likelihood of facing temptation, and not
due to avoiding an uncertain outcome completely.
7The multiple price list employed here is a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism to elicit a
subject’s WTP in an incentive-compatible manner.
8The price EUR 1.50 in the URR was chosen to achieve a balanced number of subjects who face the misreporting
opportunity in the three possible lottery allocations. We based our estimation on the results of a structurally related
pilot with different parameterization.
9We addressed the potential concern that subjects might be suspicious about whether the seller price z0 was pre-
determined or not. In their cubicle, we placed a sealed letter which they were only allowed to open at the end of the
experiment. The letter contained information on the predetermined price z0.
10 It also accounts for the potential effect of loss aversion, as buying the Good Lottery is costly but does not imply an
honest success with certainty. The literature typically finds more cheating in the loss domain than in the gain domain
(e.g., Grolleau et al. 2016 or Schindler and Pfattheicher 2017), with an increasing propensity to cheat the less likely the
bad outcome is (Garbarino et al. 2019). Therefore, the lying rate in the group ’Good Lottery self-selected’may have
an upward bias (that runs against our prediction). If so, focusing on the lying rate in the group ’Bad Lottery assigned’
instead allows for a clean estimation of the selection effect.
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The Regimes. In the Honest Regime, the lottery outcome of the allocated lottery is
directly payoff-relevant and ends the regime. In the Untruthful Reporting Regime, the
procedure continues. The subject learns the respective lottery outcome of the allocated
lottery and is asked to make a report on this outcome. In turn, this report determines
the payoff from the URR. The subject may report untruthfully, i.e., she might choose to
report ξ(xL) = xH . There are no audits or formal sanctions for misreporting. Our design
allows both for a comparison of the willingness to pay between-subjects (decision in the
regime which was first in order) as well as within-subjects (decision in both regimes).
Moreover, we are able to identify dishonest subjects in the URR by comparing their
reported to their realized lottery outcome which are both observable in the data.
Post-Tests and Payoffs. The experiment concluded with an incentivized elicitation
of beliefs about the choice and the reporting behavior of other participants in the
respective session.11 The Post-Test section also included the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick 2005), Murphy et al.’s (2011) test for social value orientation and a variant
of the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) to test for ambiguity aversion. Finally, we
conducted a short socio-economic questionnaire. Before subjects were paid out, they
received a detailed overview of their earnings from the experiment.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
We develop two sets of hypotheses along our decision theoretic framework. The first
set of hypotheses addresses the impact of the misreporting opportunity on individuals’
WTP for choosing (G, z) over (B, 0).
Using the actual numbers from the experimental set-up, risk neutral, payoff-maximizing
subjects have a predicted indifference price z∗ of EUR 6 in the Honest Regime.12 For
all prices z > z∗, subjects are predicted to choose the Bad Lottery. For all prices
z ≤ z∗, subjects are predicted to choose the Good Lottery. In the Untruthful Report-
ing Regime, subjects with high lying costs θ ≥ 12(= xH − xL) face a decision problem
that is exactly equivalent to the honest regime. For these subjects, the misreporting op-
portunity does not matter and the choice behavior should be the same in both regimes.
But subjects with low or intermediate lying costs θ < 12 are likely to misreport on the
zero outcome. Ex ante, because the misreporting opportunity makes the zero outcome
11We ran additional robustness sessions to account for potential confounders from the interaction effects of payment
schemes or risk preferences (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed discussion).
12An assumption is risk neutrality of subjects for small stakes. We check this assumption with an additional lottery
choice task. In fact, 72 percent of subjects can broadly be classified as risk neutral.
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less bad for them, this leads to a smaller WTP zmaxi for the Good Lottery in the URR.
However, the higher the individual’s lying costs, the worse the zero outcome is and the
closer zmaxi is to z
∗.
Hence, the comparison of γT (z) and γM(z) in Figure 2.1 suggests that, for a given
F (θ), the distribution of the WTP in the Honest Regime first-order stochastically
dominates the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime. For prices z ∈ (z∗,∞), the
comparison is trivial as γT (z) and γM(z) coincide and all individuals choose (B, 0)
in both regimes. For prices z ∈ [0, z∗), the fraction of individuals who purchase G
for a given z deviate from each other. All types of individuals choose (G, z) in the
HR. Their maximum WTP for the Good Lottery G is z∗. In contrast, the fraction
of subjects choosing (G, z) in the URR is 1 − F ( z
pG−pB ) for a given z ∈ (0, z
∗). This
share is monotonically declining in z. At z = z∗, only individuals with high lying costs
θ ∈ [xH − xL,∞) would choose (G, z). Hence, 1 − F ( z
∗
pG−pB ) is strictly smaller than 1
at z = z∗. We summarize these considerations in the following
Hypothesis 2.1 The WTP for the Good Lottery in the Untruthful Reporting Regime
(i) is between-subjects and, on average, smaller than in the Honest Regime;
(ii) is within-subjects, smaller than or equal to the Honest Regime.
Our second set of hypotheses focuses on individuals with a lottery outcome xL in
the Untruthful Reporting Regime. The decision theoretic framework suggests a close
relationship between the articulated WTP for the Good Lottery and the subsequent
reporting behavior in this regime. As reporting behavior is observable in our setting, we
are able to investigate this relationship by analyzing the WTP conditional on reporting
behavior, and vice versa.
In the Untruthful Reporting Regime, misreporting only pays off for suffi ciently small
lying costs θ < xH−xL. Accordingly, individuals base their WTP for the Good Lottery
on their anticipated reporting behavior. Honest individuals disregard the misreporting
opportunity and should therefore not alter their WTP z∗ = (pG− pB)(xH − xL). Their
WTP for the Good Lottery reflects the increased chances of an honest win outcome.
In contrast, as the misreporting opportunity makes dishonest individuals better off,
dishonest individuals should express a smaller maximum WTP zmaxi = (pG − pB)θ <
(pG − pB)(xH − xL) = z∗. Their WTP for the Good Lottery reflects their expected
reduction of lying costs. Hence, dishonest individuals have a smaller WTP than honest
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individuals in the URR. As a consequence, individuals with zmaxi < z
∗ are expected to
misreport ξ(xL) = xG and individuals with zmaxi ≥ z∗ are expected to report truthfully
ξ(xL) = xL.13
In the Honest Regime an individual’s readiness to misreport is irrelevant by design.
In this regime individuals with different attitudes toward misreporting should articulate
the same maximum WTP: z∗ = (pG − pB)(xH − xL). A comparison of both regimes
reveals that dishonest individuals (as identified by their reporting behavior in the URR)
have a smaller WTP in the URR than in the HR. In contrast, the regime has no
influence on the WTP of honest individuals.
Finally, consider the reporting behavior conditional on the lottery allocation. Let
the seller price of the Good Lottery be z0 ∈ (0, z∗). Individuals with a WTP smaller
than z0 should self-select into (B, 0). Since z0 < z∗, these individuals should misre-
port if such an opportunity emerges. Individuals with a WTP (weakly) higher than z0
self-select into (G, z0). This group comprises two types of individuals: individuals with
θ ≥ z∗




pG−pB ) who will
misreport ξ(xL) = xH . In the aggregate, the fraction of dishonest reports in the group
of individuals who select into (B, 0) should therefore be higher than in the group who
end up with (G, z0). These considerations are collected as
Hypothesis 2.2 Consider the group of individuals who have the zero outcome xL
in the Untruthful Reporting Regime. In the Untruthful Reporting Regime
(i) individuals who misreported ξ(xL) = xH articulate a smaller WTP than truthfully
reporting individuals;
(ii) individuals who misreported ξ(xL) = xH articulate a smaller WTP than they do
in the Honest Regime;
(iii) a higher fraction of individuals who select into (B , 0 ) misreport as compared to
individuals who select into (G , z 0).
13For many reasons (including risk aversion, lack of attention, calculation errors), the observed reporting behavior
may deviate from this sharp prediction. In particular, for individuals with θ close to θ = z
∗
pG−pB
, the difference between
the payoff from lying, xH − θ, and the payoff from reporting truthfully, xL, is small. Some of the individuals with a
maximum willingness to pay above z∗ might misreport, and some of the individuals with a maximum WTP below z∗
may report honestly in the URR. A "softer" prediction that accounts for these effects is that the propensity to lie is a
declining function of the maximum articulated WTP.
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2.4 Results
The analysis of the experimental data evolves along the lines of our predictions. We
start with a comparison of the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime and the
Honest Regime. We show that the WTP in the URR is significantly smaller. Then,
we investigate the relationship of the WTP in the URR and the subsequent reporting
behavior. We find evidence that the WTP is indicative of the reporting behavior and
that subjects self-select based on their lying costs. For the most part of the analysis,
we focus on subjects with a WTP smaller or equal to EUR 6 in both regimes and who
make a consistent statement of the WTP.14
2.4.1 The Demand for the Good Lottery
Note: Graph displays cumulative distribution of a between-subjects comparison of the Willingness to Pay
(in EUR) for the Good Lottery in the Untruthful Reporting Regime and the Honest Regime
FIGURE 2.2: Demand for the Good Lottery in the Regimes
14A higher valuation for the Good Lottery may not be explained by lying costs and, hence, is beyond the scope of
our decision theoretic framework. The consistent statement of the WTP is defined as choosing either the Bad Lottery
or the Good Lottery for all price levels, or as switching only once from the Good Lottery to the Bad Lottery at zmaxi .
Alternatively, we use a control variable in our regressions analyses. A detailed discussion and an analysis of the complete
sample is provided in Appendix A.1.
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We start with a (pseudo) between-subjects comparison of the WTP of the Good
Lottery in the two regimes, focusing on the regime that was first in order. Figure 2.2
displays the aggregate distribution of subjects willing to buy the Good Lottery over
the full support of possible prices. It has a similar interpretation as the theoretical
demand curves γT (z) and γM(z) in Figure 2.1.
15 The solid line illustrates the empirical
demand curve γT (z) for the Good Lottery in the Honest Regime, and the dashed line
the empirical demand curve for the Untruthful Reporting Regime.
Comparing the WTP in both regimes, Figure 2.2 suggests that the WTP in the
HR first-order stochastically dominates the WTP in the URR. A stable gap between
both regimes of around 20 percentage points emerges up to a WTP of EUR 6. Econo-
metric tests for this range of prices confirm this observation (N = 86 in the URR
and N = 74 in the HR): The average WTP of 2.45 EUR in the URR is significantly
smaller than the average WTP of 3.88 EUR in the HR (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test:
p < 0.01). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal dis-
tributions (p < 0.01). Hence, subjects seem to take the misreporting opportunity into
account when making their lottery choice, and they reduce their WTP accordingly.
However, some subjects value the higher likelihood of an honest win outcome even
in the presence of the misreporting opportunity. Only 14 percent have a non-positive
WTP in the URR, and the average WTP in the URR is significantly larger than zero
(one-sample median test: p < 0.01).16 For prices higher than EUR 6, both empirical
demand curves seem to converge, which may indicate that the decision is not related to
lying costs in the range. Consistent withHypothesis 2.1(i), we summarize our findings in
Result 2.1 In a between-subjects comparison, the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting
Regime is smaller than in the Honest Regime.
2.4.2 The Within-Subjects Differences in the Willingness to Pay
Since all subjects state their WTP in the HR as well as in the URR, we are also
able to make a within-subjects comparison of the valuation of the Good Lottery in
both regimes. Figure 2.3 illustrates the within-subjects difference between the WTP
in the Honest Regime and the Untruthful Reporting Regime, i.e., zmaxi,HR− zmaxi,URR. We
15The gray area between EUR 6 and EUR 6.5 represents the theoretical indifference price z∗ as measurement of the
WTP was implemented in intervals of EUR 0.50. Figure 2.2 displays the data without any restrictions to the level of
the WTP in both regimes (URR: N = 115; HR: N = 116).
16A non-positive WTP in the URR may indicate subjects with lying costs of zero (θ = 0) who are exactly indifferent
between both lotteries.
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Note: Graph displays cumulative distribution of within-subjects differences in the WTP between
the Honest Regime and the Untruthful Reporting Regime
FIGURE 2.3: Within-subjects Differences in the WTP
abstract from subjects with a non-positive WTP in both regimes which leaves us with
121 subjects here.
In Figure 2.3, we mainly observe two groups of subjects. There is a large group with
a difference in their WTP of around zero (between EUR -1 and EUR 1, 61 percent),
indicated by the gray interval. These are subjects with a WTP which is broadly simi-
lar in both regimes.17 Our decision-theoretic framework suggests that subjects in this
group may have high lying costs (θ ≥ 12). In this case, subjects forgo the misreporting
opportunity and both regimes are payoff-equivalent. Second, a group of 34 percent of
subjects has a positive difference between EUR 1 and EUR 6, i.e., a higher WTP in
the HR as compared to the URR. This group presumably consists of subjects with
small to medium lying costs θ ∈ (0, 12). These subjects should be willing to misre-
port for the zero outcome. Their WTP for the Good Lottery is determined by the
desire to avoid the costs of lying. The smaller the lying costs, the smaller the WTP in
17To account for small mistakes and fuzziness in choice behavior, we define the group that has a similar WTP in both
regimes as having an absolute difference smaller or equal to EUR 1. A more narrow definition of this group (absolute
difference smaller or equal to EUR 0.5) does not qualitatively change the results: 10 percent have a negative difference,
50 percent have a similar WTP in both regimes, and 40 percent have a positive difference.
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the URR and the larger the difference between both regimes. The prevalence of these
two groups of subjects with distinct differences in their WTP is in line with the pre-
diction from our decision-theoretic framework.18 Finally, the average within-subjects
difference is EUR 1.07 between both regimes, which is significantly larger than zero
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.01). In accordance with Hypothesis 2.1(ii), we state:
Result 2.2 In a within-subjects comparison, for the vast majority of subjects, the
WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime is smaller than or equal to the WTP in the
Honest Regime.
2.4.3 The Willingness to Pay Conditional on Reporting Behavior
The analysis so far has revealed that the misreporting opportunity in the URR decreases
the demand for the Good Lottery. Now, we investigate the relationship of the WTP in
the URR and the subsequent reporting behavior. In our decision-theoretic framework,
both are determined by an individual’s lying costs θ. Subjects hence may self-select
based on their WTP, and report accordingly when facing the misreporting opportunity.
To shed light on this, we focus on subjects with a zero outcome (for the respective
lottery). These subjects had a monetary incentive to lie and to report the win outcome
instead.19
Differences in the WTP Among Honest and Dishonest Subjects. We start
by examining the WTP conditional on the observed reporting behavior in the URR
(N = 71). Misreporting subjects are classified as dishonest subjects, and those who
made a truthful report as honest. Figure 2.4 displays the average WTP in both regimes
for honest and dishonest subjects, respectively. The between-subjects comparisons of
the WTP reveal that dishonest subjects in the URR are willing to pay less than a
third of what honest subjects would pay for the Good Lottery. This difference is highly
significant (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p < 0.01). In contrast, there is no significant
difference between honest and dishonest subjects in the HR (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
test: p = 0.74). The within-subjects comparisons across regimes corroborate these
findings: dishonest subjects reduce their WTP for the Good Lottery by more than
70 percent when they have the opportunity to misreport (Wilcoxon signed ranks test:
18There is a third group of subjects with a negative difference between EUR -4.5 and EUR -1. This group is beyond
the scope of our framework, but with a population share of 5 percent it is also small in comparison to the other groups.
19For subjects with an honest win outcome (N = 131), we cannot observe whether they had lied or not, and therefore
they are excluded here. However, none of these subjects lied downward by stating a lower number than actually drawn.
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Note: WTP in the URR and HR conditional on reporting behavior in the URR.
Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. Brackets indicate significant treatment differences, *** p<0.01.
FIGURE 2.4: Comparison of WTP conditional on Reporting Behavior
p < 0.01). For honest subjects, we find no such difference in the WTP between the
regimes (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p = 0.45).
In summary, as our decision-theoretic framework suggests, only in the URR is there
a difference between dishonest and honest subjects, and only dishonest subjects have
a smaller WTP in the URR than in the HR. Hence, our results indicate that dishonest
subjects deliberately reduce their WTP in the presence of the misreporting opportu-
nity. In contrast, both regimes are payoff-equivalent for honest subjects as they tend
to state a similar WTP in the URR and HR. In line with Hypothesis 2.2(i) and 2.2(ii),
we summarize these findings in
Result 2.3 Dishonest subjects have a smaller WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime
(i) as compared to honest subjects;
(ii) as compared to their WTP in the Honest Regime.
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WTP Honest Regime 0.820*** 0.162 0.649*** 0.232
(0.112) (0.120) (0.127) (0.147)
Gender -0.227 -0.652 0.331 -0.830
(0.443) (0.665) (0.423) (0.720)
Age -0.027 0.078 -0.047 0.099
(0.073) (0.091) (0.067) (0.094)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES YES
Procedural Controls YES YES YES YES
Post-Test NO NO YES YES
Constant 0.637 3.871 -0.946 4.058
(1.993) (2.900) (1.774) (2.915)
Observations 98 55 98 55
Notes: The table presents results of an interval regression. The depedent variable is the WTP in EUR
in the Untruthful Reporting Regime. Specification "1A/2A" includes subjects that reported honestly a
zero outcome and specification "1B/2B" includes subjects that dishonestly reported a win outcome
and had a WTP smaller than or equal to EUR 6 in the URR. "WTP Honest Regime" is a subjectʼs
WTP for the Good Lottery in the Honest Regime in EUR, "Gender" is a dummy for female subjects,
and "Age" is the age of the respective subject. "Socio-Economic Controls" include a dummy for
business/economics students and a dummy for subjects with non-German mother tongue, "Procedural
Controls" include a dummy for consistent choice behavior and control for order effects on both
regimes, and "Post-Tests" include the number of correct answers (0 to 3) in the Cognitve Reflection
Test (Frederick 2005), Murphy et al.ʼs (2011) measure of distributional preferences (-16.26 to 63.39),
a dummy for ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961) and an indicator for an individualʼs risk preferences.











TABLE 2.1: Multivariate Analysis of the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime
Multivariate Analysis of the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime.
We confirm these findings in an interval regression analysis on the WTP for the Good
Lottery in the Untruthful Reporting Regime (Table 2.1).20 The main result of interest
is the coeffi cient on the WTP in the Honest Regime. For the subgroup of honest sub-
jects (specifications (1A)/(2A)), we find a positive and highly significant relationship
between the WTP in both regimes. The point estimate implies that an increase of
EUR 1 in the WTP in the HR is associated with an increase of EUR 0.65 to EUR 0.82
in the WTP in the URR. As both regimes are payoff-equivalent for honest subjects,
this is in line with our theory framework. In contrast, for the subgroup of dishonest
subjects (specifications (1B)/(2B)), the coeffi cient on the WTP in the HR is small and
not significantly different from zero. Hence, the WTP in the URR seems to be based
20Here, we control for a consistent statement of the WTP in ‘Procedural Controls’directly. Moreover, as the misre-
porting opportunity is not relevant for honest subjects, we also include honest subjects with a WTP larger than EUR
6 in the URR (specification 1A/2A). Imposing the restriction of a WTP smaller or equal to EUR 6 for honest subjects
does not qualitatively change the results in specification 1A/2A.
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on a different motivation than in the HR, namely the subject’s lying costs.
Result 2.4 The WTP in the Honest Regime does not predict the WTP in the Untruthful
Reporting Regime for dishonest subjects, which indicates that subjects who misreported
based their WTP on their lying costs instead.
2.4.4 Reporting Behavior Conditional on the Willingness to Pay
Note: Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. Brackets indicate significant treatment differences, *** p<0.01.
FIGURE 2.5: Misreporting conditional on Lottery Allocation
(Dis-)Honest Reporting in Different Lotteries. As a next step, we analyze the
reporting behavior based on a subject’s WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime.
The sample is again restricted to the subgroup of subjects with the zero outcome (N =
114).21 Figure 2.5 displays the fraction of dishonest reports for the three possible lottery
allocations. A comparison between the group ‘Bad Lottery self-selected’(N = 52) and
21As the WTP is not the focus of the analysis, we do not impose the restriction of making a consistent statement of
the WTP here. Results are robust to this selection choice.
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the group ‘Bad Lottery assigned’(N = 35) allows us to investigate the consequences of
self-selection for dishonest behavior. Subjects in both groups take part in the cost-free
Bad Lottery, but have a different WTP. In the former group, the WTP is below the pre-
determined price of EUR 1.5 for the Good Lottery, while subjects in the latter group
were willing to acquire the Good Lottery but were randomly assigned to the Bad
Lottery (prob. 1/3). Our decision-theoretic framework suggests that the first group
consists predominantly of dishonest subjects and the second group of a mixture of
honest and dishonest subjects. We find evidence in line with this prediction: Subjects
with a small WTP are more than twice as likely to give a dishonest report as subjects
with a high WTP. The difference of more than 40 percentage points is highly significant
(χ2-test: p < 0.01).
We also compare the first two groups to the group of subjects whose choice of the
Good Lottery was implemented (‘Good Lottery self-selected’, N = 27, prob. 2/3). It is
important to note that there are two core differences between the lotteries: the Good
Lottery has a smaller probability of the zero outcome, and subjects pay EUR 1.50 for
the Good Lottery independent of the outcome. Both aspects might affect the reporting
behavior of subjects outside the scope of our model. The comparison of subjects that
self-selected into the Bad Lottery with subjects that self-selected into the Good Lottery
reveals that the latter are significantly less likely to use the misreporting opportunity
(χ2-test: p < 0.01). In contrast, we do not find a significant difference of the reporting
behavior between subjects with a high WTP that were involuntarily assigned to the
Bad Lottery and those who were assigned to their preferred Good Lottery (χ2-test:
p = 0.42).
These results provide evidence that lying costs do not depend on the implemented
lottery, and that subjects do not select into the Good Lottery as it eases misreporting.
Moreover, subjects with the zero outcome in the Good Lottery also seem to abstain
from recovering their loss of EUR 1.5 by misreporting. Hence, self-selection into the
Good Lottery reflects the preference for honest earnings: subjects with a high WTP in
the Untruthful Reporting Regime have a lower propensity to misreport. In accordance
with Hypothesis 2.2(iii), we state
Result 2.5 The fraction of dishonest subjects is significantly lower among subjects
willing to self-select into the Good Lottery than among the set of subjects who self-
select into the Bad Lottery.
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WTP Untruthful Rep. Reg. -0.300*** -0.312*** -0.364*** -0.329***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.069) (0.070)
Gender -0.704** -0.684** -0.606** -0.541*
(0.276) (0.277) (0.282) (0.321)
Age 0.024 0.017 0.018 0.038
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.033)
WTP Honest Regime 0.139**
(0.058)
Socio-Economic Controls YES YES YES YES
Procedural Controls NO YES YES YES
Post-Test NO NO NO YES
Constant 0.430 -0.0407 -0.548 -1.404
(0.981) (1.085) (1.199) (1.056)
Observations 114 114 114 114
Notes: The table presents the results of probit specifications. The dependent variable is dishonest
reporting (dummy variable). The dataset is restricted to subjects with a zero outcome and a WTP
smaller than or equal to EUR 6 in the URR. "WTP Untruthful Rep. Reg." is a subjectʼs WTP in the
Untruthful Reporting Regime in EUR, "Gender" is a dummy for female subjects, "Age" is the age of
the respective subject, and "WTP Honest Regime" is a subjectʼs WTP in the Honest Regime in EUR.
"Socio-Economic Controls" include a dummy for business/economics students and a dummy for
subjects with non-German mother tongue, "Procedural Controls" include a dummy for consistent
choice behavior and control for order effects on both regimes and "Post-Tests" include the number of
correct answers (0 to 3) in the Cognitve Reflection Test (Frederick 2005), Murphy et al.ʼs (2011)
measure of distributional preferences (-16.26 to 63.39), a dummy for ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg
1961) and an indicator for an individualʼs risk preferences. Robust standard errors in parentheses, XX
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(4)(3)(2)(1)VARIABLES
TABLE 2.2: Multivariate Analysis of Misreporting Behavior
Multivariate Analysis of the Reporting Behavior. Table 2.2 reports the results
of a probit regression model with dishonest reporting as the dependent variable. Our
model predicts a binary relationship between the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting
Regime and reporting behavior. Here, we investigate a softer prediction, namely that
a higher WTP in the URR is related to a smaller probability of misreporting. We find
evidence for this prediction: the marginal effect of an increase of EUR 1 in an individ-
ual’s WTP in the URR corresponds to a decrease in the probability of misreporting by
8 to 10 percentage points. Both the sign and the magnitude are robust to the inclusion
of diverse control variables in the alternative specifications (2) to (4). Female subjects
are approx. 13 to 20 percentage points less likely to misreport, while we do not find a
significant effect on the age of subjects. The WTP in the Honest Regime significantly
increases the probability of giving a dishonest report. Our model does not make any
prediction on the relationship of both variables, but, importantly, the coeffi cient on
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the WTP in the URR remains unaffected. Finally, subjects with a higher cognitive
ability (Frederick 2005) are significantly more likely to misreport, while none of the
other post-tests (social value orientation, ambiguity aversion and risk preferences) has
a significant effect.
Result 2.6 Self-selection by a higher WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime leads
to a smaller propensity of misreporting.
2.4.5 Estimation of Lying Costs
The final part of our analysis focuses on an estimation of the individuals’lying costs
based on the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting Regime. This is a subtle way of measur-
ing an individual’s lying costs: first, subjects state their willingness to pay to improve
their chances of drawing the win outcome honestly. Only then some subjects face the
actual decision of whether to misreport or not. Importantly, the decision in both steps
is determined by the individual’s lying costs.
As lying is observable, the estimation procedure is based on the reporting behavior
of subjects with the zero outcome.22 Setting the left side of equation (2.4) equal to zero
and solving for the lying costs θ, we recover a subject’s lying costs as
θ =
{
z/(pG − pB) if ξ(xL) = xH
xH − xL if ξ(xL) = xL
. (2.6)
Figure 2.6 displays the estimated distribution of the lying costs (N = 114). For
honest subjects, the costs of lying outweigh monetary benefits, and hence, lying costs
have to be equal to or higher than EUR 12. This is a lower bound of the true lying
costs, and the proportion of these subjects is captured by the bar indicating lying costs
of EUR 14. For dishonest subjects, the costs of lying are smaller than the monetary
22Our procedure may also allow the estimation of lying costs if the reporting behavior is not observable. The key
challenge here is to separate honest subjects with prohibitively high lying costs but a smaller than predicted WTP
(for behavioral reasons, such as risk preferences or loss aversion), from subjects that are willing to lie but have strictly
positive lying costs. Both groups have a WTP above zero but below EUR 6 in the Untruthful Reporting Regime.
However, since only dishonest subjects have a smaller WTP in the URR as compared to the HR, a similar WTP in
both regimes may indicate honest subjects with prohibitively high lying costs. Classifying the latter group of subjects
as honest allows for a separation of both groups and an estimation as proposed in equation (2.6).
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Note: Estimation of lying costs is based on observed reporting behavior and the WTP in the URR.
FIGURE 2.6: Estimated Distribution of Lying Costs
benefits, and lying costs are recovered as of the WTP in the Untruthful Reporting
Regime. The result of this estimation suggests an almost binary distribution of the ly-
ing costs. Roughly 30 percent of subjects have zero lying costs, and around 50 percent
of subjects have prohibitively high lying costs. A remaining 20 percent of subjects have
intermediate lying costs in the interval EUR (0, 12). This is in line with survey evidence
that subjects’reporting behavior is by and large unresponsive to increased incentives
in cheating games (e.g., Abeler et al. 2019 and Gerlach et al. 2019).
Result 2.7 The majority of subjects have either zero or prohibitively high lying costs,
and only 20 percent of subjects fall in the intermediate range.
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter studies differences between individuals who seemingly have no reservations
of earning money by lying, and those who incur behavioral costs of misreporting and
have a preference for honest money. Whether the former group of individuals are also
more likely to deliberately select into misreporting opportunities is a crucial resulting
question.
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In our theory-guided experiment, we assess individuals’willingness to pay to earn
money in an honest fashion. Based on this, we experimentally investigate whether
subjects self-select into honest and dishonest earning opportunities based on their lying
costs, and whether this self-selection is predictive of their reporting behavior. In the
experiment individuals choose between a Bad and a Good Lottery. The Bad Lottery
has a zero outcome with high probability. In contrast, the Good Lottery yields a zero
outcome with a low probability. We elicit an individual’s willingness to pay for choosing
the Good Lottery over the Bad Lottery in two different regimes. One regime is truthful
by design. The other regime allows for misreporting. In particular, individuals may
claim the win outcome even if their true lottery outcome is zero. The choice of the
Bad Lottery confronts individuals with the misreporting opportunity by a high chance
whereas the Good Lottery involves misreporting only with a low chance.
Our results indicate that the presence of the misreporting opportunity leads to a
strong reduction in the WTP for the Good Lottery. Both in a between-subjects as well
as in a within-subjects comparison, the demand for the Good Lottery in the truthful
regime first-order stochastically dominates its demand in the regime with a misreport-
ing opportunity. However, this finding is not unique for all subjects: they seemingly
anticipate their ability to withstand or surrender to the temptation of dishonest earn-
ings and select the lottery accordingly. Some subjects are not willing to spend money on
the Good Lottery, and tend to misreport whenever the opportunity arises. Other sub-
jects expend considerable resources on making their earnings honestly. In turn, these
subjects are also less likely to misreport on the low lottery outcome. We interpret these
findings as evidence that subjects self-select into misreporting opportunities based on
their individual lying costs.
Our findings may have implications outside the lab. While some situations in real life
leave subjects with little influence on the opportunity to misreport, for instance, as the
opportunity arises by chance or by complete surprise, others allow for an anticipation of
the cheating opportunity and to pre-plan how to behave optimally. An example might
be insurance fraud. Our results suggest that dishonest subjects are more likely to self-
select into environments with cheating opportunities, and consequences for truth-telling
may be detrimental if such self-selection is possible.
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2.A Appendix —Robustness Results for the unrestricted Sample
In our main analysis, we impose a few restrictions on our data set in order to test the
predictions of our theoretical framework. Apart from making a consistent statement of
the WTP, i.e., not switching back and forth for different price levels or switching in the
wrong direction, a further restriction is the limitation of the WTP in the Untruthful
Reporting Regime, and consequently the WTP in the Honest Regime, to EUR 6.23
This leads to a reduction in the total number of observations. In this appendix, we
report (sub)section by (sub)section our findings for the unrestricted sample and show
that they are in line with our results from the main analysis. It is important to note
that testing our hypotheses in the unrestricted sample comes at the cost of analyzing
data outside the scope of our theoretical framework. For the WTP in the URR and the
HR (compare to subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2), no restrictions apply and we analyze the
complete sample (N = 308). As subjects with an honest win outcome (N = 131) have
no incentive to lie, the analysis of the relationship of reporting behavior and the WTP
(compare to subsections 2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5) is restricted to the group of subjects
with a zero outcome (N = 177). In this group, we distinguish between honest subjects
that truthfully reported the zero outcome (N = 98) and dishonest subjects that lied
and reported the win outcome (N = 79).
Subsection 2.4.1: The Demand for the Good Lottery. The pseudo between-
subjects comparison of the WTP in the first decision reveals that the average WTP
in the URR is EUR 4.52 (N = 154) and the average WTP in the HR is EUR 5.38
(N = 154). The difference between both regimes is significantly different from zero
(Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.03) and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the
null hypothesis that both distributions are equal (p = 0.01). Hence, result 2.1 is robust.
Subsection 2.4.2: The Within-Subjects Difference in the Willingness to
Pay. The average within-subjects difference between the HR and URR is EUR 0.56
and significantly larger than zero (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.01, N = 308).
For the decomposition into the three groups (compare to Figure 2.3), we find that 55.8
23Several potential explanations come to mind why the WTP might be larger than EUR 6 in the URR. First, the
WTP for subjects with high lying costs (θ ≥ 12) is determined by risk preferences as in the HR. If a subject’s WTP
in the HR is larger than EUR 6, the WTP in the URR should also be larger than EUR 6. Second, some subjects may
disregard the misreporting opportunity, for example, due to a lack of awareness (see Fosgaard et al. (2013) and Lohse et
al. (2018)). These subjects will not misreport and therefore face the same decision problem as in the HR. Third, some
subjects might have kleptomaniac traits, i.e., they misreport whenever there is an opportunity to do so, even if it does
not pay off in the respective situation. These subjects may want to avoid the temptation to lie and may therefore have
a WTP larger than EUR 6 in the URR.
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percent have a similar WTP in the HR and in the URR, 28.6 percent have a higher
WTP in the HR as compared to the URR and 15.6 percent have a higher WTP in the
URR as compared to the HR. The third group has a slightly larger share than in the
main analysis, but qualitatively the results are the same. Hence, result 2.2 is robust.
Subsection 2.4.3: The Willingness to Pay Conditional on Reporting Be-
havior. As for the main analysis, we compare the WTP conditional on reporting
behavior. Dishonest subjects have a WTP of EUR 5.15 in the HR and of EUR 3.34
in the URR, while honest subjects have a WTP of EUR 5.39 in the HR and of EUR
5.19 in the URR (compare to Figure 2.4). Between honest and dishonest subjects, the
difference in the URR is highly significant, while we find no such difference in the
WTP in the HR (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p < 0.01 and p = 0.52, respectively).
Within-subjects and between regimes, the difference in the WTP is not significant for
honest subjects but is highly significant for dishonest subjects (Wilcoxon signed ranks
test: p = 0.45 and p < 0.01, respectively). Hence, result 2.3 is robust. The interval
regression analysis on the WTP in the URR (Table 2.1) reveals that a higher WTP
in the HR leads to a significantly higher WTP in the URR, both for honest and for
dishonest subjects. This finding for dishonest subjects deviates from our result in the
restricted sample, potentially due to a change in the behavioral pattern for subjects
with a high WTP in the URR.
Subsection 2.4.4: Reporting Behavior Conditional on the Willingness to
Pay. Finally, we investigate the effect of self-selection on reporting behavior. 70 percent
of subjects in the group ‘Bad Lottery self-selected’are dishonest (N = 60), 31 percent
of subjects in the group ‘Bad Lottery assigned’are dishonest (N = 67), and 32 percent
of subjects in the group ‘Good Lottery self-selected’are dishonest (N = 50)(compare
to Figure 2.5). The difference between the first and the second group is highly sig-
nificant, as is the difference between the first and the third group (χ2-test: p < 0.01,
respectively). The difference between subjects with a high WTP that were involuntar-
ily assigned to the Bad Lottery and those that were assigned to the preferred Good
Lottery is small and not significant (χ2-test: p = 0.94). The probit regression analysis
on the reporting behavior (Table 2.1) reveals that a higher WTP in the URR is related
to a higher propensity to misreport. Hence, result 2.5 and result 2.6 are robust.
Subsection 2.4.5: Estimation of Lying Costs. As in our main analysis, we focus
on subjects with the zero outcome in the URR (N = 177). The estimation of the lying
costs reveals a similar pattern as for the restricted sample: 19 percent of subjects have
lying costs of zero, while 55 percent have prohibitively high lying costs and abstain
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from misreporting. A fraction 12 percent of subjects have an intermediate range of
lying costs between θ ∈ (0, 12), while 14 percent of subjects have lying costs θ > 12
but are dishonest. In sum, result 2.7 is robust.
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2.B Appendix —Further Results on the Willingness to Pay
The design of our experiment faced two challenges: On one hand, our reasoning relies
on the fact that any difference in the WTP between both regimes traces back to
the presence of the misreporting opportunity. Hence, we minimized all other potential
differences between the Honest Regime and the Untruthful Reporting Regime. However,
a crucial precondition for the validity of our results was that subjects anticipated the
lack/presence of the misreporting opportunity in the HR/URR when stating their
WTP. This required some subtle changes in the implementation of both regimes. For
example, the result of the lottery was visualized by a wheel of fortune in the URR,
while there was no visualization in the HR. Moreover, the necessity to make a report
per se may have affected the WTP in the URR.
In order to exclude any influence of these differences on subjects’WTP, we ran four
additional sessions of a Robustness Regime (RR) and the Honest Regime.24 This RR
was identical to the URR in all aspects of the implementation, except that subjects
were required to make an honest report by design. Instructions were modified such that
subjects were able to anticipate that they would have no opportunity to misreport. In
contrast, the HR was not modified and is directly comparable to the HR in our main
experiment.
Figure 2.B shows the distribution of the WTP in the Robustness Regime and the
Honest Regime for subjects with a consistent statement of their WTP. We focus on the
regime that was first in order only (compare to section 2.4.1). Unlike for Figure 2.2,
a visual inspection reveals no persistent ‘gap’in the WTP between both regimes but
rather suggests that both curves are equal. The average WTP in the RR is EUR 4.96
(N = 26), while the average WTP in the HR is EUR 5.13 (N = 32). The difference
of EUR 0.16 is not significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test:
p = 0.79), and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal
distributions (p = 1.00). This result is robust to the inclusion of all subjects (EUR 5.47
vs. EUR 5.47, Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.97, N = 74).
The average within-subjects difference between both regimes (compare to section
2.4.2) is EUR 0.15 and not significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed ranks
test: p = 0.56). A vast majority of 77 percent of subjects have a similar WTP in both
regimes (absolute difference is smaller than or equal to EUR 1), while the fraction of
24The sessions with a total of 74 subjects took place in January 2019 at the econlab Munich.
58
Chapter 2 —Better to Win Honestly Than to Get Rich by Lying?
FIGURE 2.B: Comparison WTP in the Robustness Regime and the Honest Regime
subjects with a negative and positive difference is 11 and 12 percent, respectively. We
do not observe a prevalence of the two groups with a positive or a zero difference. In
summary, the comparison of the Robustness Regime and the Honest Regime reveals no
evidence of a difference in the WTP between both regimes which required truthfulness
by design. This suggests that the technical differences in the implementation of the URR
and the HR regime in our main experiment did not affect the WTP in a particular
direction. Instead, it is rather the opportunity to misreport which leads to treatment
effects.
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2.C Appendix —Screen-Shots from the Experiment
As noted in section 2.3.1, subjects found all instructions for the experiment on screen.
This appendix presents a selection of screen-shots from the experiment. The experiment
was conducted in German, and we provide an English translation here. For brevity and
clarity, we only show the most important or most characteristic screen-shots. The actual
experiment consisted of screens before, in between, and after the selection of screens
shown here. Captions of the respective screen-shot provide additional information to
which stage and to which treatment the screen-shot belongs to (URR for Untruthful
Reporting Regime, HR for Honest Regime).
URR: Summary of the procedure. In addition, subjects saw a preview of each of the
steps.
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URR: Explanation of the ‘Bad Lottery’and the ‘Good Lottery’.
URR: Elicitation of the Willingness to Pay for the ‘Good Lottery’.
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URR: Lottery outcome (Wheel of Fortune, final state).
URR: Report of lottery outcome.
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HR: Summary of the procedure. In addition, subjects saw a preview of each of the
steps.
HR: Explanation of the ‘Bad Lottery’and the ‘Good Lottery’.
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Is this item applicable to you? Many questions and forms require a binary answer,
and ‘I don’t know’is not an available option. So what do you do here? Obviously, not
disclosing additional earnings from a speaker’s fee on a business trip to your employer
is deceptive, but privately filling for compensation on delays or collecting miles on
such trips is fine? Concealing losses from impatient investors is accounting fraud, but
praising the new business strategy despite lacking the financial numbers is just how
the game is played? The lack of knowledge in reporting situations like these creates a
trade-off. On the one hand, people can abstain from making a potentially false claim.
This leads to relief from all negative consequences of a dishonest claim in the future.
Nevertheless, people might regret this choice when it turns out that the claim would
have been justified. On the other hand, people can choose the self-serving option.
However, the claim might be untruthful, and ignorance may not serve as a valid excuse
in this case. Hence, people may incur a similar discomfort as if they had deliberately
lied. They may suffer from intrinsic costs of violating (self-imposed) social norms. They
may see their self-image as an honest person endangered. Or they might be afraid of
losing their social image as a person of integrity.
Our research questions are motivated by exactly this trade-off. What do subjects
report when they do not know whether their claim is justified? Is there a behavioral
cost of making a potentially unjustified claim? And how does the reporting decision
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under ignorance relate to the reporting decision with full information? Additionally,
we investigate into the determinants of the reporting decision under ignorance. Does
the probability that a claim is justified affect the reporting behavior? Is there a social
norm regarding reporting under ignorance and does it differ from the norm regarding
reporting with information? Finally, do people prefer to stay ignorant when being able
to self-select, or do they rather pay for information to avoid the ambiguity in the
reporting decision?
We address these questions in a theory-guided laboratory experiment. Based upon
an individual lottery outcome, subjects are eligible either to a high payoff or to a low
payoff. Importantly, subjects can manipulate their earnings as they are asked to claim
the payoff themselves. Along the first treatment dimension, we vary whether subjects
know if their lottery outcome qualifies for the high or low payoff, or whether they need
to make their claim under ignorance. Along the second treatment dimension, we vary
the ex-ante probability that a lottery outcome is eligible to the high payoff (which
is common knowledge). We also elicit subjects’beliefs on the reporting behavior of
others and on the social norm under both information conditions. Moreover, subjects
can self-select into information and ignorance in a modified reporting task at the end
of the experiment.
We find a substantial effect of ignorance on reporting behavior. Ignorant subjects
make almost twice as many unjustified claims as informed subjects. In contrast, the
probability of being eligible to the high payoff itself has only a small impact, but boosts
the fraction of unjustified claims to almost 90 percent under ignorance. Beliefs on the
reporting behavior are accurate on average, but show a bias towards the own claiming
choice. Especially subjects avoiding a potentially unjustified claim expect more other
subjects to do so, too. Moreover, subjects agree that a deliberate unjustified claim
of the high payoff is dishonest. However, the social norm on the reporting behavior
under ignorance is more controversial, and beliefs are spread over the entire sphere
between honesty and dishonesty. Finally, most subjects are information seeking when
being allowed to self-select, but only willing to spend little resources on identifying
their eligibility to payoffs.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. A growing literature investigates the
role of information avoidance and (deliberate) ignorance for decision-making in moral
dilemmas (for recent surveys, see Hertwig and Engel 2016, and Golman et al. 2017). As
dishonest reporting is a specific case of a moral dilemma, we contribute to this litera-
ture in a broader sense. Research on this topic has mostly focused on selfish behavior
at the expense of others. For example, in Dana et al.’s (2007) binary dictator game,
dictators may remain ignorant about the consequences of their allocation choice. Specif-
ically, the payoff-maximizing choice for the dictator is either beneficial for the recipient,
or leads to a reduction in the recipient’s payoff. A significant proportion of dictators
stay ignorant in order to take the (presumably) selfish option while keeping up the
(self-)image of fair person. A number of studies corroborate and extend this finding.
Grossman (2014) shows that the propensity to avoid information depends on whether
it needs to be actively or passively chosen. As peers tend to be more lenient towards
uninformed selfish choices, ignorance may also serve as a strategic device (Conrads
and Irlenbusch 2013 and Bartling et al.’s 2014). Other papers investigate the role of
self-signaling and social-signaling concerns for selfish decision-making under ignorance
(Grossman 2015, and Grossman and van der Weele 2017), highlight differences in in-
formation seeking/avoiding behavior between objective and subjective norm compliers
(Spiekermann and Weiss 2016) or emphasize the effect of self-selecting into ignorance
(Kajackaite 2015, and Serra-Garcia and Szech 2018). We contribute to this literature
by taking a step back. Our reporting task is structurally simpler as it does not involve
any fairness or distributional concerns, any financial harm to other subjects or any
strategic considerations. Making a (potentially) unjustified claim of the high payoff in
our setting is a self-serving but not a selfish action. However, as subjects are asked to
only claim what they are eligible for, claiming a high payoff represents non-compliance
with explicit rules. Our results suggest that ignorance enables subjects to violate this
requirement of an honest claim more often, but that some people feel obliged to refrain
from a potentially unjustified claim in case of doubt.
Secondly, we contribute to the experimental literature on lying behavior (see the sem-
inal contributions by Gneezy 2005, Mazar et al. 2008, and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
2013). Recent surveys find that a substantial fraction of the experimental population
abstains from lying for a monetary gain (Abeler et al. 2019, Gerlach et al. 2019). This
abstention traces back to the behavioral costs of dishonest reporting, which may be
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composed of intrinsic costs, self- or social image concerns and the fear of violating
social norms (e.g. Abeler et al. 2019, Gneezy et al. 2018). The literature has identified
a number of behavioral determinants of dishonesty,1 but evidence on uncertain lies is
scarce. Dugar et al. (2019) show that senders are more likely to deceive receivers if the
harm of the deceptive message is unknown. However, senders are perfectly aware of
sending a deceptive message. We build on this literature. While dishonestly claiming
the high payoff with information resembles the basic setting, the ignorance dimension
is new to the literature. Making a claim of a high payoff under ignorance may be re-
garded ex-ante as a partial lie. Ex-post, however, the claim of the high payoff is either
justified or unjustified. The investigation of this trade-off for honest people is the core
contribution of this chapter.
3.3 Decision Theoretic Framework
Structure2 Consider a risk-neutral, payoff-maximizing agent i. Suppose this agent
takes part in a lottery with multiple outcomes. It is common knowledge that any lottery
outcome is eligible to a high payoff xH with probability p, and to a low payoff xL with
probability (1 − p). However, agents differ with respect to the information on the
eligibility of their specific lottery outcome. Some agents know about their eligibility to
the high or low payoff, denoted by sH or sL, while other agents receive no information,
denoted by s∅. The information is a draw from the information set S = {sH , sL, s∅}.
Irrespective of their draw, agents have to claim either the high payoff xH or the low
payoff xL, i.e. they need to claim ξ(S) ∈ {H,L}. This claimed payoff determines their
monetary payoff from the lottery.
Lying Costs Each agent i is characterized by a tuple (θInf , θIgn) with θInf ∈ [0,∞)
and θIgn ∈ [0,∞). Let θInf denote an agent’s behavioral cost of dishonestly claiming
xH with information, ξ(sL) = H, and θIgn denote an agent’s behavioral cost of making
1For illustration, these determinants include positive and negative externalities of lying (e.g. Erat and Gneezy 2012),
the ex-ante probability of drawing the win outcome (e.g. Abeler 2019), individual versus team decisions (e.g. Kocher
et al. 2018), the role of emotions (e.g Coricelli et al. 2010) or of feelings of being treated unfair (Houser et al. 2012),
the time dimension (e.g. Lohse et al. 2018), the relationship of creativity and dishonesty (Gino and Ariely 2012), or
socio-economic characteristics (e.g. Shalvi and Leiser 2013). The list is by no means complete.
2The notation and structure of the analysis in this section borrows from chapter 2.
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a potentially unjustified claim of xH under ignorance, ξ(s∅) = H.3 Hence, payoffs from
claiming ξ(S) = H and ξ(S) = L are the following:
sH sL s∅
ξ(S) = H xH xH − θInf xH − θIgn
ξ(S) = L xL xL xL
Both the existence and heterogeneity of lying costs θInf is well documented (e.g.
Gneezy et al. 2018 and Abeler et al. 2019) and might be interpreted as the sum of
intrinsic lying costs and self- or social-image concerns. The costs of making a potentially
unjustified claim under ignorance follow from a similar reasoning.4 However, we assume
θIgn ≤ θInf for all agents. Ignorance may serve as an excuse for claiming the high
payoff, leading to smaller intrinsic lying costs. Moreover, (self-imposed) social norms
may require a less clear-cut reporting decision as compared to information, and the self-
and social-image may be less threatened. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of agents.
All of the probability mass is located below the 45-degree line as of θIgn ≤ θInf .5
Reporting with Information The information on the eligibility to payoffs allows
for a conditional reporting strategy. Whenever an agent observes sH , she claims ξ(sH) =
H. In contrast, if an agent observes sL, her reporting behavior depends on her lying
costs θInf . For lying costs θInf ≥ xH − xL, she honestly claims ξ(sL) = L.6 For lying
costs θInf < xH − xL, she dishonestly claims ξ(sL) = H and incurs the lying costs
of θInf . The dotted vertical line in Figure 3.1 illustrates this division into honest and
dishonest agents.
The reporting behavior leads to the following ex-ante payoff from the participation
in the lottery with information
πInf =
{
xH − (1− p)θInf if θInf < xH − xL
pxH + (1− p)xL if θInf ≥ xH − xL
. (3.1)
3For the simplicity of notation, we refer to an agent’s tuple as (θInf , θIgn) instead of (θInf,i, θIgn,i). θInf and
θIgn need not be correlated, e.g. higher lying costs with information do not necessarily imply higher costs of making
a potentially unjustified claim under ignorance. If the latter costs were equal to the expected lying costs, i.e. θIgn =
(1− p)θInf , the decision theoretic framework would boil down to a model of information-seeking behavior only.
4As claiming the low payoff ξ(s∅) = L under ignorance may be unjustified as well, an alternative interpretation of
θIgn is the spread in the behavioral costs of claiming the high payoff ξ(s∅) = H over the low payoff ξ(s∅) = L.
5 In the following, we are agnostic about the distribution of agents, except that none of the subsets M1 to M5 in
Figure 3.1 is empty.
6 In the indifference case θInf = xH − xL, we suppose that an agent honestly claims ξ(sL) = L.
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FIGURE 3.1: Distribution of Agents
Reporting under Ignorance Ignorance on the eligibility to payoffs does not allow
for a conditional reporting strategy. Therefore, an agent’s claim only depends on her
costs of making a potentially unjustified claim θIgn, but is independent on whether
her outcome qualifies for the high or the low payoff. For θIgn ≥ xH − xL, she claims
ξ(s∅) = L, and for θIgn < xH − xL, she claims ξ(s∅) = H. The dotted horizontal line
in Figure 3.1 illustrates the threshold for making a potentially unjustified claim of xH .
The ex-ante payoff from the participation in the lottery under ignorance is indepen-
dent of the probability distribution of payoffs and is given by
πIgn =
{
xH − θIgn if θIgn < xH − xL
xL if θIgn ≥ xH − xL
. (3.2)
Preferences for Information In accordance with their lying costs (θInf , θIgn),
agents may always dishonestly claim xH (subset M1 and M2 in Figure 3.1), may only
make a (potentially) dishonest claim under ignorance (subset M3 and M4), or may
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abstain from making a (potentially) dishonest claim altogether (subset M5).7 A com-
parison of ex-ante payoffs from the information conditions, (1) and (2), allows for
a classification into information seekers and information avoiders. When having the
choice, an agent is willing to pay exactly as much as the difference (1) —(2) for in-




θIgn − (1− p)θInf if θIgn ≤ θInf < xH − xL
θIgn − (1− p)(xH − xL) if θIgn < xH − xL ≤ θInf
p(xH − xL) if θIgn ≥ xH − xL
. (3.3)
In Figure 3.1, δ0 displays agents with z∗ = 0 , i.e. combinations of (θInf , θIgn) for
which an agent is exactly indifferent between information and ignorance. Agents located
below δ0 are better off under ignorance (negative WTP, indicated by dark gray area),
and agents above δ0 are better off with information (positive WTP, indicated by light
gray area).
Change in the Probability Distribution of Payoffs Now consider an increase
in the probability of being eligible to the high payoff xH from p to p′, with p′ > p. We
distinguish two cases here.
First, suppose (θInf , θIgn) does not depend on p. The increase in p neither changes
the thresholds for claiming ξ(sL) = H and ξ(s∅) = H nor leads to a change in the
distribution of agents into the subsetsM1∪M2,M3∪M4, andM5. Reporting behavior
with information is unaffected, while there are relatively less unjustified claims of xH
under ignorance.8 Moreover, information on the eligibility to payoffs becomes more
7There are four different combinations of costs (θInf , θIgn). First, consider agents with θInf < xH − xL ∧ θIgn <
xH − xL. These agents always claim ξ(S) = H, independent of their eligibility to xH or the information condition.
The difference (1) — (2), ∆ = θIgn − (1 − p)θInf , may be positive or negative. Agents in the subset M1 are better off
under ignorance as expected lying costs with information, (1−p)θInf , are larger than the costs θIgn under ignorance. In
contrast, agents in subsetM2 prefer information. The chance of honestly claiming ξ(sH) = H with information outweighs
the reduced lying costs under ignorance that occur with certainty. Second, consider agents with θInf ≥ xH − xL ∧
θIgn < xH − xL. These agents honestly claim ξ(sL) = L with information but claim ξ(s∅) = H under ignorance.
Hence, the smaller lying costs under ignorance ensure getting the high monetary payoff. The difference (1) — (2),
∆ = θIgn− (1−p)(xH−xL), may also be positive or negative. Agents in the subset M3 prefer ignorance to information,
while agents in M4 are better off with information. The latter group rather enjoys an honestly claimed high payoff with
probability p (and an honestly claimed low payoff with probability (1 − p)) than a potentially unjustified high payoff
under ignorance. Third, consider agents with θInf ≥ xH−xL ∧ θIgn ≥ xH−xL. These agents honestly claim ξ(sL) = L
with information but also claim ξ(s∅) = L under ignorance. They rather forgo a justified high payoff than making a
potentially dishonest claim ξ(s∅) = H under ignorance. The difference (1) — (2), ∆ = p(xH − xL), is strictly positive
and agents are always better off with information. Finally, the case θInf < xH − xL ∧ θIgn ≥ xH − xL is ruled out by
assumption.
8The increase in p leads to two changes: first, as information seeking becomes more attractive, more agents are in
M2 and M4 and fewer agents are in M1 and M3. Second, the overall mass of agents eligible to the low payoff xL
decreases. Therefore, relatively more agents forgo a justified high payoff xH by claiming ξ(s∅) = L under ignorance
71
Chapter 3 —Misreporting under Ignorance
attractive. The ex-ante expected payoffs with information increase both for honest and
dishonest agents since they are eligible to xH more often, but does not affect payoffs
under ignorance (cf. equation (3.2)). Hence, δ0 shifts downwards.
Second, suppose (θInf , θIgn) depends negatively on p, i.e. an increase in p leads to
smaller behavioral lying costs. In this case, it seems reasonable that θInf (p)−θInf (p′) <
θIgn(p) − θIgn(p′). The reduction in the costs of claiming xH under ignorance, θIgn,
is larger than the reduction of the costs with information, θInf .9 Consequently, the
distribution of agents in Figure 3.1 changes. Less agents are in the subset M5, while
the composition ofM1 toM4 depends on the relative change in θInf to θIgn. The larger
the relative reduction of θIgn to θInf , the more agents are in M1 and M3 (and the less
are in M2 and M4). Hence, while there are more unjustified claims of xH both with
information and under ignorance, the increase under ignorance is stronger. The shift
in the distribution also counteracts the downward shift of δ0, and more agents may
become information avoiding.
(agents in M5), which counterbalances agents claiming ξ(s∅) = H. Our empirical analysis accounts for this by adjusting
for the expected number of agents eligible to xL. An alternative measure that targets (unjustified) claims of xH at the
individual level would predict no change in reporting behavior under ignorance.
9With information, an agent perfectly knows when she is lying, which implies minor changes in intrinsic lying costs or
self-image concerns. In contrast, it may become easier to convince herself that she is actually eligible to the high payoff
xH under ignorance, especially when p′ ≥ 0.5. The same may hold for the judgment of a social observer. Consequently,
self- and social-image concerns are of less relevance under ignorance the larger p.
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3.4 Experimental Setup
3.4.1 Design
FIGURE 3.2: Treatment Allocation
Overview We use a one-shot, between-subjects design. The experiment (‘Report-
ing Task’) closely follows our decision-theoretic framework. Subjects randomly draw a
lottery outcome and subsequently claim a high payoff or a low payoff based on their
lottery outcome. The first treatment dimension of our 2-by-2 design varies the ex-ante
probability of being eligible to the high payoff. ‘Low Probability’indicates treatments
with probability p = 0.1 and ‘High Probability’indicates treatments with probability
p = 0.5 of being eligible to the high payoff. The second treatment dimension varies
the information on the eligibility to the payoffs. All subjects have common knowledge
about the probability distribution. However, only half of the subjects know whether
their lottery outcome is eligible to the high or the low payoff (‘Information’), whereas
the other half of subjects does not (‘Ignorance’). The first dimension is implemented
between sessions and the second dimension within sessions. Figure 3.2 summarizes the
exogenous treatment allocation.
Procedure of the Reporting Task Figure 3.3 illustrates the procedure of the
Reporting Task. It commences with a short explanation of the computerized lottery
and the subsequent claiming stage. Subjects receive the information that one (five)
of the lottery outcomes is (are) eligible to a payoff of EUR 8, and nine (five) of the
lottery outcomes are eligible to a payoff of EUR 2. Subjects then randomly draw their
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FIGURE 3.3: Procedure of the Reporting Task
individual lottery outcome.10 However, they have no information on the correspondence
of outcomes to payoffs yet. On the next screen, subjects find two closed envelopes and
open exactly one of them. One envelope contains a list explaining which outcome is
eligible to which payoff, while the other envelope is empty.11 Finally, subjects have to
claim either the high payoff of EUR 8 or the low payoff of EUR 2. They are specifically
asked to claim the payoff they are eligible to based on their lottery outcome only. This
concludes the Reporting Task, and subjects receive their claimed payoff as earnings.
Unknown to subjects, they have the possibility to open the second envelope ex-post
after completing the norm elicitation.
Post-Tests Next, we conducted a number of post-tests related to the Reporting
Task.12 First, subjects participate in a variant of the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961)
to measure ambiguity aversion. Second, we elicit subjects’willingness to pay (WTP) for
two different binary lotteries. These lotteries resemble the Reporting Task in terms of
the probability distribution and spreads of payoffs, but do not allow for a manipulation
of payoffs. Third, we elicit the certainty equivalent of a binary lottery with payoffs EUR
0 (probability 0.5) and EUR 1 (probability 0.5). Fourth, we use a claiming task in style
of Tjøtta (2019). Here, subjects are not formally bound by an eligibility restriction and
may claim any amount between EUR 0 and EUR 0.5. Fifth, subjects choose whether
10We use a computerized Wheel of Fortune. Outcomes are represented by letters in random order.
11Prior to their choice of the envelope, subjects read that one envelope is empty and the other one contains the
correspondence of outcomes to payoffs. Both envelopes appear identical when closed. For half of the subjects the right
envelope was empty and for the other half the left envelope. Appendix 3.D provides screen-shots of the Reporting Task.
12We describe the sections/tasks and post-tests in chronological order. Section/tasks were referred to as ‘parts’and
post-tests as ‘scenarios’in the experiment.
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they receive information on the outcome of a compulsory lottery with binary payoffs
of EUR -0.50 (probability 0.5) and EUR 0.50 (probability 0.5).
Beliefs on the Reporting Behavior and Social Norms The next section elicits
subjects’beliefs on the fraction of high and low claims in both information conditions
in the respective session. Moreover, we ask subjects on their beliefs regarding social
norms (inspired by Krupka and Weber 2013). On a scale of 1 (‘completely honest’) to
6 (‘completely dishonest’), subjects estimate the modal answer for two hypothetical
reporting situations. In the first situation, a participant claims the high payoff under
ignorance, and in the second situation, a participant claims the high payoff with the
knowledge that she is only eligible to the low payoff. Subjects receive payment based on
the precision of their estimation. Additionally, subjects state their personal perception
on the social norm in the hypothetical cases (flat payment).
Implementation and Payoffs We conducted our laboratory experiment in Jan-
uary 2020 at the econlab Munich. In total, 16 sessions with 287 subjects took place
(predominantly local university students; average age 23 years; 55 percent female sub-
jects).13 Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was
programmed and implemented with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The average sessions
duration was 75 minutes, and the average payoff was EUR 17 (min. EUR 8.20, max.
EUR 31.3) including a show-up fee of EUR 6 and average earnings of EUR 4.37 from
the post-tests. After completing the experiment, subjects took part in a short socio-
economic questionnaire, the section on Machiavellian traits of the Dark Triad (Jones
and Paulhus 2014) and a short questionnaire regarding the experimental setup.
3.4.2 Hypotheses
Our hypotheses focuses on the Reporting Task with an exogenous allocation to the
information conditions.14 In Section 3.2, we argue that the costs of claiming ξ(sL) = H
with information, θInf , are larger than the costs of claiming ξ(s∅) = H under igno-
rance, θIgn. The implications for reporting behavior for a given probability of being
eligible to xH follow directly.15
13We ran four pilot sessions (N = 81) in December 2019 and January 2020. As the reporting task was equivalent to
the main experiment in two of the pilot sessions, we include respective sessions in our main analysis (N = 39). Results
are robust to this selection choice.
14For a discussion on the self-selection into the preferred information condition, please refer to Appendix 3.A.
15Only agents in subset M1 and M2 in Figure 3.1 make an unjustified claim ξ(sL) = H with information, while
agents in the subsets M1 to M4 make a (potentially) unjustified claim ξ(s∅) = H under ignorance. Agents in M5
who report ξ(s∅) = L counteract the latter group. Denote the union of the five disjoint subsets M1 to M5 by M .
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Hypothesis 3.1 The fraction of unjustified claims under ignorance is larger than the
fraction of unjustified claims with information.
For the effect of an increase in p on reporting behavior, we state two competing
hypotheses. When lying costs (θInf , θIgn) are independent of p, the distribution of
agents in M1 to M5 in Figure 3.1 does not change. The same holds for the threshold
levels for making a (potentially) unjustified claim. With information, the change in
p increases the number of agents who honestly claim ξ(sH) = H, but leaves the re-
porting decision of agents with sL unaffected. Hence, the fraction of unjustified claims
does not change. Under ignorance, the same holds for agents’decisions on claiming
ξ(s∅) = H and ξ(s∅) = L. However, due to the increase in p, agents with large lying
costs θIgn ≥ xH − xL claim ξ(s∅) = L despite being eligible to xH more often, which
decreases the aggregate fraction of unjustified claims of xH .
Hypothesis 3.2A A higher probability of being eligible to xH does not change the
fraction of unjustified claims with information but reduces the fraction under ignorance.
An increase in p may also reduce agents’ lying costs (θInf , θIgn). In particular, it
may lead to a reduction of θIgn relative to θInf . The larger p, the better agents may
convince themselves that they are eligible to xH under ignorance. This may reduce
intrinsic lying costs and dampen self- and social-image concerns, which is not possible
for claiming with information.16 Hence, the increase in the fraction of unjustified claims
under ignorance outweighs the increase with information in this case.
Hypothesis 3.2B A higher probability of being eligible to xH increases the fraction of
unjustified claims with information and under ignorance. The increase under ignorance
is larger than the increase with information.
The resulting fractions of unjustified claims of xH are given by ηInf =
|M1∪M2|






|M| under ignorance. Due to a small expected mass of agents in M5 and our parameterization
(p = 0.1 and p′ = 0.5), the second term of ηIgn should be small. Hence, the fraction of unjustified claims under ignorance
is larger.
16This crowds-out the subset M5, and may change the distribution of agents in M1 to M4 towards M1 and M3 in
Figure 3.1.
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3.5 Results
For the most part, the following analysis focuses on subjects that have an incentive to
make a (potentially) unjustified claim of xH , which leads to an exclusion of subjects who
are eligible to xH with information. This leaves us with 94 subjects with information
(57 subjects in Low Probability and 37 subjects in High Probability), and 177 subjects
under ignorance (78 subjects in Low Probability and 99 subjects in High Probability).
3.5.1 Unjustified Claims with Information and under Ignorance
Note: Reporting behavior by treatment allocation. The left side shows the fraction of claims of the high payoff
to total claims. The dashed lines refer to the ex-ante probability of being eligible to the high payoff.
Brackets indicate significant treatment differences, ∗∗∗p<0.01. The right side displays the fraction of
(expected) unjustified claims of the high payoff among those (expected to be) eligible to the low payoff.
FIGURE 3.4: Reporting Behavior by Treatment Allocation
Fraction of claims of xH
Figure 3.4 (left side) shows the fraction of subjects claiming xH . Here, we abstract
from conditioning on the eligibility to payoffs. In Low Probability, 41 percent claim
xH with information (N = 64) and 69 percent under ignorance (N = 78). In High
Probability, the respective fractions are 76 percent with information (N = 85) and 95
percent under ignorance (N = 99). In all treatments, subjects claim xH significantly
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more often than the ex-ante probability p = 0.1 and p = 0.5 with honest reporting
(Binomial-Test: p < 0.01, respectively).17 More importantly, significantly more subjects
claim xH under ignorance as compared to information (χ2-Test: p < 0.01, respectively).
This finding holds for both probability dimensions and indicates more unjustified claims
under ignorance.
Fraction of unjustified claims of xH
As a next step, we analyze the fraction of unjustified claims of xH . By condition-
ing on the eligibility to payoffs, we can directly compare reporting behavior between
treatments.18 Figure 3.4 (right side) displays the fraction of unjustified claims for Low
Probability on the left and for High Probability on the right. In both treatments, ig-
norance almost doubles the fraction of unjustified claims as compared to information.
The increase from 33 percent to 66 percent and from 46 percent to 90 percent is highly
significant (χ2-Test: p < 0.01, respectively). In line with Hypothesis 3.1, subjects seem
to have smaller costs of making a (potentially) unjustified claim under ignorance than
with information, leading to more unjustified claims under ignorance.
Result 3.1 Ignorance leads to significantly more unjustified claims of xH as compared
to information.
Our findings on an increase in the probability of being eligible to xH are more
nuanced. There is only limited evidence for an effect on reporting behavior with infor-
mation. In High Probability, informed subjects are 13 percentage points more likely to
make an unjustified claim as compared to Low Probability. The increase is moderate
in size and statistically not significant (χ2-Test: p = 0.22). In contrast, the increase in
unjustified claims in High Probability amounts to 24 percentage points under ignorance
(χ2-Test: p < 0.01). This suggests that the costs of making a (potentially) unjustified
claim of xH under ignorance decrease in the probability of being eligible to xH .
Result 3.2 Under ignorance, an increase in the probability of being eligible to xH
leads to more unjustified claims of xH .
17Due to the randomness of the lottery and the random allocation to information conditions, 56 percent were eligible
to xH in High Probability with information.
18The fraction of unjustified claims of xH is given by η̂Inf =
#(ξ(sL)=H)
#(sL)
for information and by η̂Ign =
#(ξ(s∅)=H)−#(E[Elig ib le to xH ])
#(E[Elig ib le to xL])
for ignorance. Less formally, we compute the difference of the total number of claims of
the high payoff subtracted by the (expected) number of justified claims of the high payoff and divide by the (expected)
number of subjects eligible to the low payoff.
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The distribution of lying costs (θInf ,θIgn)
The fraction of unjustified claims also allows for insights on the distribution of sub-
jects’lying costs (θInf , θIgn) as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In Low Probability, one third of
subjects is willing to dishonestly claim xH both with information and under ignorance
(M1 ∪M2). Another third of subjects is willing to claim ξ(s∅) = H under ignorance,
but honestly claims ξ(sL) = L with information (M3∪M4). The last third is not willing
to claim the high payoff under ignorance, ξ(s∅) = L, while these subjects also honestly
claim ξ(sL) = L with information (M5).19 The increase of the ex-ante probability p
shifts the distribution of subjects in equal parts toM1∪M2 andM3∪M4 (both around
45 percent of subjects) at the expense of M5 (reduction to 10 percent of subjects) in
High Probability. This indicates support for Hypothesis 3.2B.
Multivariate analysis of reporting behavior
Table 3.1 shows the results of a multivariate analysis of reporting behavior. We
employ a linear probability model with (potentially) unjustified claiming of the high
payoff as the dependent variable (binary variable).20 In the two baseline specifications
(1) and (2), moving from information to ignorance increases the fraction of (potentially)
unjustified claims by 36 to 42 percentage points. This effect is highly significant and in
line with Hypothesis 3.1. Hence, we confirm our finding on the smaller costs of making
an unjustified claim under ignorance as compared to information. The coeffi cient on
‘High Probability’in specification (1) also suggests a higher propensity of unjustified
claims of xH due to the increased probability of being eligible to xH . However, the
introduction of the interaction term in specification (2) points to a different conclusion.
For ignorant subjects, the total effect of High Probability amounts to a significant
increase of (potentially) unjustified claims by 26 percentage points. Hence, the increase
in p leads to a reduction in the lying costs θIgn. For informed subjects, the effect is
smaller and fails to reach statistical significance. The same holds for the interaction term
‘Ignorance x High Prob.’, which is limited evidence that the increase in the fraction of
(potentially) unjustified claims of xH is larger under ignorance.21 Therefore, our results
are only partially in line with hypothesis 3.2B.
19The empirical distribution is in line with our assumption that none of the subsets M1 to M5 are empty and that
M5 is not disproportionally large.
20 In all specifications, the treatment Low Probability with information is the reference group. We use a linear probabil-
ity model in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the interaction term between the treatment dimensions ‘Ignorance
x High Prob.’(compare to Ai and Norton, 2003). A probit estimation of the reporting behavior is provided in Appendix
3.C. Our main results are robust except for the significance of the interaction term.
21As for the coeffi cient ‘High Probability’in the treatments with information, this might be due to the limited sample
size.
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Ignorance 0.418*** 0.359*** 0.365*** 0.357*** 0.371*** 0.352*** 0.366***
(0.059) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077) (0.095) (0.0960) (0.098)
High Probability 0.213*** 0.126 0.122 0.121 0.096 0.104 0.091
(0.052) (0.104) (0.097) (0.092) (0.104) (0.103) (0.108)
Ignorance x High Prob. 0.131 0.154 0.143 0.152 0.161 0.151















Socio-Eco. Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.299*** 0.333*** 0.193 -0.167 -0.095 -1.052*** -0.305
(0.053) (0.063) (0.225) (0.231) (0.204) (0.336) (0.237)
Observations 271 271 271 271 234 234 233
R2 0.264 0.268 0.304 0.360 0.355 0.371 0.322
Notes: The table presents results of a linear probability regression with potentially unjustified claims as the dependent
variable (dummy variable). The reference group is the treatment with information and a low ex ante probability of being
eligible to the high payoff. "Ignorance" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with ignorance on being eligible
to the high or the low payoff, "High Probability" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with high ex ante
probability (prob. = 0.5) on being eligible to the high payoff, and "Ignorance x High Prob." is the interaction between
both dummies. "Awareness" is self-reported awareness that only the claim determines the payoff (dummy variable), and
"Experience" is self-reported previous participation in a related experiment as the reporting task (dummy variable).
"Ambiguity Aversion" refers to ambiguity seeking, payoff-maximizing and ambiguity averse subjects (-1 to 1), "Taking
Task" refers to the amount taken in a task in style of Tjøtta (2019) (Eurocents 0 to 50), "Information Avoiders" refers
to subjects not willing to learn their lottery outcome in the post-test section (dummy variable), and "Curiosity 2nd
Envelope" refers to subjects opening the second envelope ex post (dummy variable). "Socio-Eco. Controls" include a
dummy for female subjects, the age of the subject, a dummy for subjects with German mother tongue, a dummy for
Economics and Business students and the number of siblings. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses,
*** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1.
VARIABLES (7)(6)(2)(1) (5)(4)(3)
TABLE 3.1: Multivariate Analysis of Misreporting Behavior
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The alternative specifications (3) to (7) confirm the robustness of our main results
in specification (2). Specification (3) introduces a number of socio-economic control
variables. We do not find a gender effect, but Economics and Business students are
significantly more likely to make an unjustified claim.22 Self-reported awareness of the
opportunity to misreport in specification (4) is correlated with a significantly larger
propensity of making a (potentially) unjustified claim (compare to Lohse et al. 2018).
A similar finding holds for self-reported previous experience in experiments akin to the
Reporting Task (specification (5)). Specification (6) includes a number of post-tests.
Ambiguity averse subjects are less likely to make a (potentially) unjustified claim, as
well as subjects that are willing to take less in Tjøtta’s (2019) taking task. Information
avoidance on a lottery outcome is not related to reporting behavior, while subjects that
open the second envelope ex-post are more likely to make a (potentially) unjustified
claim. Finally, a higher score of Machiavellian traits (as measured in the Dark Triad
by Jones and Paulhus 2014) is not correlated to reporting behavior.
3.5.2 Beliefs on the Reporting Behavior
In the complete sample (N = 326), subjects’beliefs on the fraction claiming xH and xL
with information and under ignorance match, on average, the actual reporting behav-
ior.23 Subjects correctly predict the treatment difference between informed and ignorant
subjects in both treatments (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.01, respectively).
However, the accuracy of average beliefs hides a strong bias towards the own claiming
choice. Figure 3.5 (left side: Low Probability (N = 135); right side: High Probability
(N = 136)) displays a between-subjects comparison of subjects’belief conditional on
the own treatment allocation and claiming choice.24 As a reading example, informed
subjects claiming ξ(sL) = L in Low Probability believe that 23 percent of informed
subjects claim xH in this treatment. The black diamonds indicate the actual reporting
behavior. Subjects claiming xL strongly underestimate the fraction of subjects claim-
ing xH in all treatments, while the overestimation by subjects claiming xH is less pro-
nounced. In Low Probability (Figure 5 left side), subjects claiming xL have a downward
22For a discussion on the correlation of different socio-economic factors and dishonest behavior, see the survey by
Gerlach et al. (2019).
23 In Low Probability, the estimated fraction reporting xH with information is accurate and under ignorance under-
estimated by 7 percentage points. In High Probability, the fraction of claims of xH is underestimated by around 10
percentage points.
24We elicited beliefs on both information conditions for each subject. Here, we restrict to subjects’belief for the own
information condition.
81
Chapter 3 —Misreporting under Ignorance
Note: Beliefs of reporting behavior conditional on subjects’treatment allocation and claiming choice. The left
figure shows Low Probability, the right figure shows High Probability. The left side in each figure
displays beliefs of informed subjects, and the right side of ignorant subjects.
FIGURE 3.5: Beliefs on Reporting Behavior by Treatment Allocation
bias of 18 percent with information and of 43 percent under ignorance. The downward
bias for subjects claiming xL in High Probability is comparable and amounts to 29 per-
cent with information and 45 percent with ignorance. We cannot reject that their belief
equals the ex-ante probability of being eligible to xH , p
′
= 0.5 (One-Sample-Median
test: p = 0.83 and p = 0.69), which implies no unjustified claims of xH . In contrast,
the upward bias for subjects claiming xH is smaller in Low Probability, and beliefs are
accurate in High Probability.
In both Low Probability and High Probability, we do not find a treatment difference
in beliefs between informed and ignorant subjects claiming xL (Wilcoxon-Mann Whit-
ney test: p = 0.75 and p = 0.95).25 Hence, subjects claiming ξ(sL) = L or ξ(s∅) = L
may consider the reporting situation with information equivalent to the reporting sit-
uation under ignorance. In contrast, we find a strong treatment difference in beliefs
for subjects claiming xH (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p < 0.01, respectively). As
subjects claiming ξ(sL) = H or ξ(s∅) = H expect other subjects to claim the high
25Since most ignorant subjects claim ξ(s∅) = H in High Probability, only 5 out of 99 subjects claim ξ(s∅) = L in
this treatment. Hence, results for this subgroup may not be robust and should be interpreted cautiously.
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payoff under ignorance more often, they may fear less negative consequences for their
self- and social image.
Result 3.3 Beliefs on the reporting behavior are accurate, on average, but biased to-
wards subjects’own claiming choice.
3.5.3 Social Norms regarding Reporting Behavior
Note: Figure shows the weighted distribution of beliefs on the social norm (as grades from ‘1’to ‘6’).
FIGURE 3.6: Social Norms regarding Reporting Behavior
Adherence to social norms may be an important motivation for subjects’reporting
decision. While the true eligibility is a fixed point for reporting behavior with informa-
tion, social norms for reporting under ignorance lack such a benchmark. To shed light
on this matter, we ask subjects on their belief of the modal answer for two hypothetical
reporting situations (N = 287). In the first situation, subjects state their belief on the
social norm for claiming ξ(s∅) = H under ignorance on a scale form 1 (‘completely
honest’) to 6 (‘completely dishonest’). In the other scenario, they evaluate claiming
ξ(sL) = H with information on the same scale. We discuss the beliefs on social norms
here, which are broadly in line with the individual perception of subjects.
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Figure 3.6 displays the distribution of beliefs on the social norm by treatment
weighted by the probability mass of each grade. Grades above the dashed line are in
the dishonest sphere, while grades below are in the honest sphere. Claiming ξ(sL) = H
with information is considered dishonest (average grade for Low Probability and for
High Probability is 5.25 and 5.05 out of 6). The mass of the two grades ‘6’(‘completely
dishonest’) and ‘5’comprise around 80 percent of subjects in both treatments, leaving
considerable less mass on all other possible grades. For the hypothetical case with in-
formation, we find no major treatment differences between Low Probability and High
Probability (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.09), except for a slight shift from
grade ‘6’to grade ‘5’in High Probability.
In comparison to information, the average belief on the social norm for making a
(potentially) unjustified claim under ignorance is significantly shifted towards honesty
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.01, respectively). Claiming ξ(s∅) = H is considered
somewhere between honesty and dishonesty, and average grades are 3.27 (Low Proba-
bility) and 2.89 (High Probability). Importantly, there is much less consensus on the
social norm. Subjects’beliefs are distributed equally along the grades ’1’(‘completely
honest’) to ‘5’, and only grade ‘6’(‘completely dishonest’) has less probability mass
than the other grades. For Low Probability, 49 percent of subjects belief that claiming
ξ(s∅) = H is considered more dishonest than honest, while 33 percent do so for High
Probability. Hence, the increase in the probability of being eligible to xH significantly
shifts the social norm under ignorance (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.02).26 Due
to the more dispersed social norm under ignorance, some of the ignorant subjects may
not feel bound to a strict social norm. This might be one explanation for the increased
fraction of unjustified claims under ignorance.
Result 3.4 In contrast to information, social norms for reporting under ignorance
are controversial. The claim of a high payoff under ignorance is considered in between
honesty and dishonesty.
26 In contrast to the beliefs on the reporting behavior, beliefs on social norms are less biased towards the own claiming
choice.
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3.6 Discussion
While the lack of knowledge increases the propensity of making unjustified claims, a
substantial minority prefers to forgo a justified payoff to the risk of being dishonest.
Some people seem to consider ignorance not as a valid excuse for self-serving dishonest
behavior, and face similar costs as for deliberate lying. The bad news is that this
behavior is almost crowded-out completely when the likelihood of being eligible to the
high payoff appears suffi ciently high. This indicates that the reporting decision under
ignorance may crucially depend on the ability to convince oneself of the eligibility to
the high payoff. The higher the ex-ante probability of being eligible to xH , the easier
ignorant subjects can do so. The channel potentially works via intrinsic lying costs and
self-image concerns, and is in line with our finding that the probability dimension has
only a significant impact under ignorance. In addition, adherence to social norms and
social image concerns may explain reporting behavior as well. As there is no consensus
regarding the social norm under ignorance, subjects may feel less obliged to make a
justified claim and may be less afraid of negative consequences to their image.
Implications arise to the design of forms and to the accessibility of information.
While some subjects may take their ignorance as a strategic device to choose to self-
serving option, other subjects may make an unjustified claim accidently due to their
lack of knowledge. Providing options such as ‘I don’t know’in offi cial forms may not be
satisfactory from the point of the inquirer at first glance, but can reduce the propensity
of the self-serving (dishonest) reporting behavior. Especially when consequences of a
dishonest report have severe consequences, the indication of a lack of knowledge may
be beneficial for both sides. This is also in line with the finding that most subjects are
information seeking when information is free of costs (cf. Appendix 3.A). Consequently,
information on rules and regulations should be as accessible as possible. A prominent
example might be forms for the tax declaration, which people oftentimes perceive as
complicated. However, our findings on self-serving behavior under ignorance should
not be overstressed, as ignorance does not prevent legal prosecution and punishment
(Ignorantia legis non excusat). This may counterbalance or even reverse our findings,
and subjects may try to avoid a conflict with the law by abstaining from making a
potentially unjustified claim altogether.
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3.7 Conclusion
People refrain from making a self-serving lie more often than not. However, missing
information or a lack of knowledge on laws and regulations might leave people insecure
on whether they tell the truth. The answer ‘I don’t know’may not be satisfactory
to conversation partners, and forms often only allow for binary yes-or-no decisions.
Here, honest people face a trade-off between forgoing a potentially justified claim and
the risk of being a liar. We investigate into this trade-off and ask what people report
when they do not know whether their claim is justified. In our laboratory experiment,
subjects have to claim either a low payoff or a high payoff in an income-reporting task.
Importantly, they are only eligible to one of the payoffs. Along the first dimension, we
vary whether subjects know of their eligibility to payoffs. Along the second dimension,
we vary the ex-ante probability of being eligible to the high payoff, which is common
knowledge. Independent of their treatment allocation, subjects have to claim one of
the payoffs, which in turn determines their earnings. We elicit subjects’beliefs on the
reporting behavior and on social norms, and corroborate our findings by a number of
post-tests.
We find that ignorance of the eligibility to payoffs has a large effect on reporting be-
havior. The fraction of unjustified claims of the high payoffalmost doubles as compared
to informed subjects. In contrast, the probability dimension in itself has a minor im-
pact. However, subjects are particularly prone to claim the high payoffunder ignorance
when the probability of being eligible is high. These findings suggest that the behav-
ioral costs of making an unjustified claim under ignorance are smaller than lying costs
with information. Still, some of the ignorant subjects feel obliged to only claim the low
payoff. Further results indicate that beliefs on the reporting behavior are accurate, on
average, but biased towards the own claiming choice. In particular, subjects that refrain
from making a (potentially) unjustified claim underestimate the actual claiming rate of
high payoffs. Social norms on the reporting behavior under ignorance are controversial,
and subjects’beliefs are distributed over the entire scale from honesty to dishonesty. In
contrast, there is consensus that unjustified claiming the high payoff with information
is considered dishonest. Hence, subjects are more comfortable to make an unjustified
claim under ignorance as negative consequences for their self- and social-image may be
less pronounced. After all, taking a controversial and self-serving action with a lack of
knowledge may be judged less harshly.
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3.A Appendix —The Self-Selection Task
Appendix 3.A. presents results on the ‘Self-Selection Task’, which allowed subjects to
choose their preferred information condition. Results should be taken with a grain of
salt as we conducted the Self-Selection Task at the very end of our experiment. Hence,
the preceding belief and norm elicitation may affect the WTP for information. As the
Self-Selection Task is structurally similar to the Reporting Task, previous reporting
behavior may also contaminate behavior in the Self-Selection Task.27
Design
The Self-Selection task is structurally similar to the Reporting Task but allows for
self-selection into ignorance or information. Along the probability dimension, half of
subjects are allocated to Low Probability (p = 0.1) and half of subjects to High Proba-
bility (p
′
= 0.5), irrespective of the treatment allocation in the Reporting Task.28 After
participation in the lottery, subjects state their willingness to pay (WTP) for opening
both envelopes over leaving both envelopes closed. If their WTP was larger or equal to
a pre-determined price (EUR 0.20), subjects open both envelopes but have to pay the
pre-determined price. In contrast, if their WTP was smaller than the pre-determined
price, subjects have to leave both envelopes closed and do not pay anything. We elicited
the WTP for information in the range of EUR -2 to EUR 2 using the strategy method
(Selten 1967). As in the Reporting Task, subjects had to claim their payoff based on
their lottery outcome in the final stage of the Self-Selection Task. The Self-Selection
Task was paid out only with 20 percent probability and subjects were not able to
anticipate the task.
Hypotheses
This second set of hypotheses focuses on the self-selection into the preferred informa-
tion condition (Self-Selection Task). Agents with costs θIgn ≥ xH−xL claim ξ(s∅) = L
under ignorance and ξ(sL) = L with information (subset M5 in Figure 3.1). They pay
for the chance of an honest high payoff xH , and have a WTP z = p(xH − xL) for
information (cf. equation (3.3)). Agents with θIgn < xH − xL claim ξ(s∅) = H under
27For other settings with repeated misreporting opportunities, see for example Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
Abeler et al. (2014) or Effron et al. (2015).
28We inform subjects that their lottery outcome and the correspondence of outcomes to payoffs in the Self-Selection
Task is independent to the lottery outcome and the correspondence in the Reporting Task.
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ignorance. However, they may claim ξ(sL) = L or ξ(sL) = H with information as
θInf ≥ θIgn (subsets M1 to M4). These agents have a WTP z < p(xH − xL) for infor-
mation (cf. equation (3.3)). For a price z̄ = 0 (as depicted in Figure 3.1), all subjects
that self-select into ignorance (subsets M1 and M3) claim ξ(s∅) = H, while subjects
that self-select into information may claim ξ(sL) = L or ξ(sL) = H. The larger the
pre-determined price z̄, the more subjects select into ignorance (and claim ξ(s∅) = H),
and the less subjects remain in subsets M2 and M4 relative to M5. At the boundary
price z̄ = p(xH − xL), all agents with information honestly claim ξ(sL) = L. Conse-
quently, the fraction of unjustified claims under ignorance is larger as with information.
More importantly, subjects that self-selected into ignorance are more prone to make
an unjustified claim as compared to ignorant subjects under exogenous allocation.29
Hypothesis 3.A1 When agents self-select into their preferred information condition,
ignorant subjects make more unjustified claims of xH
(i) than subjects that self-select into information;
(ii) than ignorant subjects under exogenous allocation.
Finally, the effect of an increased probability of being eligible to xH on the WTP for
information depends on the effect of the increase in p on the distribution of lying costs
(θInf , θIgn). If (θInf , θIgn) is independent of p, information becomes more attractive rel-
ative to ignorance as of the larger probability of being eligible to xH . Hence, more agents
are willing to pay for information. In contrast, when (θInf , θIgn) depends on p, the di-
rection of the change in the WTP is ambiguous and depends on the relative change of
θInf to θIgn. As argued, it seems reasonable that θInf (p)− θInf (p′) < θIgn(p)− θIgn(p′),
which may imply less information seeking behavior. However, we abstain from a com-
peting hypothesis due to the ambiguity here.
Hypothesis 3.A2 The increase in the probability of being eligible to xH increases
information seeking behavior.
29The effect of self-selection for informed subjects remains ambiguous and depends on the distribution of agents in
the subsets M1 to M4.
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Results for the Self-Selection Task
Note: The left side displays the WTP for information conditional on reporting behavior. The right side displays
the fraction of (expected) unjustified claims of the high payoff among those (expected to be) eligible to the low payoff.
FIGURE 3.A1: Behavior in the Self-Selection Task.
First, we analyze the WTP for information based on reporting behavior (Figure 3.A1
left side). We restrict the analysis to subjects with a consistent statement of the WTP
that have an incentive to make an unjustified claim (N = 254).30 In Low Probability,
subjects with a high claim xH are information avoiders, on average, and subjects with
a low claim xL are information seekers. We find a small but significant difference in the
WTP for information between both groups (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: EUR -0.12
vs. EUR 0.19, p < 0.01). In contrast, we find no such difference in High Probability
(Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.91). While subjects with a high claim xH have
a similar WTP for information as in Low Probability, subjects with a low claim xL
reduce their WTP to EUR -0.41 and are avoding information as well.31
30We elicit subjects’WTP with a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism in form of a multiple
price list. Inconsistent statements include multiple switches or switches in the wrong direction. This restriction leads to
exclusion of 14 out of 268 subjects and does not affect our results.
31The behavior in this group is not in line with any of our predictions. As honestly claiming ξ(sL) = L and ξ(sH) = H
with information leads to a strictly larger payoff than claiming ξ(s∅) = L under ignorance, these subjects should have
a WTP of at least EUR 0 for information. In combination with the small number of subjects in this cell (N = 9), our
findings for this group may not be robust and should be treated cautiously.
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As a next step, we compare the reporting behavior under self-selection. For a pre-
determined price level of EUR 0.20, 19 percent of subjects self-select into information
in Low Probability and 16 percent in High Probability. Figure 3.A1 (right side) dis-
plays the rate of unjustified claims dependent on the treatment allocation (compare to
Figure 3.4 in section 3.5.1). We confirm the strong increase in the fraction of unjus-
tified claims under ignorance in Low Probability (χ2-Test: 46 percent vs. 88 percent,
p < 0.01).32 In line with Hypothesis 3.A1(ii), we also find that almost 90 percent of
ignorant subjects make an unjustified claim of xH . This is close to the theoretically
predicted corner solution under self-selection, and a significant increase as compared to
the exogenous allocation in section 3.5.1 (χ2-Test: 88 percent vs. 66 percent, p < 0.01).
In High Probability, effects are less clear-cut. While the fraction of unjustified claims
under ignorance is comparable to the fraction under exogenous allocation, the fraction
of unjustified claims with information significantly increases to 85 percent (χ2-Test:
46 percent to 85 percent, p < 0.01). Consequently, we do not find a significant dif-
ference between information and ignorance (χ2-Test: p = 0.87).33 Nevertheless, results
are broadly in line with Hypothesis 3.A1(i) and (ii).
Result 3.A1 Subjects that self-select into ignorance are most likely to make a (po-
tentially) unjustified claim of the high payoff.
We conclude with a comparison of the WTP for information. We focus on subjects
with a consistent statement of the WTP, which leaves us with 137 subjects in Low
Probability and 133 subjects in High Probability. Figure 3.A2 shows the cumulative
distribution of subjects choosing information over the entire range of prices (EUR -2 to
EUR 2). It has a similar interpretation as a demand curve for information. A substan-
tial minority of 31 and 35 percent avoids information (WTP z < 0), while the majority
of subjects are information seekers (WTP z ≥ 0). However, almost 79 and 73 percent
of subjects have a WTP in the interval [EUR -0.2, EUR 0.2]. This suggests rather small
costs of making a (potentially) unjustified claim both with information and under ig-
norance. We do not find a significant difference in the average WTP between both
32As the treatment allocation in the Self-Selection Task was independent of the Reporting Task, a within-subjects
comparison is not suitable. The econometric approach of a between-subjects comparison chosen here is not completely
appropriate to the data structure either, but seems to be the best alternative.
33Both for Low Probability and High Probability, the larger propensity of informed subjects to make an unjustified
claim as compared to the exogenous allocation in 3.5.1 seems un-intuitive. A natural prediction would be that mostly
honest subjects self-select into information. However, a large probability mass in M2 and M3 may lead to the observed
reporting behavior. As we were agnostic about the distribution into the subsets, and due to discussed methodological
issues of the Self-Selection Task, the findings for informed subjects should not be overstressed.
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FIGURE 3.A2: Willingness to Pay for Information
treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test: p = 0.71), and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test
does not reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions (p = 0.89). The distribution
of the WTP for information in Low Probability is somewhat more concentrated around
EUR 0, while there are both slightly more subjects with a positive and negative WTP
for information in High Probability. Nevertheless, the WTP for information is largely
unresponsive to the probability dimension, leading to no support of Hypothesis 3.A2.
Result 3.A2 When being able to choose, most subjects prefer information to igno-
rance. The probability dimension does not influence this choice.
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3. B Appendix —Robustness Results for WTP for Information
We argue that the WTP for information is closely related to the (spread of) lying costs
(θInf , θIgn) with information and under ignorance (equation (3.3)). However, other fac-
tors might influence the WTP for information as well. For example, some subjects may
consider their ignorance on the eligibility to payoffs as being eligible to the low payoff
xL. In this case, the WTP for information is equivalent to the WTP for participation
in a lottery with the same probability distribution and spreads of payoffs.34 To exclude
this possibility and to draw further inferences about the WTP for information, sub-
jects were offered to participate in two binary lotteries in the post-test section. The
first (second) lottery yields EUR 0 with probability p = 0.9 (p
′
= 0.5) and EUR 6
with probability p = 0.1 (p
′
= 0.5). We impose the restriction of making a consistent
statement of the WTP, which leaves us with 131 subjects in Low Probability and 125
subjects in High Probability.35
FIGURE 3.B: Comparison of the WTP for Information to the WTP for participation
Figure 3.B compares the WTP for information in the Self-Selection Task (solid line)
to the WTP for the participation in the equivalent lottery (dashed line). The gray
shaded area indicates the WTP for participation under maximization of expected pay-
offs.36 The left side displays the comparison for Low Probability and the right side for
High Probability. The average WTP for participation in both lotteries is significantly
larger than the average WTP for information (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, EUR 0.51
vs. EUR -0.05 and EUR 1.90 vs. EUR -0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.01). For a price of EUR
34Moreover, risk aversion and loss aversion may affect the WTP.
35The restriction applies only to 9 to 10 percent of subjects. Our results are robust to this restriction.
36As we measure the WTP in intervals, we do not indicate a point prediction here.
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0, almost all subjects participate in the respective lottery, whereas only 69 percent and
65 percent are willing to receive information. This difference becomes even larger for
strictly positive prices (91 percent vs. 17 percent at a price of EUR 0.20 for Low Prob-
ability and 92 percent vs. 17 percent at a price of EUR 0.50 for High Probability). The
gap in the WTP persists over the whole range of relevant price levels and only closes
when prices approach the theoretical maximum WTP for participation. This indicates
that the WTP for information originates from a different source than the WTP for par-
ticipation in the lotteries, namely a subject’s costs of making a potentially unjustified
claim under ignorance and with information.
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3.C Appendix —Robustness Results for Section 3.5.1
Table 3.C displays the results of a probit regression analysis of the reporting behav-
ior. Specifications (1) to (7) are equivalent to the specifications in Table 3.1 and show
the robustness of our results. In the two baseline specifications (1) and (2), moving
from information to ignorance significantly increases the rate of (potentially) unjus-
tified claims. The marginal effect amounts to 25 to 34 percentage points. As for the
linear probability estimation, the coeffi cient on ‘High Probability’in specification (1)
suggests an increase in the fraction of unjustified claims. However, the introduction of
the interaction term in specification (2) reveals that this effect only holds for subjects
in the ignorance treatments. The marginal (total) effect in this group is 30 percentage
points. Besides the total effect for ignorant subjects, specification (2) also indicates evi-
dence for a larger increase in the propensity of making a (potentially) unjustified claim
of xH than with information. As of the potentially biased estimation of interaction
terms in probit specifications (Ai and Norton 2003), this result should be interpreted
cautiously.
Concerning the alternative specifications (3) to (7), results are in line with the linear
probability estimation. We confirm the significant positive correlation of Economics
and Business students to (potentially) unjustified claiming, but also find a significant
correlation with age and gender in some of the specifications. Self-reported awareness of
the opportunity to make unjustified claims as well as self-reported previous experience
with the Reporting Task are related to a higher propensity to make a (potentially)
unjustified claim (specification (4) and (5)). Results on the post-tests in specification
(6) are broadly in line with the linear probability estimation, while there is no evidence
for a correlation with Machiavellian traits in specification (7).
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Ignorance 1.248*** 0.933*** 0.999*** 1.055*** 1.151*** 1.072*** 1.068***
(0.180) (0.228) (0.242) (0.243) (0.303) (0.297) (0.297)
High Probability 0.764*** 0.329 0.345 0.367 0.278 0.351 0.257
(0.176) (0.269) (0.268) (0.282) (0.316) (0.303) (0.304)
Ignorance x High Prob. 0.809** 0.906** 0.917** 1.035** 1.126** 0.964**















Socio-Eco. Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.611*** -0.431** -0.902 -1.433** -2.911*** -6.604*** -3.561***
(0.159) (0.172) (0.640) (0.674) (0.920) (1.417) (1.053)
Observations 271 271 271 271 234 234 233
(7)VARIABLES
Notes: The table presents results of a probit regression with potentially unjustified claims as the dependent variable
(dummy variable). The reference group is the treatment with information and a low ex ante probability of being eligible
to the high payoff. "Ignorance" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with ignorance on being eligible to the
high or the low payoff, "High Probability" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with high ex ante probability
(prob. = 0.5) on being eligible to the high payoff, and "Ignorance x High Prob." is the interaction between both
dummies. "Awareness" is self-reported awareness that only the claim determines the payoff (dummy variable), and
"Experience" is self-reported previous participation in a related experiment as the reporting task (dummy variable).
"Ambiguity Aversion" refers to ambiguity seeking, payoff-maximizing and ambiguity averse subjects (-1 to 1), "Taking
Task" refers to the amount taken in a task in style of Tjøtta (2019) (Eurocents 0 to 50), "Information Avoiders" refers
to subjects not willing to learn their lottery outcome in the post-test section (dummy variable), and "Curiosity 2nd
Envelope" refers to subjects opening the second envelope ex post (dummy variable). "Socio-Eco. Controls" include a
dummy for female subjects, the age of the subject, a dummy for subjects with German mother tongue, a dummy for
Economics and Business students and the number of siblings. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses,
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TABLE 3.C: Robustness Analysis of Misreporting Behavior
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3.D Appendix —Screen-Shots from the Experiment
As noted in section 3.4.1, subjects found all instructions for the experiment on screen.
This appendix presents a selection of screen-shots from the experiment. The experiment
was conducted in German, and we provide an English translation here. For brevity and
clarity, we only show the most important or most characteristic screen-shots. The actual
experiment consisted of screens before, in between, and after the selection of screens
shown here. Captions of the respective screen-shot provide additional information to
which stage and to which treatment the screen-shot belongs to.
All Treatments: Explanation of the probability distribution before participation in
the lottery (here: Low Probability).
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All Treatments: Initial state of the Wheel of Fortune before pointer starts spinning.
All Treatments: Final state of Wheel of Fortune with individual lottery outcome.
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All Treatments: Initial situation before subjects open one of the envelopes.
Information: Subject opened the envelope with information (by chance).
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Ignorance: Subject opened the envelope without information (by chance).
All Treatments: Subjects claim their payoff from the lottery.
99
Chapter 3 —Misreporting under Ignorance
100
4
Compliance in Teams —Implications
of Joint Decisions and Shared Consequences
This chapter is based of joint work with Tim Lohse.1
4.1 Introduction
To comply, or not to comply: that is a question potentially worth billions of dollars as
the dividend arbitrage trading scheme ‘CumEx’or the Volkswagen emissions scandal
show. These violations of tax laws and pollution standards give cause for concern. De-
spite enormous fines levied on companies, the well-documented deterring effect of audits
seems to lose its bite when teams make compliance decisions. One crucial difference
with an individual compliance problem is the involvement of several agents or parties.
For example, in order to run the highly complex share deals of the CumEx tax fraud
scheme (which had no economic purpose other than to receive tax reimbursements for
taxes that were never paid) employees both within, as well as between, banks, stock
traders, and law firms had to cooperate. Apart from this team decision-making, the
concomitant economic consequences — the gains from undetected wrongdoing or the
losses in the case an audit reveals the misconduct —oftentimes do not arise to a single
decision-makers alone. Typically, the entire company and potentially also third parties
1The chapter is based on the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper 2018—03 ‘Com-
pliance in Teams — Implications of Joint Decisions and Shared Consequences.’ For the dissertation, this chapter has
been editorially adapted. These changes are the sole responsibility of the author of this dissertation.
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can be affected. Thus, compliance decisions within teams might also hinge on the fact
that the economic liability is shared among several agents.
This anecdotal evidence leads to several research questions. Are dyads as the small-
est but yet important size of a team more prone toward non-compliance than single
individuals? How is the team decision different from the decision by individuals and
what is their motivation for (non-)compliance? Most importantly, what are the key
determinants of the compliance behavior of teams? Is it the fact that the compliance
decision is made by several agents in a team, or rather the fact that the monetary
consequences are shared between team members? Answering these questions may give
valuable insights into how non-compliance can effectively be reduced and under which
conditions an auditing mechanism is suited to tackle non-compliance by teams.
In order to answer these questions, we run a laboratory compliance experiment. Non-
compliance, i.e., falsely claiming to have a low income although the true income is high,
and thereby evading a deduction, can pay off. However, an exogenous audit may apply,
revealing the underreporting and leading to a fine. Along the first dimension of our
2-by-2 design, subjects either decide alone or in a team on their income reports. The
two team members may coordinate before their decision-making via a chat. Along the
second dimension, subjects are liable for the economic consequences either alone or in
a team, i.e., team members either share their final earnings or not. Both dimensions
are crucial but they are also intertwined.
Our results are as follows. Dyads are significantly more non-compliant than single
individuals. Joint decision-making per se contributes little to this increase in non-
compliance. In contrast, it is the shared (rather than individual) liability which leads
to significantly more misreporting and accounts for most of the increased dishonesty of
teams. Hence, our findings suggest that holding each team member fully (rather than
only partially) liable might effectively restore compliance in teams. Further results
indicate that teams successfully coordinate by making their decisions consensually. We
also find evidence for behavioral spillovers between team members. More often teams
tend to be dishonest, or sometimes honest, for both declarations. Evaluating the team
chat protocols reveals that team members are mostly concerned about the risk of an
audit and the monetary consequences of the report. Moral concerns about violating
social norms of honesty only play a minor role.
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4.2 Related Literature
We contribute to the well established literature on tax compliance (see Alm 2019 and
Mascagni 2018 for surveys), which recently started to link the analysis of compliance
behavior with methods and theories from psychology. For example, Christian and Alm
(2014) show that the promotion of empathy and sympathy may help to increase com-
pliance. Dulleck et al. (2016) provide evidence that psychic stress, arising from the
contemplation of the possibility to evade, can increase compliance. So far, only a few
papers experimentally study the role of social interactions within a group for tax eva-
sion. Fairness seems to play an important role, but not social conformity (Fortin et
al. 2007). Publicly exposing the deceivers in the laboratory deters evasion (Coricelli et
al. 2010, 2014) and can have both a negative contagion effect and a positive shaming
effect (Laury and Wallace 2005). As opposed to individual tax compliance, Abraham
et al. (2017) show that joint tax compliance is positively affected by social norms.
An inherent feature of team decision-making is also the transmission of information
by taxpayer communication about the audit rate and compliance behavior of others,
as studied by Alm et al. (2009, 2017). We contribute to the experimental compliance
literature by explicitly studying differences in the compliance behavior between indi-
viduals and teams. Our differentiation between the collective decision and the shared
economic consequences among the team members may advance our understanding of
non-compliance and tax evasion. Given compelling evidence concerning the external
validity of tax compliance studies undertaken in the laboratory (Alm et al. 2015), a
lab experiment is particularly well suited to shed light on this matter. Importantly, we
provide evidence that it is the shared liability that boosts non-compliance and suggest
that enforcement policies aiming at this dimension might be particularly promising.2
As the compliance decision is a specific case of the more general question of whether
or not to be honest, our study also adds to the literature on dishonesty in teams.
Whereas Sutter (2009) shows that teams are as deceptive as individuals, Cohen et al.
(2009) argue that groups might cheat even more. Findings by Weisel and Shalvi (2015)
in a setting of a sequential dice roll (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) point in the
same direction, but stress the role of aligned incentives. Closest to our setting, Kocher
et al. (2018) conduct a variation of the dice-rolling experiment and confirm higher
2We abstract from, first, other non-individualistic features of compliance problems such as the provision of public
goods or voting on taxation parameters (for a survey on some aspects, see Alm 2014), and second, from theoretical
discussions of corporate tax evasion (Chen and Chu 2005, Crocker and Slemrod 2005), or collaboration between two
agents with heterogeneous lying aversion (Boadway et al. 2002).
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misreporting in teams. Communication in teams is crucial for coordination. Inherent
to team decisions is also the question of who benefits and who loses from a dishonest
report. There is evidence that subjects lie more often if others benefit (Wiltermuth
2011, Gino et al. 2013, Conrads et al. 2013), but they lie less often when it comes at
the expense of oneself or of others (Erat and Gneezy 2012). Compliance problems differ
from mere cheating opportunities, and we contribute to this literature which typically
abstracts from auditing mechanisms. Including both the liability dimension and the
decision-making dimension allows us to investigate how these two key determinants
impact the decision of being (dis)honest. The possibility of an audit also introduces
extrinsic costs such as monetary fines, and dishonest reporting imposes a (monetary)
risk for the team partner. Moreover, regret or shame may be more pronounced in
a compliance framework. Finally, based on the analysis of the chat protocol we can
identify the underlying motivations of the compliance decision in a team.
In light of the real world examples of non-compliance sketched above, our findings
provide answers to important policy questions such as if, and under which circum-
stances, audits might be able to restore honesty in team decisions. More specifically, do
companies need to take a setback and rely more on the decisions of single employees
rather than teams to prevent dishonesty? Should law enforcement hold both parties
of a joint non-compliance decision (partially) liable, or rather focus on punishing one
party to the full extent?
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4.3 The Experiment
4.3.1 Design of the Laboratory Experiment
FIGURE 4.1: Treatment Allocation
Overview. The experiment follows a 2-by-2 between-subjects design as illustrated
in Figure 4.1. First, we vary whether subjects decide on their declared income individ-
ually or jointly in a dyad.3 Second, we vary whether subjects are liable individually
or collectively, i.e., on an individual level to the full extent or on a team level to pro-
portional amounts. All treatments use a tax compliance task with 10 periods. In each
period, a subject i earns with probability 0.2 a low income Y l (400 Experimental Cur-
rency Units [ECU] = EUR 8) and with probability 0.8 a high income Y h (ECU 1000
= EUR 20). While no deduction applies to a low income, subjects are supposed to pay
a deduction ∆ of ECU 400 on a high income. The deduction returns to the laboratory.
For declarations of a high income, the deduction of ECU 400 is subtracted automati-
cally from the income without further investigation. In contrast, declarations of a low
income are independently from each other audited by the computer with a fixed prob-
ability p = 0.5.4 In the case of no audit or a truthful declaration of a low income, no
deductions or fines apply. However, if an audit reveals non-compliance, i.e., if a high
3The crucial behavioral differences we are studying primarily depend on whether a person is acting alone or not. We
define a team as a dyad (cf. Conrads et al. 2013, Muehlheusser et al. 2015, or Weisel and Shalvi 2015) being the smallest
but yet important size of a group. Firms, public administrations or the military frequently rely on dyads in the form of
dual control in the course of which two persons have to agree on a certain decision.
4We have chosen a random audit because it is the easiest to understand. Other papers study alternatives, such as en-
dogenous audit mechanisms where the audit probability increases with the estimated degree of underreporting (Gilpatric
et al. 2011; Cason et al. 2016) or subjects’perceived untrustworthiness (Konrad et al. 2017). Our parametrization of
incomes, deduction and fine borrows from Konrad et al. (2017).
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income has been falsely declared as low, subjects must remargin the deduction of ECU
400 topped up by a fine Θ of ECU 200.5 At the end of each period, subjects receive an
overview of their earnings of this period (and of their partners’reporting and earnings
in T2 to T4). Figure 4.2 summarizes the five stages of the decision process in a single
period of the experiment.
FIGURE 4.2: Procedure of one Period in the Experiment
First dimension: Decision-making. In treatments with individual decision-
making (T1 and T2), subject i’s only task is to make a report Ri of her own income
Yi with Ri ∈ {h, l}. This report automatically determines the declaration Di ∈ {h, l}
of her income as Di = Ri. In treatments with joint decision-making (T3 and T4), the
computer forms a team by randomly matching a subject i with a partner j right after
the income-generating stage. Team members i and j are mutually informed about their
5The unique best choice for subjects with a low income is to be honest about their income. Therefore, most of the
subsequent analysis focuses on subjects with a high income since they face a trade-off of whether to be honest or not.
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incomes Yi and Yj.6 Each team member must then make two reports: one report of her
own income and one report of the income of her partner. Hence, i reports Rii and
Rij, whereas j reports Rjj and Rji. In order to allow for a coordination on the reports
before submitting them, team members enter a coordination stage (stage 3) and have
the opportunity to exchange messages in a chatbox for 120 seconds. Then, both team
members simultaneously make their reports on both incomes. For subject i the two
reports Rii and Rji determine the declaration Di of subject i’s income in the following
way: if Rii = Rji, i.e., if the own income report matches with the partner’s report
on one’s own income, this matched report is registered as declaration Di of subject i:
Di = Rji = Rii. However, if Rii 6= Rji, the true income of subject i is taken as i’s
declaration: Di = l if Yi = Y l and Di = h if Yi = Y h (and is never subject to an
audit if Yi = Y h). Therefore, a dishonest declaration is only feasible if both team part-
ners unanimously agree on being non-compliant.7 The described procedure applies vice
versa to team partner j’s declaration and, thereby, implies the joint decision-making.
Finally, a declaration of a low income Di = l is audited independently of the team
partner’s declaration of a low income Dj = l with probability p = 0.5.
Second dimension: Liability. The second dimension varies to whom the payoff
consequences of a declaration accrue. In treatments with individual liability (T1 and
T3), subject i’s period payoff Pi consists only of the earnings Ei from the declaration
of the own income including the potential deduction and fine. There are two possible
earnings for a subject with a high income: first, in the case of an honest declaration
Di = h earnings are Ei = Y h − ∆; second, in the case of a dishonest declaration




(∆+Θ). Treatment 1 resembles the baseline setting in standard compliance
games. In Treatment 3, individual liability means that if one team member conspires
to underreport the other team member’s income, she herself neither benefits from it
nor would she face any fines should an audit reveal the underreporting.
In treatments with shared liability (T2 and T4), both team members mutually share
their earnings. A subject i’s period payoff is given by Pi = 12(Ei + Ej) with Ei and
6As the main focus of our experiment is to isolate the effect of joint decision-making from the effect of shared liability,
we abstract from team dynamics over time and use a pre-announced absolute stranger matching protocol. In addition,
we ensure that matched team members have the same income in order to rule out status or fairness considerations.
7Two alternative designs for the default mechanism of non-matching reports are conceivable but less suitable than
our approach. In case an audit is automatically triggered, the best response to a team partner’s report would be to state
the same, i.e., comply if she complies and do not comply if she does not comply. In contrast, it is the weakly dominant
strategy to base the report on one’s true preference for our coordionation mechanism. In case non-matching reports lead
to the implementation of only one of the reports with equal probability, incentives to reach an agreement on dishonest
reports would be reduced and joint decision-making would essentially be incomplete.
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Ej denoting i’s and j’s earnings including potential deductions and fines, respectively.
Thus, both team members share the potential monetary benefits but also the monetary
costs of a dishonest declaration in case the random and independent audits target
Di or/and Dj. This procedure keeps the range of potential earnings comparable to
treatments without shared liability and does not change the total stake size of the
individual reporting decision.
Implementation and payoffs. We conducted the experiment in July 2017 at the
econlab Munich with 268 subjects (predominantly local students; average age 22.6;
51 percent female participants). Fourteen sessions with up to 24 subjects took place,
each lasting for up to 100 minutes. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner
2015) and the experiment was programmed and implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). Experimental instructions were given in hard copy and were also read aloud
by the same instructor. After the successful completion of some trial questions on
the experimental setup, the main experiment with 10 periods started. At the end,
one period was randomly chosen for the payoff. Following the final period, subjects
took part in several incentivized post-experimental tests (Holt and Laury’s (2002) risk
elicitation task, the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) and a variant of Murphy
et al.’s (2011) test for social value orientation). Each session concluded with a socio-
economic questionnaire. Subjects earned an average of EUR 22 (min. EUR 9, max.
EUR 31) including a show-up fee of EUR 6 and earnings from the post-experimental
tests up to EUR 3.90.
4.3.2 Conceptual Framework
In our framework the compliance decision rests on two factors. First, we include the
utility from the monetary payoff of non-compliance. Non-compliance has the same
expected payoff along all dimensions, but shared liability leads to a more condensed
distribution. Second, subjects may incur psychological costs from an untruthful report
which may very well depend on the specific experimental treatment.8 Along the first
dimension, LIDi and L
JD
i denote subject i’s lying costs for individual and joint decision-
making, respectively. Lying costs can also occur along the second dimension and depend
8Given the constant size of a lie, we confine our framework to fixed lying costs. Without loss of generality, the lying
costs are denoted separately according to the two dimensions of the experiment. This approach provides a clearer picture
of the different costs at work. For a detailed investigation on the structure of lying costs, see for example Gneezy et al.
(2018) and Abeler et al. (2019).
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on whether subject i is individually liable (LILi ) or shares the economic consequences
with the team partner (LSLi ).
We focus on identical compliance behavior by both team partners and define Ỹ :=
Y h − 1
2
(∆ + Θ). We assume u(·) to be strictly concave and increasing in the earnings
Pi. The treatment specific spread of expected payoffs (in utility terms) of subject i for
non-compliance minus compliance read:
For a risk-neutral subject without any moral concerns (i.e. lying costs of zero), the
spreads as given by (1) to (4) are strictly positive and all equal, suggesting that the
subject would underreport in all treatments. Aspects of risk aversion due to the mone-
tary punishment in case of a detected misconduct on the one hand and strictly positive
lying costs on the other hand may lead to negative signs of some or even all spreads.
In such a case subject i would comply. The subsequent behavioral predictions about
the effect of our two dimensions on compliance behavior are based on a comparison of
the spreads across treatments.
Following the rich experimental evidence for an erosion of social norms in groups
(Kocher et al. 2018, among others) and the possibility to defer the blame for anti-
social behavior onto others (Dana et al. 2007, among others), we suppose LIDi > L
JD
i .
Comparing the spreads of T3 and T1, Hypothesis 4.1 then follows directly from the
positive sign of (3)−(1):
Hypothesis 4.1 Joint rather than individual decision-making leads to more non-
compliance.
Further behavioral considerations can point in the same direction as Hypothesis 4.1.
Teams are strategically more sophisticated (Kocher and Sutter 2005 or Sutter et al.
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2013) and act with more self-interest (Kugler et al. 2007, among others). It is also
for these reasons that teams might be more prone toward the economically rational
decision to non-comply.
Evidence for Hypothesis 4.1 would cast a severe shadow on the concept of team work
and joint decision-making in general and would provide a potential explanation for the
recent corporate scandals of non-compliance. An impending implication for the design
of governance rules would be to strengthen the role of individual decision-making and,
thereby, possibly bringing back deep hierarchies with lonely leaders.
The derivation of Hypothesis 4.2 rests on two factors: Sharing the potential benefits
of a dishonest report has been shown to increase misreporting (Wiltermuth 2011, Gino
et al. 2013), and it is reasonable to suppose that LILi > L
SL
i . Secondly, the more
condensed distribution of earnings may induce more non-compliance for risk averse
subjects. Comparing the spreads of T2 and T1, Hypothesis 4.2 follows from the positive
sign of the difference (2)−(1):
The first two factors are positive, and the term in square brackets is strictly positive
by Jensen’s inequality for risk averse subjects. Since LILi > L
SL
i , the sign of (2)−(1)
is strictly positive. In an analogous way, the same holds for the sign of (4)−(3) when
comparing T4 to T3.
Hypothesis 4.2 Shared rather than individual liability leads to more non-compliance.
Beyond our framework, other aspects support Hypothesis 4.2. Sharing the potential
fine may increase non-compliance because the per capita size of the loss per declaration
is smaller and, therefore, appears individually less threatening.
Evidence for Hypothesis 4.2 would not question working in teams or flat hierarchies
in general, but allude to a more subtle source of non-compliance. Sharing or even fully
externalizing the costs of one’s misconduct would provide exactly the wrong incentives
since it would lead to more non-compliance.
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4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 The Report of the own Income
We start our analysis with subjects’reports Ri (Treatment 1 and 2) and Rii (Treatment
3 and 4) of their own income Yi. This measure of compliance is directly comparable
across all treatments.9 In the following, we focus on subjects with a high income Y h as
they face a trade-offbetween reporting honestly or evading the deduction and reporting
dishonestly. This leaves us with 2,166 observations from 268 subjects over 10 periods.
Note: Brackets indicate significant treatment differences, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
FIGURE 4.3: Misreporting of own Income by Treatment
Figure 4.3 displays average non-compliance for the report of the own income in
each treatment.10 A comparison of Treatment 1 with individual liability and individual
9As outlined in section 4.3.1, the structure of the declaration Di of income Yi varies along the decision-making
dimension. Our results in section 4.4.1 are robust to using the declaration as a measure of non-compliance instead. For
a detailed analysis, please refer to appendix 4A.2.
10 (Non-)Compliance is computed as follows: we first calculate the non-compliance rate of each subject over the
respective periods. This leaves us with one observation per subject for non-parametric tests (N = 268). Non-compliance
per treatment, as displayed in Figure 4.1, is the average over individual rates. Results of a more conservative approach
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decision-making to Treatment 4 with shared liability and joint decision-making reveals
that the fraction of dishonest reports significantly increases from 62 percent to 85 per-
cent (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01). Exploring the intermediate treatments
refines the picture: joint decision-making has only a small effect and increases non-
compliance by 7 percentage points on average. These differences are not statistically
significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.29 and p = 0.41). In contrast, effects
for the liability dimension are clear-cut. Moving from individual to shared costs and
benefits raises the fraction of dishonest reports significantly by 16 percentage points
on average (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.02 and p < 0.01, respectively). Im-
portantly, this increase in non-compliance is nearly identical along the decision-making
dimension.11
Table 4.1 confirms the findings in a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable
is the misreporting of the own income (coded as a dummy variable). We show effects
for a random effects probit regression that takes account of the panel data structure
and clustering at the session level. Column (1) is a baseline specification and includes
dimension dummies and a set of socio-economic control variables.12 Joint decision-
making has no significant effect on non-compliance, and we cannot confirm Hypothesis
4.1. In line with Hypothesis 4.2, shared liability significantly increases the probability
of giving a dishonest report. Column (2) indicates the results of a specification that
includes an interaction term between both treatment dimensions. Results from column
(1) are validated, but we find no evidence of an interaction effect. The coeffi cient
on the interaction term is small and not significant. The average marginal effect of
shared liability in both specifications amounts to 12 percentage points and highlights
the economic relevance of this dimension, while the non-significant average marginal
effects of joint decision-making and the interaction term are smaller (4—5 percentage
points and 1 percentage point, respectively). Hence, the two baseline regressions only
point toward a negative effect of shared liability on compliance.
The alternative specifications in Table 4.1 (columns 3 to 6) include post-experimental
tests and further robustness checks. Importantly, the main results from the baseline
with averaging at the session level (N = 14) are broadly in line with tests on the individual level. While we find
no significant effect along the decision-making dimension, joint liability leads to significantly more non-compliance
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.20 and p = 0.03, respectively).
11The observed effects emerge as a stable outcome after a few initial periods of learning. See appendix A.1 for detailed
information about compliance behavior over time.
12Control variables include gender, age, number of siblings, and a dummy for students of economics and business
administration. In line with earlier literature, we find that women are less likely to misreport. Moreover, age is positively
correlated with compliance.
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Joint Decision 0.233 0.219 0.215 0.203 0.237 0.233 0.236
(0.168) (0.244) (0.225) (0.271) (0.235) (0.260) (0.254)
Shared Liability 0.594*** 0.575*** 0.554*** 0.533*** 0.612*** 0.614*** 0.600***
(0.187) (0.167) (0.172) (0.206) (0.143) (0.172) (0.187)
Joint Dec. x Shared Liab. 0.0306 0.016 0.035 -0.010 0.045 -0.024
(0.348) (0.343) (0.392) (0.346) (0.378) (0.406)
Risk Attitude 0.122** 0.136***
(0.048) (0.048)
Cog. Refl. Test 0.243*** 0.214**
(0.079) (0.084)
Soc. Val. Ori. -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Lagged Audit 0.310*** 0.314***
(0.090) (0.090)
Socio-Eco. Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 2.524*** 2.532*** 2.066*** 2.010*** 2.604*** 2.590*** 1.647**
(0.581) (0.599) (0.575) (0.535) (0.645) (0.637) (0.652)
Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 1,958 1,958
Number of Subjects 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
Notes: The table presents results of a random effects panel probit specification with dishonest reporting (binary variable) as the
dependent variable. "Joint Decision" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with joint decision-making, "Shared Liability" is
a dummy variable that indicates treatments with shared payoffs, and "Joint Dec. x Shared Liab." is the interaction between both
dummies. The reference group is Treatment 1 with individual payoffs and individual decision-making. "Risk Attitude" refers to the
number of risky decisions (0 to 10) in Holt and Laury (2002). "Cog. Refl. Test" is the number of correct answers (0 to 3) in the
Cognitve Reflection Test (Frederick 2005). "Soc. Val. Ori." indicates Murphy´s et al. (2011) measure of distributional preferences
(-16.26 to 63.39) and "Lagged Audit" is a dummy for being audited in the previous period. "Socio-Eco. Controls" include a dummy
for female subjects, the age of the subject, a dummy for Economics and Business students and the number of siblings. Standard
errors in parentheses account for clustering at the session level, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
(7)VARIABLES (4) (5) (6)(1) (2) (3)
TABLE 4.1: Multivariate Analysis of Dishonest Reports of the own Income
specifications (1) and (2) are robust. Since the audit introduces a risk dimension in the
compliance decision, we control for subjects’risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002)
in column (3). In line with the previous literature, we find that being less risk-averse
is positively correlated to higher non-compliance. Cognitive ability, as measured by
Frederick (2005), might influence the compliance decision as more impulsive subjects
may over- or underestimate potential costs. We find that reflective thinking is pos-
itively correlated to a higher probability of giving a dishonest report (column (4)).
Due to the monetary consequences for the team partner, social preferences might also
alter the compliance decision. In column (5), social preferences as measured by the
Social Value Orientation (Murphy et al. 2011) are not significantly related to the com-
pliance decision. As an additional robustness check, we include lagged audits in our
regression analysis (column 6). In line with earlier literature on the bomb crater effect
113
Chapter 4 —Compliance in Teams
(Mittone 2006), we find that lagged audits on the report of the own income increase
non-compliance. We complete our analysis with the full model including all indepen-
dent variables and show that results are robust (column 7). We summarize the findings
above in our main result providing support for Hypothesis 4.2 but very limited evidence
for Hypothesis 4.1:
Result 4.1 For the report of the own income
(i) joint decision-making has only little effect on the compliance rate;
(ii) shared liability significantly increases non-compliance.
4.4.2 The Report of the Partner’s Income
Besides the report for their own income Rii, subjects are required to make a report
Rij for their partner’s income Yj in treatments with joint decision-making (Treatment
3 and 4). The procedure leaves us with two reports per subject in these treatments: a
report for the own income and a report for the income of their partner.
Note: Bracket indicates significant treatment difference, *** p<0.01.
FIGURE 4.4: Misreporting of Partner’s Income
Figure 4.4 displays the non-compliance rate for the reports on the partner’s income.
Aggregate non-compliance is comparable to the report of the own income. In Treat-
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ment 3 with joint decision-making and individual liability, 70 percent of reports for
the partner’s income are dishonest. This fraction increases to 84 percent in Treat-
ment 4 with joint decision-making and shared liability (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test:
p < 0.01). The (nearly) perfect similarity of the aggregate compliance rates for the
report of the partner’s income (Figure 4.4) with compliance for the report of the own
income (Figure 4.3) disguises the fact that not all subjects who make honest reports
for their own income Rii do so for their partner, Rij (and vice versa). While 91 percent
do so in Treatment 4, 28 percent choose deviating reports in Treatment 3. Moreover,
the vast majority of teams successfully coordinate on the reports. Reports match with
95 percent probability in Treatment 3 and with 92 percent probability in Treatment 4.13
Result 4.2 Subjects are willing to make a dishonest report on behalf of their part-
ner, especially when they may benefit from joint non-compliance under shared liability.
4.4.3 The Declaration Behavior within Teams
Although joint decision-making has no effect on the aggregate compliance rate, it does
influence the composition of declarations within teams. Figure 4.5 summarizes the two
declarations of a team in Treatment 2 to 4.14 For each treatment, the upper bar (’Ob-
served’) displays the actual composition of declarations as observed in our data. On
the lower bar (’Predicted’), we display a pseudo-prediction on the composition of dec-
larations. This prediction assumes that coordination is not possible, and consequently,
there are no behavioral spillovers between the team members. The composition of dec-
larations follows a simple calculation based on the observed aggregate compliance rate
in the respective treatment.15 The slightly gray shaded area on the very left (’honest
teams’) refers to the fraction of teams with two honest declarations, the one in the
middle (’mixed teams’) refers to the fraction of teams with one honest and one dishon-
13 In the few cases of non-matching reports, a subject’s partner does not systematically deviate in one direction. The
probability of a subject making a dishonest report and her partner making an honest report on the subject’s income
is roughly comparable to the opposite case of a subject making an honest report and her partner making a dishonest
report on the respective income.
14Since Treatment 1 (individual decision and liability) has no team characteristics, we do not include this treatment
here. If the same matching protocol as for the other treatments is applied, the results for artificial teams read as follows:
14.0 percent of teams are classified as honest, 46.3 percent of teams are classified as mixed, and 39.7 percent of teams
are classified as dishonest.
15 In absence of coordination, the predicted fraction of honest teams is the square of the compliance rate (1 subtracted
by the non-compliance rate), the predicted fraction of mixed teams is two times the compliance rate multiplied by
the non-compliance rate, and the predicted fraction of dishonest teams is the square of the non-compliance rate. By
illustration, the calculation for Treatment 2 is the following: fraction of honest teams is (1 − 0.78)2 = 0.05; fraction of
mixed teams is 2 · (1− 0.78) · 0.78 = 0.34; fraction of dishonest teams is 0.782 = 0.61.
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FIGURE 4.5: Composition of Declarations within Teams
est declaration, and the dark gray area on the far right (’dishonest teams’) refers to
the fraction of teams with two dishonest declarations.
A comparison of the observed and the predicted composition of declarations allows
for detailed insights on the impact of joint decision-making. In Treatment 2, decision-
making occurs individually and coordination among team members is not possible.
The distribution of honest, mixed and dishonest teams closely follows the theoretically
expected distribution based on the actual compliance rate. Consequently, individual
declarations of team members are not correlated.16 In contrast, both treatments with
joint decision-making are characterized by a medium to high correlation of declarations
within teams. The positive correlations suggest that joint decision-making is marked
by spillovers between team members which results in more consequential declaration
behavior. In comparison to the predicted composition in absence of coordination, teams
16We measure the correlation of declarations by the phi coeffi cient, which has a similar interpretation to the Person
correlation coeffi cient but is suited for binary variables. Calculation is based on a 2x2 contingency table of pairs of
declarations in teams. Rows reflect the declaration of the own income and columns the declaration of the partner’s
income. A correlation of zero results when the probability in each of the four cells (honest, mixed and dishonest teams)
equals to the product of marginal probabilities (the aggregate (non-)compliance rate). While the phi coeffi cient is not
different from zero in Treatment 2 (corr=0.04, χ2-statistic: p = 0.60), the phi coeffi cient is positive in Treatment 3 and
4 (corr = 0.32 and corr = 0.70, χ2-statistic: p < 0.01, respectively).
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choose more often to be honest or to be dishonest for both declarations, but less often
the intermediate case of mixed declarations. For Treatment 3 with joint decision-making
and individual liability, the observed fraction of mixed declarations is 14 percentage
points lower than predicted (29.7 percent vs. 43.9 percent), while both the fraction
of two honest or two dishonest declarations is higher than predicted. For Treatment 4
with joint decision-making and shared liability, this effect is even more pronounced and
the case of mixed declarations is almost crowded-out completely (9.1 percent vs. 30.7
percent). This pattern is also evident from a direct comparison of the observed compo-
sition of declarations between Treatment 2 and Treatment 4: moving from individual to
joint decision-making leads to a reduction of mixed declarations, and a corresponding
increase in mainly dishonest but also some honest declarations.
In summary, the compliance behavior under joint decision-making is potentially two-
directional: some teams may be less compliant, and some teams may be more compli-
ant. As the magnitude of both directions is roughly comparable and cancels out, this
might explain why joint decision-making has no effect on the aggregate compliance rate.
Result 4.3 Joint decision-making is characterized by behavioral spillovers between
team members. As a consequence, teams are prone to be either honest or dishonest.
4.4.4 Evaluation of the Team Chats
The analysis of chat protocols allows for further insights into team decision-making
in Treatment 3 and 4.17 Less than 2 percent of teams abstain from using the chat.
Usage of the chat leads to a successful coordination on the mutual income reports (99
percent in Treatment 3 and 96 percent in Treatment 4). The finding is in line with the
low rate of non-matching reports (compare to section 4.4.2). In half of all chats, the
chat is not only a mere instrument for coordination (e.g., typing in a single number
as a proposed report), but it is also used for the exchange of arguments in favor or
against non-compliance. In early periods this exchange of arguments is slightly more
pronounced (57 percent) as compared to final periods (46 percent).
Conditional on subjects giving an honest or dishonest report, Figure 4.6 provides
an overview of the frequency with which a particular argument is mentioned in the
17The evaluation of chats was carried out independently by five research assistants according to an analysis protocol
(available upon request). For each chat, we take the median evaluation of graders.
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FIGURE 4.6: Frequency of Arguments mentioned in Chat
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chat.18 Inspired by Kocher et al. (2018), we use following categories: “Money”refers to
the frequency with which the monetary consequences of a report are addressed, while
“Honesty”indicates discussions on being truthful. “Rules”refers to the experimental
instructions, in particular that subjects were supposed to report their actual income.
“Other” indicates discussions about the compliance behavior of other subjects, while
“Prev. Audit”captures the experience with audits in previous periods. Finally, “Risk”
refers to the risk dimension of the compliance task.
In quantitative terms, the risk dimension is the most important argument, followed
by the monetary consequences in case of shared liability (Treatment 4) or experience
with previous audits in case of individual liability (Treatment 3). The social norm of
honesty is discussed much less and only ranks third. This observed chat behavior is in
line with Result 4.1. Moral aspects play a minor role as compared to economic aspects,
implying that the tendency to disguise one’s own responsibility for underreporting takes
a back seat. Adherence to rules and the behavior of other subjects are mentioned only
in a few cases (except for honest subjects in Treatment 4). We do not observe strong
treatment differences for dishonest reporting, while there are evident differences for
honest reporting. Both in terms of the frequency and the distribution of arguments,
honest reporting in Treatment 4 is different compared to the other cases and seems to
be the most controversial option.
As we partially focus on categories of arguments comparable to Kocher et al. (2018),
we are able to relate our compliance task to their computerized deception problem.
This gives insights into the similarities and differences of compliance and deception
problems. We find differences mainly in two aspects: first, the frequency of argumenta-
tion is higher for honest reporting (and not for dishonest reporting) in the compliance
task. Second, the most frequent argument for dishonest reporting is the risk dimen-
sion, as compared to the monetary consequences in the deception problem. However,
monetary consequences are also relevant for the compliance problem, though mostly
for honest reporting. Moreover, both the discussion of monetary consequences and of
risk considerations are related to the economic consequences of a report, and therefore
indicate a similarity rather than a difference between both problems. Both settings
share that the concept of being honest is identified for an intermediate number of
18We focus on subjects with a high income that used the chat. For honest reporting, this leaves us with 189 observations
in Treatment 3 and 91 observations in Treatment 4. For dishonest reporting, we have 439 observations in Treatment
3 and 551 observations in Treatment 4. There might be zero, one or multiple arguments per chat (hence, frequencies
do not add up to 1), and some statements may fall into more than one category. This procedure allows for a direct
assessment of the importance of arguments in the respective four cases.
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chats. Adherence to rules and the behavior of others are only of minor importance
for both settings. In summary, the introduction of an audit shifts attention toward
the risk dimension and the audit itself, while other motivations, such as the monetary
consequences or the concept of being honest, remain important for the compliance task.
Result 4.4 The vast majority of subjects use the chat to coordinate on the mutual
reports. Arguments refer primarily to the economic consequences but less to moral con-
cerns.
4.5 Discussion
The small insignificant increase of dishonest reporting along the decision-making di-
mension is good news and bad news at the same time. On the one hand, the deception
literature’s doom assessment of team behavior as rather deceptive does not entirely
carry over to the more complex framework of compliance. A possible explanation is
that if partner j is devoted to honesty while i isn’t, the latter would need to convince
the former of joint non-compliance. As a team partner can always enforce on honest
declaration by making an honest report, only deceiving subjects have an incentive to
persuade their partner of giving a dishonest report, too. This might be quite cumber-
some, morally challenging as a deferral of responsibility for non-compliance is diffi cult,
and, thus, could drive up i’s psychological costs of joint decision-making. Moreover, a
social observer may assign the moral responsibility for a dishonest declaration on the
simple question “Cui bono?”In this case, it would not matter how the compliance de-
cision was made but only who economically benefits. For these reasons, the inequality
of the associated lying costs ( LIDi > L
JD
i ) could become less strict or even reverse,
and Hypothesis 4.1 would not materialize. On the other hand, a negative implication is
that third-party reporting seems to be ineffective in reducing dishonest behavior when
agents have the possibility to coordinate beforehand. Non-compliance in the joint de-
cision treatments requires not only a silent approval or non-objection, but an active
statement by the team member. This condition leads neither to a large fraction of non-
matching reports nor does it prevent successful evasion. Although honest subjects are
not dependent on their partner to achieve a truthful declaration, a substantial fraction
of subjects are willing to actively assist their partner in being non-compliant.
Unlike for joint decision-making, our results on shared liability are clear-cut. Inde-
pendent of the decision-making dimension, sharing the costs and benefits of a dishonest
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report decreases compliance. In quantitative terms, this dimension accounts for over
two thirds of the difference in the compliance rate between Treatment 1 and Treatment
4. An explanation is that the concept of “White Lies”(Erat and Gneezy 2012) transfers
to compliance problems, i.e., subjects are more likely to not comply if it benefits not
only themselves on expectation but also their partners. The magnitude of the effect
would be in line with previous findings from the deception literature.19
Implications arise to the design of the internal structures of companies or organi-
zations. Importantly, team decision-making per se is not the major source of non-
compliance in group settings. Hence, there is no need for firms to forgo the benefits
of team work in order to induce more honest decisions by its employees. Instead, our
results suggest that it is suffi cient to set liability rules right, meaning that each team
member could be fully rather than just partially economically liable. This should de-
ter misconduct ex ante. In the case of the Volkswagen emission scandal, for example,
full individual liability might have prevented engineers and managers from committing
their offenses in the first place. The recommendation of full individual liability does
not only hold for teams, but also for compliance decisions by single employees that
have potentially large external effects on the company: our findings from Treatment 2
show that shared liability substantially increases non-compliance even under individ-
ual decision-making. Famous rogue traders Nick Leeson (Barings Bank) and Jérôme
Kerviel (Société Générale), for example, caused huge losses (and, in Leeson’s case,
the collapse of the bank) in an attempt to increase company profits through trading
activities which violated internal regulations. Importantly, while acting on their own,
successful non-compliance would have been individually advantageous for them as well
as for the entire company. However, these cases also show the limits of individual lia-
bility rules ex post. The losses caused by Leeson or Kerviel outweighed their individual
economic capability by far. Ultimately, such settings call for tight internal monitoring
of employees’activities and external prosecution of misconduct for which the culprit
could even face imprisonment. For other applications, such as joint tax evasion, in-
dividual liability is potentially a feasible policy: fines for unreported employment or
evaded sales taxes might be imposed on either party to the full extent, and thereby
deployed as an effective deterrence mechanism.
19Since the possibility of an audit in our setting is a major difference to the deception problem, a direct comparison
should be interpreted cautiously. Erat and Gneezy (2012) find an increase of cheating of 13 percentage points (treatment
T[10,0] vs. T[10,10]), while Wiltermuth (2011) reports an increase between 10 and 15 percentage points (treatment self-
alone vs. self-and-other, study 2 and 3). Conrads et al. (2013) show that the average reported number in a dice-rolling
experiment is inflated by 17 percent for teams (treatment Individual vs. Team).
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4.6 Conclusion
Team decisions are widespread, and firms heavily rely on team work. However, recent
corporate delinquencies and tax scandals suggest that team decisions may also have
a dark side: teams seem to be more dishonest than individual decision-makers. In
this chapter, we study the (tax) compliance decision of dyads as the smallest form of
teams in a laboratory experiment. We ask whether the compliance behavior of teams
is different from the compliance behavior of individuals and identify the effect of key
differences to individual decisions. The first dimension of our 2-by-2 between-subjects
design varies whether the compliance decision is made individually or in a team. Teams
coordinate via a chat and each member subsequently reports both the own income and
the income of the team member. The second dimension varies whether the monetary
consequences of the (non-)compliance decision, in particular gains from undetected
non-compliance and losses in the case of an audit, accrue only to the respective subject
alone or if they are shared between both team members. This allows us to answer an
even more important question, namely how non-compliance by teams can effectively be
deterred. Specifically, we ask under which conditions an auditing mechanism is suited
to address non-compliance by teams.
We find significantly more dishonesty in dyads as compared to individuals. This
effect can mainly be attributed to the liability dimension: independent of whether
the compliance decision is made on an individual basis or in teams, shared economic
consequences among team members lead to significantly increased non-compliance. In
contrast, the impact of team decision-making is small and we find no significant effect
along this dimension. Further results indicate that decisions in teams are characterized
by a low rate of disagreement in terms of non-matching reports and a medium to high
correlation of reporting behavior. Most important motivations for (non-)compliance
include the risk dimension of the compliance task and the monetary consequences of
a report. Our findings are corroborated by different robustness checks. An implication
of these insights for firms or organizations in general, is that team structures do not
necessarily lead to more non-compliance. In order to restore compliance within teams,
it is advisable to prohibit sharing of consequences but to place an emphasis on the full
liability of each individual team member.
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4.A Appendix —Evolution of Compliance Behavior over Time
FIGURE 4.A1: Compliance over Time conditional on Individual (left side) and Joint
Decision-Making (right side).
Figure 4.A1 compares compliance behavior over periods. The left side displays the
evolution of non-compliance for individual and shared liability conditional on individual
decision-making (Treatment 1 and 2). The right side displays this evolution conditional
on joint decision-making (Treatment 3 and 4). The insights from aggregate misreporting
are in line with these observations over time: a ’compliance gap’of 10 to 20 percentage
points along the liability dimension emerges from period three onwards.
FIGURE 4.A2: Compliance over Time conditional on Individual (left side) and
Shared Liability (right side).
Comparing the evolution in Treatment 1 to Treatment 3 and Treatment 2 to Treat-
ment 4 reveals that the effects for decision-making are weaker. There seems to be no
stable ’compliance gap’along this dimension (Figure 4.A2). The graphs also reveal no
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evidence of an interaction of the liability and the decision-making dimension, since the
effect of shared liability for both individual and team decision-making are fairly similar.
Both graphs exhibit the same pattern over periods. Compliance behavior still fluctu-
ates in the first three periods while the rate of dishonest reports increases in three out
of four treatments. Subsequently, the compliance rate converges to a treatment-specific
level.20 We cannot observe strong reversals in the compliance behavior or end-round ef-
fects. Therefore, compliance behavior is not the outcome of some specific outlier periods
but it is a stable pattern.
20Although we ran pre-experimental practice questions, the most probable explanation is the learning of subjects.
Since the shared liability treatments are slightly more complicated than individual liability treatments, convergence
takes one to two periods longer. Nevertheless, the between-treatment differences in compliance behavior in period 1 are
already broadly in line with following periods.
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4.B Appendix —The Declaration of Incomes
Joint Decision 0.024 0.074 0.070 0.057 0.088 0.076 0.069
(0.162) (0.235) (0.221) (0.263) (0.227) (0.252) (0.258)
Shared Liability 0.497*** 0.560*** 0.541*** 0.526*** 0.589*** 0.594*** 0.578***
(0.182) (0.160) (0.164) (0.191) (0.140) (0.168) (0.179)
Joint Dec. x Shared Liab. -0.104 -0.111 -0.095 -0.135 -0.083 -0.122
(0.332) (0.327) (0.370) (0.330) (0.348) (0.378)
Risk Attitude 0.104** 0.104**
(0.043) (0.045)
Cog. Refl. Test 0.198** 0.177**
(0.078) (0.080)
Soc. Val. Ori. -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Audit 0.241*** 0.243***
(0.089) (0.088)
Socio-Eco. Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 2.207*** 2.179*** 1.794*** 1.734*** 2.235*** 2.245*** 1.489***
(0.551) (0.573) (0.535) (0.510) (0.613) (0.599) (0.574)
Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 1,958 1,958
Number of Subjects 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
Notes: The table presents results of a random effects panel probit specification with dishonest declarations (binary variable) as
the dependent variable. "Joint Decision" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with joint decision-making, "Shared
Liability" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with shared payoffs, and "Joint Dec. x Shared Liab." is the interaction
between both dummies. The reference group is Treatment 1 with individual payoffs and individual decision-making. "Risk
Attitude" refers to the number of risky decisions (0 to 10) in Holt and Laury (2002). "Cog. Refl. Test" is the number of correct
answers (0 to 3) in the Cognitve Reflection Test (Frederick 2005). "Soc. Val. Ori." indicates Murphy's et al. (2011) measure of
distributional preferences (-16.26 to 63.39) and "Lagged Audit" is a dummy for being audited in the previous period. "Socio-Eco.
Controls" include a dummy for female subjects, the age of the subject, a dummy for Economics and Business students and the
number of siblings. Standard errors account for clustering at the session level and are given in parentheses, XXXXXXXXXXXX
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
(6) (7)VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TABLE 4.B: Multivariate Analysis of Dishonest Declarations of the own Income
An analysis of the final declaration of incomes reveals that the fraction of dishonest
declarations is almost identical to the fraction of dishonest reports. For treatments
with individual decision-making, the fraction of dishonest reports equals the fraction
of dishonest declarations by design. For treatments with joint decision-making, the
declaration mechanism itself may increase compliance: if subjects disagree and state
different reports for an income, the mechanism automatically leads to a truthful dec-
laration. Due to high coordination within teams, the tendency toward compliance is
very moderate in size but decreases the effect of joint decision-making even further.
Non-compliance for declarations amounts to 67 percent in Treatment 3 and 81 per-
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cent in Treatment 4 (as compared to 70 percent and 85 percent dishonest reports,
respectively).21
In Table 4.B, we show the results of a panel probit regression with dishonest decla-
rations as the dependent variable (coded as a dummy variable, standard errors account
for clustering on the session level). The results are broadly in line with our previ-
ous analysis of dishonest reports (Table 4.1). The two baseline specifications include
dimension dummies (column 1) and an interaction term (column 2). Shared liability
significantly increases the probability of a dishonest declaration. In contrast, we find
no evidence of an effect of joint decision-making or an interaction between both dimen-
sions. For declaration behavior, the coeffi cient for joint decision-making is even smaller
than for reporting behavior. This is also reflected by the average marginal effects: the
effect of shared liability is stable and between 11 to 13 percentage points, while the
(non-significant) effect of joint decision-making is only 1—2 percentage points. The al-
ternative specifications confirm the robustness of our findings: specifications in column
(3) to column (5) include the post-experimental tests while specification (6) controls
for audits in the previous period. Results of a full model with all independent variables
is displayed in column (7). As for reporting behavior, more risk-taking and better per-
formance in the Cognitive Reflection Test is correlated to a higher non-compliance for
declarations. In contrast, we do not find an effect for social preferences. Finally, being
audited in the previous period significantly increases non-compliance. As for the report
of the own income, we find no evidence for Hypothesis 4.1, but we confirm Hypothesis
4.2.
21A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test confirms the earlier findings for the report of the own income: the differences along
the decision-making dimension are not significant (T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4, p = 0.63 and p = 0.54), while joint liability
significantly increases non-compliance (T1 vs. T2 and T3 vs. T4, p = 0.02 and p < 0.01).
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4.C Appendix —Robustness Results for Section 4.4.1
Joint Decision 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.054
(0.043) (0.061) (0.060) (0.066) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063)
Shared Liability 0.142*** 0.145** 0.135** 0.140* 0.149** 0.147** 0.137**
(0.042) (0.066) (0.065) (0.072) (0.066) (0.065) (0.069)
Joint Dec. x Shared Liab. -0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008
(0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.085) (0.084) (0.089)
Risk Attitude 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.009) (0.008)
Cog. Refl. Test 0.053*** 0.044***
(0.015) (0.015)
Soc. Val. Ori. -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Audit 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.016) (0.016)
Socio-Eco. Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 1.129*** 1.127*** 1.013*** 1.019*** 1.137*** 1.107*** 0.902***
(0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.158) (0.156) (0.157)
Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 1,958 1,958
Notes: The table presents results of a multi level mixed effects regression with clustering at the session and at the individual level.
The dependent variable is dishonest reporting (binary variable). "Joint Decision" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments
with joint decision-making, "Shared Liability" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with shared payoffs, and "Joint Dec.
x Shared Liab." is the interaction between both dummies. The reference group is Treatment 1 with individual payoffs and
individual decision-making. "Risk Attitude" refers to the number of risky decisions (0 to 10) in Holt and Laury (2002). "Cog. Refl.
Test" is the number of correct answers (0 to 3) in the Cognitve Reflection Test (Frederick 2005). "Soc. Val. Ori." indicates
Murphy's et al. (2011) measure of distributional preferences (-16.26 to 63.39) and "Lagged Audit" is a dummy for being audited
in the previous period. "Socio-Eco. Controls" include a dummy for female subjects, the age of the subject, a dummy for
Economics and Business students and the number of siblings. Standard errors are given in parentheses,
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(6) (7)VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TABLE 4.C: Robustness Analysis of Dishonest Reports of the own Income
In our main analysis (Table 4.1 in section 4.4.1), we use a panel probit regression
to account for the binary structure of the reports. To show that the estimation of
interaction terms is not biased, Table 4.C reports the results of a multi-level mixed
effects regression with clustering on both the session and the individual level. We do
not find any major differences to the probit estimation in section 4.4.1. In particular,
the coeffi cient on the interaction term between the decision-making dimension and the
liability dimension stays very small and is not significant.
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4.D Appendix —Experimental Instructions
This appendix provides an English translation of the instructions for treatment 4 (joint
decision-making and shared liability). The experiment was originally conducted in Ger-




Please read the instructions completely and carefully. A precise understanding of the
instructions may allow you to earn more money.
Your anonymity is preserved during the whole experiment. Please note that you
are not allowed to communicate with other participants except for usage of the chat
window.
During the experiment, it may happen that you have to wait for the experiment
to continue. However, we ask you not to use your smartphone during the entire ex-
periment. Anything that distracts your and the other participants’attention from the
experiment is prohibited. In case you break these rules, you are excluded from the
experiment and you do not receive any payout.
All participants of the experiment received the same instructions.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We are going to help you.
2. Introduction
You will repeatedly make decisions in this experiment. Your earnings in this experi-
ment depend on your decisions.
Your earnings in this experiment are denoted in Taler. At the end of the experiment
your Talers are converted into Euros and you are paid out by the laboratory. The
following exchange rate applies: 50 Talers = 1 Euro. In addition every participant
receives a show-up fee of 6 Euro.
Before the experiment starts, you are asked to answer a few questions. They exem-
plify situations that could arise in the experiment.
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The actual experiment consists of 10 rounds. Each round is independent of previous
and subsequent rounds. The figure below (Subsection 3.2) illustrates the different steps
of each round.
In the aftermath of the experiment, you are asked to answer additional questions
and to make additional decisions. The respective instructions will then be displayed.
3. Description of the Experiment
3.1 General Procedure
In this experiment, you and your partner repeatedly take the role of a taxpayer who
decides whether to report his actual income or not.
Your income:
- At the beginning of each round, you are asked to count digits on the screen
and thereby earn your income.
- Randomly you are either asked to count many digits, and as a consequence
you will earn a high income (1000 Talers), or you are asked to count few digits, and
therefore you will earn a low income (400 Talers).
- You can either earn a high income with 80% probability or a low income with
20% probability.
After you have earned your income, you and your partner have to report your income
at the computer to the tax authority. The tax authority does not know whether you
earned a high or a low income.
For a high income a deduction of 400 Talers is due, which is returned to the lab-
oratory. Whenever a high income is not correctly declared and this is revealed by a
subsequent audit, you have to pay a fine of 200 Talers on top of the deduction.
In contrast, a low income is exempt from deduction. Whenever you earned a low
income, but instead declare a high income, you have to pay the deduction of 400
Talers. Since declarations of high incomes are not audited, there is no fine in this case.
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3.2. Graphical Overview of the Experiment
3.3 Procedure of Income Reporting
At the beginning of each round, another participant who has never been your partner
before is randomly matched with you as your team partner. You will make the report of
your income jointly with him. Conversely, your partner makes the report of his income
jointly with you.
First, you will be informed about the income that you have earned and the income
that your partner has earned (Step 1). Subsequently, a chat window will open on screen
and you will get the opportunity to chat with your partner for two minutes (Step 2).
After the chat you will submit two reports. For each report, you may either state a
high or a low income (Step 3):
a report which income you would like to state for yourself.
- a report which income you would like to state for your partner.
- Conversely, your partner will also make a report of his income and a report
of your income.
You and your partner will share the financial consequences of your reports. This
means that both of you will receive half of your own and half of your partner’s earnings.
Consequentially, both partners share deductions and potential fines equally.
The declaration of your income to the tax authority:
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- If your report and your partner’s report of your income match, this confirmed
report is transmitted as the declaration of your income.
- If your report and your partner’s report of your income do not match, there
is no confirmation. In this case, your actual income is transmitted as the declaration
of your income.
- Conversely, the same procedure applies for the declaration of your partner’s
income.
3.4. Individual Audits and Round’s Earnings
After the declaration of incomes, a partial audit is conducted:
- Declarations of a low income are randomly audited with a 50% probability.
- Declarations of a high income are not audited.
Your earnings and your partner’s earnings depend on the declarations and the po-
tential audits (Step 4):
- Whenever a declaration is audited and the declaration of a low income is true,
neither the deduction nor the fine are due.
- Whenever a declaration is audited and the declaration of a low income is
untrue, the deduction of 400 Talers and the fine of 200 Talers are due.
- Whenever a declaration is not audited and the declaration is a low income,
neither the deduction nor the fine are due, irrespective of the actual income.
- Whenever the declaration is a high income, the deduction of 400 Talers is due.
- The financial consequences of the respective declaration are equally shared
between you and your partner.
At the end of the round, the earnings from the declaration of your income and the
earnings from the declaration of your partner’s income are shared equally between you
and your partner. This determines your individual earnings of the respective round.
Afterwards, the next round starts (Step 1).
4. Concluding remarks
One of the ten rounds is randomly selected by the computer. Your earnings from
this selected round determine your earnings (in Talers) of the experiment.
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The payout is carried out at the end of the experiment. You will be called up by
your seat number by the laboratory staff.
In case a medical or technical emergency occurs during the experiment, please press
the F1 button.
Any more questions?
If not, . . .
. . . thank you for your participation in this experiment and good luck!
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